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ABSTRACT.
This part summarises the thesis in order to make the job of the
readers easier. This is essentially the thesis at a glance. There
is a clear statement of the problem under exploration. Once they
know what to expect, readers have a frame of reference for reading
the thesis.
Although most developing countries are agrarian in nature and
despite the dominant position occupied by the agriculture sector in
their traditional economies, many have consistently failed to pay
adequate attention to agriculture and rural development. It is
widely believed that the governments in these countries intervene
in the agriculture sector in many ways, to serve political
interests and other non-publicly beneficial ends. This can take the
form of: buying crops from farmers at less than the world prices
and then selling it to relatively better-off urban dwellers. In
this way, resources are transferred out of agriculture which is the
main source of livelihood for vast rural and urban populations. To
compensate farmers, some governments provide subsidies — such as
credit, fertilisers, seeds, etc — which are mostly misused and
misdirected and benefit mostly landlords. These government
intervention policies result in a large waste of resources. This
has often led to a stagnant agriculture sector; that, in turn, has
resulted in a large shortfall of domestic food production, balance
of payment crises and political instability. Pressured by both the
World Bank and IMF, there are moves towards liberalisation of
agricultural markets in order to gain maximum efficiency.
This thesis examines Paddy and Rice Marketing in Pakistan as an
example of agricultural marketing with specific emphasis on whether
or not it should be liberalised.
Going beyond but including the limited published evidence on the
subject, empirical data were collected in Pakistan to address the
issue. Four and half months of field work in Pakistan was carried
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out on various organisations involved in rice marketing, using
semi-structured interviews.
It was found that in Pakistan, the government uses a mixture of
subsidies and taxes in the agriculture sector.
These subsidies are misused and misdirected and overall the
agriculture sector is taxed to serve urban interests.
Rice production in Pakistan consists of two main varieties --
Basmati and Irri rice. Producers of both varieties are officially
paid on the basis of the cost of production. However this results
in Basmati producers being paid very low prices compared to the
export price, whereas Irri producers are paid close to the export
price. The Rice Export Corporation of Pakistan — the state owned
enterprise which handles rice — was found to be inefficient,
corrupt, and a politically influenced organisation, characteristics
common in state-owned agricultural marketing organisations
throughout the developing world.
It was found that the Pakistan Government's intervention in
paddy/rice marketing has been a hindrance to the efficient
operation of the sector.
The author concludes that with regard to the rice marketing
problems of Pakistan, only partial support can be given to the need
for liberalisation. Because of the vital role of Irri rice as a
staple food for the poor, production requires some government
intervention. By contrast, Basmati rice is a valuable export crop
whose full potential is not being exploited efficiently. Indeed it
is facing increased competition from better organised Indian and
other exporters. Full liberalisation appears to offer the best
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1.1 Introduction to Pakistan's Rice Marketing.
The Pakistan economy like many other developing countries is
agrarian in nature and agriculture is very important for the
country's economy in general. It provides the means of livelihood
for about 80% of the population. It is the way of life of the rural
people who make up more than 70% of the total population. It also
provides the basis for the country's industrial output. It is the
main source of the national income and foreign exchange earnings.
Being a major component of the country's economy, the agricultural
sector is in a position to affect the country's economy and
economic development.
Agriculture is a major contributor to the national income of
Pakistan. It is the second biggest contributor, after the services
sector. Agriculture in Pakistan at the time of independence
accounted for 53% of the GNP, since then its share has declined
steadily because of the increase in other sectors, and in recent
years it has contributed about 25% to the GNP. The contribution of
agriculture to other spheres of Pakistan's economy is even greater
than its share of the GNP. For example, it provides employment to
more than 50% of the labour force, and directly accounts for about
30% of total exports. If one takes into account the raw material
content of cotton textiles and other agro-based manufactured
1
exports, its share would be over 60% of total exports, [Hanid, et,
al., (1990); Viqar Ahmed and Rashid Ahmed, (1984)]. Even though the
contribution of agriculture has been recognised, it has never been
given its due attention. Policies related to agriculture in general
have reflected this fact [Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Food
and Agriculture, 'Commission Report', 1988].
Before 1972, when Bangladesh was a part of Pakistan, jute and
cotton were major export crops. A large quantity of rice was
produced but not exported on large scale because of the need to
feed the 120 million population of both East Pakistan (Bangladesh)
and West Pakistan. In 1972, when East Pakistan became independent,
rice became the major export crop of Pakistan, as supplies
previously marketed to East Pakistan became surplus, and also
following the introduction of high yielding varieties like IRRI.
Since then Pakistan has been among the five major rice exporting
countries in the world.
Rice is the staple food crop in Pakistan next to wheat, especially
in the areas where it is grown. On the whole it accounts for about
40% of the Pakistani population's consumption. It is the most
important cash crop next to cotton. It not only feeds the fast
growing population of Pakistan, but has also contributed about 15%
of total export earnings on average between 1977 to 1987
[Government of Pakistan, 'Economic Survey of Pakistan', 1989-90].
The varieties of rice produced in Pakistan are - Basmati, Irri and
other traditional varieties^. Basmati is a high quality rice
2
o
because of its cooking characteristics . There is a great demand
for it and it is offered at premium prices. It is consumed by rich
people domestically and the surplus is exported mainly to the
Middle-East and industrial countries.
Irri rice is a low quality rice in tens of its cooking
O
characteristics . It is a basic staple food for the urban and rural
■asses. It is consumed by the low income group domestically and the
surplus is exported mainly to Asian and African countries. One
study [UCG, 1989, P.78], found that African countries accounted for
52X of the exports and the Asian countries have been absorbing
about one-quarter on average between 1975-76 to 1987-88.
Total rice production in Pakistan was 3,278,000 tonnes a year on
average from 1980-81 to 1988-89, out of which 61.16X (2,005,000
tonnes) was Irri Rice, 29.77X (976,000 tonnes) Basmati Rice and the
remainder (8.6X (282,000 tonnes) other traditional varieties
[Agriculture Statistics of Pakistan, 1988-89].
Because of the suitability of the soil and climate, Basmati Rice is
produced in parts of Punjab province and Irri Rice is produced
mainly in Sindh. Out of the total Irri rice production of 2,005,000
tonnes, 65X was produced in Sindh, 22X in Punjab, 11X in
Baluchistan and only 2X in NWFP province of Pakistan on average
between 1980-81 to 1988-89 [Ibid], [see table 1.1],
The Rice Export Corporation of Pakistan (RECP), a public sector
organisation, retains the monopoly on the export of rice but
3
TABLE - 1.1.
run cur or iick po»; nocwmrr m cobuptioi a mi 01 atuacs (un-ii u isms) n paiistai.
(Bice Quititj ii IN tone*)
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Sources: Agriculture Statistics of Pakistan, 1988-89; (ICG, 1989 'Kice Export
Operations Study*, Lahore, Pakistan.
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declares a loss annually on Irri rice export. It procures rice from
millers for export on a voluntary basis. Internal distribution of
rice — which in the past had restricted — is now free of
government intervention. Domestic prices, however, are influenced
by government floor prices, which we will discuss later in chapters
vii and viii.
RECP procured 27.6% (269,376 tonnes) of Basmati Rice, out of the
total Basmati Rice production of 976,000 tonnes in Pakistan, on
average between 1980-81 to 1988-89. It procured 40.89% (820,000
tonnes) of Irri Rice, out of a total Irri rice production of
2,005,000 tonnes. Out of RECP's total Irri Rice procurement
(820,000 tonnes), 91.98% (754,236 tonnes) was procured from Sindh
province and only 8.1% (66,450 tonnes) from Punjab, [Rice Export
Corporation of Pakistan, 1990]^.
Domestic consumption of rice in Pakistan was as follows: 59%
(1,184,314 tonnes) of the total Irri Rice production and 72.5%
(707,600 tonnes) out of total Basmati Rice production were consumed
a year on average from 1980-81 to 1988-89.
Pakistan produces about one percent of total world rice production
and exports about 10% of world rice export by volume, [UCG, volume-
1, 1989]. But because of three main factors: world competition
mainly from India, Thailand, China, and U.S.A; the farm and export
subsidies of the developed countries; and the neglect of
agriculture in Pakistan [Commission Report, 1988], the country has
not yet succeeded in finding a stable and sound world market share.
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The export price for Irri rice is nuch lower in comparison to
Basmati rice. As shown in table-1.2, the world price for Basnati
rice is about four times higher than Irri. The price paid to the
Basmati producers is less than half the export prices, whereas the
Irri rice producers are paid very close to the export prices which
is near the production cost. Table - 1.2 and 1.3 provide details
of the specifics.
TABLE - 1.2.
SUPPORT AND EXPORT PRICES OF BASMATI AND IRRI RICE IN PAKISTAN.
(Es: 40/kgs)
YEAES. BASMATI EICE. IRRI RICE.
PROCUREMENT EXPORT PRICE* GROSS MARGIN PROCUREMENT EIPORT PRICE* GROSS MARGIN
PRICE. FOR RECP. PRICE. FOR RECP.
1984-85 161 385 225 87 121 34
1985-86 166 445 229 90 103 13
1986-87 204 497 279 90 109 19
Adopted froi: Richard Scheraerhorn [1990] 'Sice Eiport Operation Study*, Islaaabod, Pakistan.
*Yearly average eiport price.
Note: For aore years inforaation, see table 7.6.
TABLE - 1.3.
COST OF PRODUCTION AND SUPPORT PRICE OF PADDY IN PAKISTAN.
(E«: 40/kgs).
YEAES. IASIATI RICE. IEEI RICE.
Sipport Cost of Gross Rargii I of Prod; Sipport Cost of Gross largis I of Prod;
Price. Prodictioi . for Prodicer. cost. Price. Prodictioi . for Prodscer cost.
1987-18 130 109 21.0 19.2 55 53 2.0 3.8
1988-89 135 111 21.0 18.1 60 56 4.0 7.1
Soiree: Richard Sckerierkori, [1990] 'Rice Eiport Marketing Stidy1, Islaaabod, Pakistai.
Yearly aierage cost of prodictioi.
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1.2 Statement of the Problem and Research Objectives.
As elaborated in chapter II, the economies of many developing
countries are dependent on the agricultural sector, but there has
been government intervention in the sector leading quite often to
distorted agricultural prices through state owned agencies.
Knudsen and Nash [1990, p.51] assert that state enterprises —
usually organised as government-owned agencies — distort the
agricultural sector throughout the developing world. They operate
in — and often monopolise — markets for agricultural inputs,
outputs, services and trade. These agencies, not only procure the
agricultural products at controlled and depressed prices but they
are also inefficient and ineffective in achieving their objectives.
The World Bank Report [1986] quotes numerous studies that have also
found that public sector marketing agencies can be relatively
inefficient. Staffing is one problem. Key managers are often chosen
for political reasons. Even if the top management is competent, it
is often pressured into expanding staff for political reasons.
Financial problems are common. Funds may be inadequate or released
at the wrong times. Public agencies also often have an unrealistic
and inconsistent mandate to generate government revenue, provide
cheap food and create employment.
Knudsen and Nash [Ibid, p.l] point out that in many countries,
farmers have no right to market their crops on their own or to
bargain with buyers for a fair price. The governments through state
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agencies, buy their crops at less than world prices and then sell
the crops for even less to the relatively better-off urban
dwellers. Farmers have been arrested and punished simply for
seeking to sell their own grain. They usually react to suppressed
prices by reducing their production - which results in perennial
shortages, and repeated famines in some nations.
The two authors further argue that in most developing countries,
government intervention has profoundly disrupted the agriculture
sector by directly and indirectly taxing farmers and subsidising
consumers. By lowering the farmer's price while subsidising and
controlling consumer prices, many governments of developing
countries have had to rely on imported food, dumped by the
industrial countries as a result of their own farm policies. In
severe cases when foreign exchange has been scarce or when domestic
production has been low, this policy has resulted in severe food
shortages. As a consequence, many farmers have abandoned their
farms to migrate to cities, many finding worse poverty there.
The World Bank study [1986] found that the effect of low prices for
farm output has not generally been offset by the subsides that many
governments provide through credit provision and farm inputs.
Subsidised credit and fertilisers typically lead to rationing and
shortages because of limited resources and benefit the larger and
better-off farmers more than the smaller and poorer ones. The net
effect of this combination of suppressed crop prices and subsidised
farm inputs on production, has been to depress farmers' profits.
And the conflict of policies results in a large waste of the
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nation's economic resources, resulting in impoverished farmers.
The bank study [Ibid, p.61] argues that the general economic
policies that developing countries have followed, limit the growth
of agricultural production and hamper efforts to reduce rural
poverty.
To reduce deficits on the balance of payments, structural
adjustment policies have been introduced in developing countries as
a result of pressure applied by the World Bank and the IMF. An
important conditionality of their policy measures is liberalisation
of agricultural markets.
This study examines rice marketing in Pakistan in order to consider
whether liberalisation leads to greater efficiency. The study
focuses on rice marketing in light of the two major schools of
thought on agricultural policy as described by Timmer. C Peter
[1989]: the 'Neo-classical school of thought' - which favours free
trade to maximise efficiency of resource allocation and the
'Structuralist school of thought' - which favours intervention to
achieve the goals of: market access, income distribution, and using
the marketing system as a channel for raising fiscal revenues.
The study examines two contrasting schools of thought in
particular: the structuralist approach, argued by Smith [1990,
1991] and the liberal approach, argued by Bates [1981, 1983, 1988],
which are reviewed in chapter - III.
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Since 1972, there has been an increase in the exportable surplus of
Pakistani rice. Two Major causal factors can be identified. First,
as a result of the loss of a significant portion of the Bangladesh
Market when it was separated froM Pakistan to becoMe an independent
state. Second, the increase in production because of the
introduction of high yielding Irri rice varieties. Even so, there
have been Many constraints on rice exporting in procurenent,
processing and storage, which we will describe in chapters VII,
VIII and IX.
How does the rice Market in Pakistan operate? What are the
difficulties facing the Marketing process? And what is the
structure and rationale of the process of state intervention in the
rice Marketing? This study addresses these and related problems.
The Motivation to undertake this research steMs froM the need for
such work. CoMparatively little inforMation is available either
inside or outside Pakistan concerning agricultural policies
relating to rice Marketing in Pakistan. This study will explore a
nunber of problen areas associated with Governnent intervention in
rice Marketing. The following are the specific objectives of the
study:
i. to identify the weaknesses of Pakistan's rice export Marketing
efforts arising froM production, procureMent, transport,
milling and storage,
ii. to identify the specific rice export iMpediMents,
10
iii. to explore ways of improving the existing rice marketing
practices,
iv. to generate lessons for less developed countries' (LDCs)
agricultural marketing efforts.
1.3: Scope of the study.
There have been quite negative press coverage and criticisms about
rice marketing in Pakistan since last 15 years, especially towards
government intervention, so the major motivation for this author
was to try and see to what extent there were justifications on both
sides. Since the author came from the rice growing areas, these
concerns assumed greater prominence.
The scope of the study is limited to the rice marketing of
Pakistan, including the institutions involved in procurement,
pricing, processing, transporting and exporting rice from Pakistan.
The study is also limited primarily to events up to the year
1990/91.
The starting position of this study is that the Pakistan
Government's intervention in paddy/rice marketing has been a major
factor in the inefficient operation of the sector. Liberalisation
is therefore necessary. However, it is not possible for us to test
the counter factual of what would have happened in the total
absence of the Government.
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1.4: Research Methodology.
This research is descriptive and qualitative. A most useful
attribute of the qualitative method is that it allowed the use of
in-depth interviewing and acquisition of information through probes
and counter probes on the basis of the semi-structured
questionnaire.
The major purpose of descriptive research, as the name implies is
that of describing characteristics of the population. Descriptive
research seeks to determine the answers to 'who', 'what', 'when',
'where', and 'how' questions [Zikmund William G 1986, p.36].
Here we attempt to address such issues as the weaknesses of
Pakistan's rice marketing - mainly in production, procurement,
milling, storage and exports.
The research process involved securing the data in order to analyse
the way in which the paddy/rice marketing operates in Pakistan and
identifying the difficulties which lie in the paddy/rice marketing
process. Data for this study involved a research visit to Pakistan
for four and half months, from May 1991 to October 1991, which
included acquisition of both secondary and primary data.
As far as secondary sources are concerned, these included library
search and consequent analysis of books, theses, Journals,
published reports and newspapers, and the use of on-line databases,
information services, and several libraries in the U.K. The author
also assembled data from Pakistan relating to Government's
12
agricultural policies, rice production, pricing, silling,
transportation, storage, export and export policies from Government
departments and private organisations. Among these were Monographs,
unpublished research reports, relevant Departmental and Parastatal
Annual Reports, in-house magazines and newspapers.
Examination of the literature on Pakistan rice marketing — both in
Pakistan and the U.K — highlighted the dearth of written material
on the subject. Fieldwork by this author therefore became
inevitable. This included interviews in Pakistan. Personal
interviews in English and Urdu were conducted with top, middle and
lower managements in different organisations involved directly or
indirectly with Pakistan's agriculture and particularly rice
marketing. These included rice producers, millers, RECP officials,
private exporters, Government audit department, policy makers and
researchers.
Interviews were conducted on the basis of a semi-structured
questionnaire [see appendix-1.A]. The personnel interviewed varied
greatly in their character, knowledge of the subject, age
experience, style and sensitivity to data. Because of this, and the
need to explore and probe into the rice marketing process, it was
decided to use the semi-structured questionnaire as the technique
for this particular study. The sequence of questions asked had to
follow the trend of discussion, the mood of the interviewee, their
field of competence and knowledge of the subject. The main aim was
to have a smooth and free flow of ideas and discussion on the basis
of relevant questions.
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1.5 Problems associated with data collection.
The «ajor problems encountered involved tine and Money. There was a
critical shortage of both. Secondly, the overall attitude towards
the research in the public sector in Pakistan, was negative. People
were not willing to provide information because of their concern
about 'secrecy'. However, the author succeeded in obtaining
valuable information from international organisations such as
USAID, World Bank, FAO and local sources through personal networks
of friends and relatives.
I.6: Organisation of the Study.
This thesis is divided into three parts. Part I of the study
consists of the literature review, covered by chapters 2, 3, and 4.
Part II has five chapters - 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. These are concerned
with an examination of the agricultural problems and rice marketing
situation in Pakistan, in light of the information presented in
part I of the study. Finally, part III of this thesis consists of
two chapters - 10 and 11. Chapter 10 discusses the rice trade
policies of the developed countries and the prospects for
agricultural trade liberalisation in the world in general. Chapter
II, the last chapter , summarises the conclusion of the whole study
and seeks to draw general lessons learnt for LDCs.
Chapter 2 of the thesis deals with the background of the study in
which agricultural policies in the developing countries are
examined. This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the
14
importance of agriculture in general. After that, the agricultural
input and output policies are described along with the role of
state owned organisations.
In chapter 3, the theoretical framework of the study is discussed.
Agricultural policies in developing countries are summarised in
the light of the relevant arguments of two schools of thought -
'neo-classical' and 'structuralist' views. The neo-classical school
of thought, which favours liberalisation, is argued by Bates [1981,
1983, 1988]. The structuralist school of thought which favours
government intervention, is argued by Smith [1990, 1991].
Chapter 4 develops the analytical framework of the study. This
chapter starts with a discussion of privatisation and
liberalisation in general. It then reviews the arguments for and
against the policies of agricultural liberalisation, and Government
intervention.
The fifth chapter gives an account of the economy of Pakistan.
Initially, the chapter discusses the geographical background, and
political history of the country. The chapter then follows a
discussion about the economy of Pakistan in general. Finally, the
chapter ends with a brief look at the importance of agriculture in
the Pakistan economy.
Chapter 6 is concerned with the agricultural policies of Pakistan,
in which the input and output pricing policies are discussed, along
with subsidies and taxes. It concludes with an examination of the
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effects of government intervention in the agricultural sector in
terms of net taxes or net subsidies.
Chapter 7 covers various aspects of paddy/rice Marketing in
Pakistan. The chapter starts with a discussion of rice varieties
and consumers' tastes. This is followed by a brief description of
rice producing areas, production levels, yield levels, as well as
paddy/rice procurement, and pricing policies. Finally, it reviews
the functions and organisational structure of RECP.
Chapter 8 analyses the role of RECP in the procurement and
handling of rice marketing.
Chapter 9 discusses the nature and characteristics of Pakistan's
rice exports and export policies.
Chapter 10 summarises briefly the agricultural policies of the
developed countries and the world rice trade. It also discusses the
prospects for agricultural trade liberalisation in the world in
general.
Finally, chapter 11 concludes the study by giving a summary of the
main findings; provides recommendations towards correcting some of
the major impediments to rice marketing identified in the preceding
chapters and seeks to draw general lessons learnt for LDCs.




As far the other traditional rice varieties are concerned, they are nany and aostly
consumed at farm-land and produced in a very saall quantities.
^Basaati rice is long grain, scented or araaatic variety. While cooking, the size of
rice becoaes large and flaky and gives a natural arena which is popularly liked in
Indian dishes such as 'Pulao* and 'Biryani'.
^Irri rice while cooking, does not give any natural arena. This rice is sticky when
cooked and is not liked in Indian dishes.
*This information was given by the Sice Export Corporation of Pakistan, during the
field work in 1990.
17
CHAPTER - 2
AGRICULTURAL POLICIES: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE.
The objective of this chapter is to review the previous work that
has been carried out regarding the various issues of agricultural
policies in the developing countries and to examine the level of
government involvement. The chapter begins with a discussion of
the importance of agriculture in general before reviewing the
agricultural policies in developing countries.
2.1: The Importance of Agriculture in General.
In most developing countries of the world, the agriculture sector
occupies the dominant role. Whatever yardstick we may apply,
whether it be the number of people the sector employs, the amount
of income originating in it, the amount of basic food it supplies,
the size of its dependent population, or its export earnings,
agriculture clearly occupies a position of prime importance and
will continue to do so for a considerable time to come.
According to the World Development Report [1986, p. 3] figures,
agriculture is the basic industry of the world's poorest countries.
It employs roughly 80% of the labour force in low-income*
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developing countries and about 35 to 55% in middle-income
developing ones. It is also a main source of GDP, accounting for 35
to 45% of GDP in low -income developing countries (table-2.1). The
predominance of the agricultural sector is usually one of the main
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characteristics of developing countries in the sense that
agriculture is not only the largest contributor to the national
income but also the major source of employment and foreign exchange
earnings. It is also the provider of food grain especially for the
growing urban population and for the generation of a surplus for
investment to finance development efforts.
The Bank report [Ibid] further confirmed that despite the dominant
position occupied by the agricultural sector in a traditional
economy, many parts of the developing world have consistently
failed to pay adequate attention to agricultural and rural
development. This has often led to a stagnant agriculture sector
that, in turn, has resulted in large shortfall of domestic food
production, balance of payment crises, and political instability.
TABLE - 2-1.
Agriculture's share in GDP, taplojaoit ft Export in selected years, 1964-84.
(percent)
Share of Agriculture in:
Country Group. GDP bplopwnt Export
1964-66 82-84 1965 1980 1964-66 82-84
Low-inr cm< countries 42.8 36.3 76.0 72.0 58.6 32.8
Africa 46.9 41.3 84.0 78.0 70.7 64.4
Asia 42.5 35.7 74.0 71.0 54.0 25.9
Hiddle-incoue oil exporters 21.0 14.8 62.0 50.0 40.8 13.6
Middle—incoue oil inporters
including najor exporters
of nanufacturers. 25.2 18.0 63.0 53.0 54.2 44.8
Major exporters of uanuf-
actures. 19.3 12.1 50.0 36.0 56.9 20.2
Developing countries 30.2 19.9 66.9 63.2 52.3 22.0
Industrial countries 5.1 3.1 13.7 7.1 21.4 14.1
Note: - Countries with less than $400 GNP per head are low incoue countries.
- = = nore = = = = = niddle incoue countries
= == == = = = developing countries.
Source: World Development Report [1986, p.3), The World Bank, Washington.
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2.2 Agricultural Policies in the Developing Countries.
Agricultural policy in developed and in developing nations is a
tangle of contradictions. Throughout the world, governments have
'one foot on the accelerator and one foot on the brake'—
simultaneously encouraging and discouraging increased farm
production. In the United States, the government is putting
pressure on many farmers to leave good farmland implanted — while
paying other farmers bonuses of 50X over market prices to boost
their production. In Europe, if farmers produce more than a
government-set limit, they are penalised by reductions in their
government set prices. While in many developing nations,
governments refuse to pay farmers the market value of their crops,
yet sell farmers fertilisers and seeds for far less than they are
worth.
Knudsen and Nash [1990, p.49] argue that in many developing
countries there is little recognition of the notion that a farmer's
right to the fruits of his labour is no less important than those
of the consumer. In the absence of such notions of inherent
economic rights, the deck is stacked against agriculture,
especially with respect to food pricing policies and exchange rate
policies. Since producers - even numerically superior to urban
interests - are poorly organised and usually lose battles with
politically volatile consumers in the cities. Policies are analysed
in terms of whether they meet certain objectives, such as income
distribution, self sufficiency and export, rather than in terms of
whether they erode or pressure the individuals' ability to make
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economic choices. Further, they say that in much of Africa, farmers
have no right to market their crops on their own or to bargain with
buyers for a fair price.
They [Ibid] further argue that the government buys their crops at
less than world prices and then sells it for even less to
relatively better-off urban dwellers. Farmers have been arrested
and punished simply for seeking to sell their own grain.
Agricultural restrictions and controls frequently drive down the
market price of food. Farmers usually react to suppressed prices by
reducing their production - which results in perennial shortages,
repeated famines in some nations, and the need to seek imports or
food aid. Regrettably, many politicians have reacted to food
shortages by imposing new government controls on farmers and
markets and creating more inefficient government enterprises,
rather than abolishing the controls that caused the original
problem.
Government intervention in agriculture has profoundly disrupted the
agricultural sector by directly and indirectly taxing farmers while
subsidising consumers. Prices received by producers and paid by
consumers are usually set by administrative decree to meet
political objectives. Low politically-decreed prices to producers
and consumers have tended to sharply reduce the farmer's incentive
for production while increasing consumption by urban dwellers. By
lowering the farmer's price while subsidising and controlling
consumer prices, many governments of developing countries have had
to rely on imported food, dumped by industrial countries as a
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result of their own farn policies. In severe cases when foreign
exchange is scarce or domestic production is unusually low, this
policy has resulted in severe food shortages. As a consequence,
■any farmers have abandoned their farms to migrate to cities, many
finding greater poverty there [Knudsen and Nash, 1990].
The study by World Bank [1986, p.61] largely confirmed that the
general economic policies that developing countries have pursued
limited the growth of agricultural production and hampered efforts
to reduce the rural poverty. This decreased the foreign exchange
earnings through the low level of agricultural exports. In many
cases, sector-specific pricing and tax policies have also resulted
in substantial discrimination against agriculture.
The sectoral policies keep the domestic farm prices of
agricultural products below their world prices at country borders
and also contribute significantly to the bias against agriculture.
It makes little difference from this point of view whether farmers
receive low prices because of taxes on their outputs or because of
excessive margins charged by state marketing agencies. The effects
of low prices for farm output are not generally offset by the
subsidies that many governments provide on credit and modern farm
inputs. Typically, subsidies lead to rationing and shortages, and
benefit larger and better-off farmers more than smaller and poorer
farmers [World Bank Report, 1986].
Further, in the same study [Ibid] it was argued that many
developing countries pronounce self sufficiency as an important
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objective, but follow policies that tax farmers. Many have raised
producer prices at various stages, but have followed macroeconomic
and exchange rate policies that have left real produce prices
unchanged or lower than before. Many have set up a complex system
of producer taxation, and then have set up on equally complex and
frequently ineffective systems of subsidies for inputs to offset
that taxation. Many subsidise consumers, but end up reducing the
incomes of farmers who are much poorer than many who actually
benefit from the subsidies.
The net effect on production, of the combination of suppressing
crop prices and subsidising farm inputs, is generally to depress
farmers' profits. And the conflict of policies results in a large
waste of resources and nations with impoverished farmers and happy
consumers, as argued by Bates [1981].
Policies on money supply and credit, public revenues and
expenditure, foreign borrowing and investment, and exchange rate
regimes have all been of critical importance during the 1970s and
1980s. When expansionary monetary and fiscal policies have led to
higher inflation at home than abroad, governments have often failed
to adjust exchange rates and have relied instead on increasing
import protection by implementing devices as quotas, exchange
controls, and licensing. In such circumstances the currency may
become overvalued and bias against agriculture becomes stronger
because the increased protection usually accrues to industry by
providing them cheap raw-material and low food prices for their
workers.
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Typically, food imports are excluded from restrictive measures in
order to keep urban food prices low: consequently, food imports are
implicitly subsidised. Furthermore, in trying to reduce fiscal
deficits, countries usually increase sectoral taxes on agricultural
exports and curtail subsidy programmes for agricultural inputs. As
a result of both implicit and explicit taxation, agriculture — and
the low income groups that depend on it — tends to bear the brunt
of the adjustment programmes that ensue from destabilising macro
economic policies.
The discrimination against agriculture derives from several
factors. Mainly, it is very much an integral part of development
strategies that promote and protect domestic industries behind high
trade barriers. Such strategies are intended to accelerate the
shift of resources out of agriculture by lowering its profitability
compared with that of industry: in other words, by turning the
internal terms of trade between agriculture and industry so that
agriculture is worse off than it would be if domestic prices were
aligned with relative world prices. Agricultural exports suffer as
a result; so do agricultural products that compete with imports.
This is not just because their domestic prices become lower related
to the prices of protected industrial products, but also because
the cost of the industrial inputs the farmers use, increases [World
Bank Report, 1986].
Moreover, the protectionist policies result in an appreciation of
the real exchange rate. This means that traded agricultural goods
become less profitable than non traded goods, with further adverse
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consequences on the developing country's agricultural exports
[World Bank Report, 1986]. The developing countries' agricultural
policies are described below:
2.2.1 Input Policies.
Governments have often tried to compensate for explicit or implicit
taxes on agriculture by providing input-fertiliser, credit,
irrigation services, improved seeds and electricity — at
subsidised prices. These subsidies have done little or nothing to
compensate the poorest farmers, who use few purchased inputs,
produce relatively small saleable surpluses, and are not well
enough connected to be allocated a fair share of inputs whose
shortages are created by the system. In many cases all of the
farmers' demand cannot be met at subsidised prices. This leads to
rationing. Who gets how much fertiliser for example, depends on the
rationing process. Typically, the allocation process favours the
bigger farmers and thus negates whatever equity benefits night
otherwise have accrued.
A study by Seddon [1989], as quoted in Knudsen and Nash [1990,
p.70] found that, in Morocco, 70X of the subsidies benefited the
richest farmers. Instead of helping the poor, subsidies have
nisallocated resources, skewed rural income distribution, imposed a




Most developing countries compensate producers for the policies
that depress their output prices by offering fertiliser subsidies.
This is done by setting the selling price of fertilisers lower
than the costs of production or importation.
On a micro economic level, the under-pricing of fertiliser, as with
any product, results in its inefficiently intensive use. While
aggregate quantitative estimates of this kind of loss are difficult
to make, it is clear that subsidies that in most cases exceed 50 %,
and in some cases approach 95%, produce large distortions and
therefore large costs [Knudsen and Nash, 1990]. Further more,
overuse of fertiliser has environmental effects.
The costs of subsidies are further magnified by the way in which
they are administered. Production, distribution, and importation
are frequently handled by inefficient state organisations that have
limited incentives to achieve cost savings, since losses are
covered by the government. One study estimated that the public
sector fertiliser plants in India are only 40% as productive as
private sector plants [Srinivasan, 1986].
On the other hand, imports are controlled by the government in ways
that limit the competition and pressure for efficiency that free
imports would provide. It has also been observed that, often only
one or two types of fertilisers are available, forcing farmers to
use the same kind on crops with different needs.
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A study in Senegal, as quoted in Knudsen and Nash [1990, p. 72]
compared the standard fertiliser sold by the state owned
organisations with >ore appropriate mixes, and found that equal
yields could have been achieved at 20X lower cost if better blends
had been available.
2.2.1.2 Irrigation.
In developing countries, irrigation has been the single largest
investment expenditure in agriculture. The International Food
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) as quoted in Knudsen and Nash
[1990, p.73], estimated that, it would account for over half of all
agricultural investment in the 1980s in 36 important developing
countries. Despite this emphasis, results have been disappointing,
whether compared to what was projected, what is technically
achievable or what is produced under private irrigation schemes.
Many of the problems are traceable to the policy environments in
which the investments were made, particularly the pricing of water
at rates far too low to recover costs. In most countries water
charges do not come close to covering even the costs of operating
and maintaining the irrigation system, much less servicing the
capital costs to build it. In a group of seven Asian countries -
Bangladesh, Indonesia, Korea, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines and
Thailand - for which such estimates are available, operation and
maintenance costs exceed user charges in every country except the
Philippines. As a result, there is an excess use of water.
This overuse of water in the fields, as well as large quantities
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that leak from damaged or obstructed canals in transit, causes
environmental havoc. For example, in India 10 million acres of
cultivable land have been lost through waterlogging, with another
25 million threatened by salinity, another consequence of overuse
[Jayal, 1985]. In Pakistan, 12 million acres are waterlogged and 10
million saline [World Bank, 1982]. Though Pakistan devotes half of
its irrigation budget to mitigating the salinization [Postal,
1989].
Comparative studies in the Philippines, Korea, and China have found
not surprisingly, that irrigation agency staff are more responsive
to farmer needs when their funding comes from the farmers
[Small,1986; Nickun,1982; World Bank,1982; Wade,1982].
In irrigation, other than subsidies and misuse of water, there is
also a misuse of funds. In Pakistan, it is widely believed that
there is widespread corruption in irrigation and it has been
observed that, the department invests large amounts but there is
press criticism about the expenditures on maintenance of canals.
2.2.1.3 Credit.
According to Feder, et, al., [1989], providing cheap credit to
farmers has been a major way of subsidising production and shoring
up political support in rural areas. But the strategy is costly and
ineffective. Typically, credit is provided to a large extent by
donors and channelled through special government lending
institutions. The rates charged are below commercial rates and in
28
inflationary environments are often lower than the rate of
inflation, Baking returns negative in real teres. Political and
other considerations sake it difficult to take action to collect
delinquent loans, resulting in high default rates, typically
between 20 and 50%, but sometimes rising as high as 80%.
One study [Knudsen and Nash, 1990] confiras that credit has proven
to be an ineffective vehicle for achieving the intended objectives
of increasing production and helping saall faraers. A aajor problem
is that aoney is fungible; once lent it can be (and often is) spent
for nonagricultural investaent or consuaption, that is, on
luxurious things. Studies in Mexico, Pakistan, and the Philippines
showed that only 25 to 50% of loan funds went to increase
agricultural investaent, and aost of the subsidies are windfalls to
large faraers, not saall holders. Another study [Nash, 1983]
concluded that in Peru 36% of the subsidy benefited the aiddle and
upper classes.
2.2.2.1 Pricing Policies.
The objectives of agricultural commodities' pricing policy varies
greatly aaong countries. One often stated purpose is to help and
bring about a certain incone distribution as described by policy
makers [Tolley, 1982],
Prices of important agricultural products in developing countries
are almost always set in the political arena, either by the state
organisations or by legislation. The usual policy is to set
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producers and consumers prices low relative to their international
o
levels , and at the uniform levels throughout the country and
throughout the year. Producer and consumer prices are legally
controlled. Governments have dual policy objectives in setting and
regulating the prices. They want to provide adequate incentives for
increasing food production and they seek to protect the interests
of consumers at the same time. In practice, the objective of
ensuring a regular supply of staples at low prices for consumers
has been the dominant criteria in most developing countries,[World
Bank Report, 1981, p.56]. The way they are funded varies too, but
in most countries the cost has been shifted back to farmers in the
form of low farm prices. This has been accomplished through taxes
in food exporting countries, through legal marketing monopolies
which pay low prices of domestically produced food crops, and
through sales at low prices of imported foods. This, however, is an
inefficient way of helping the poor, since most of the subsidy goes
to the middle and upper classes.
One study [World Bank Report 1981, p.56], in the context of African
countries, studied the extent to which export crops were being
taxed or subsidised by their governments during 1976-1989 (table-
2.2). All but four of 29 separate estimates were negative, and
showed net taxation, and the estimate of an overall average tax
rate of 35% as an underestimate because it takes no account of
either the inflated costs of inefficient state marketing boards or
widespread existence at that time of overvalued currencies.
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TABLE-2.2
Nominal Protection Co-efficient (NPC)* of Selected Exports Crops
for Some African Countries.
Countries Crops 1971 -75 1976-89
Cameroon Cocoa 0.37 2)a 0.45 (2)
Ghana - 0.47 5) 0.40 (4)
Ivory Coast - 0.56 2) 0.38 (1)
Togo ~ 0.50 5) 0.25 (4)
Cameroon (Arabica) Coffee 0.72 2) 0.60 (2)
Cameroon (Robusta) - • • • 0.36 (1)
Ivory Coast - 0.68 1) 0.36 (1)
Kenya - 0.94 1) • • • •
Tanzania - 0.80 5) 0.59 (4)
Togo — 0.42 5) 0.23 (4)
Cameroon Cotton • • • 0.79 (1)
Ivory Coast - 0.79 1) 1.05 (1)
Kenya - 1.07 1) • • •
Malawi - 0.68 5) 0.75 (2)
Mali - 0.55 2) 0.44 (4)
Senegal - 0.65 2) • • •
Sudan - 0.78 2) 0.60 (1)
Togo - 0.62 5) 0.79 (4)
Upper Volta — 0.79 (1)
Malawi Groundnuts 0.70 5) 0.59 (2)
Mali - 0.57 2) 0.43 (4)
Senegal - 0.48 4) 0.66 (4)
Sudan - 0.85 3) 0.67 (1)
Zambia — 0.70 5) 0.71 (4)
Kenya Maize** 0.96 1) 1.33 (1)
Malawi - 1.68 5) 1.34 (2)
Zambia - 0.72 5) 0.78 (4)
Sudan Sesame 0.83 1) 0.59 (1)
Upper Volta — • • • • 0.88 (1)
Kenya Tea 0.89 1)
Malawi Tobacco 0.42 5) 0.28 (2)
Zambia — 1.09 5) 0.88 (4)
Kenya Wheat** • • • • 1.43 (1)
Source: 'Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa:An Agenda
For Action', World Bank, 1981.
Note:
*It is a measure of the degree to which crops are taxed or
subsidised. NPC is calculated as: Producer Prices/World Price-
Transport, Marketing and Processing costs. If the NPC value is more
than one it means that crop is being subsidised.
- figures not available.
a. Figures in brackets indicates number of observations (years).
b. Maize and Wheat have been alternatively exported and imported
in these countries.
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Id another and very recent study [Krueger, et, al., 1988] as quoted
in ODI Working Paper 34 by Tony Killick [1990, p.13] it was found
that out of 18 representative countries, the domestic prices of
export crops were in almost all cases kept below international
prices (converted at the official exchange rate), by an average of
11Z .
Imported food crops were a different natter; most countries kept
domestic producer prices higher than world prices, by an average of
20-21Z. However, an additional "hidden" tax was also imposed on all
tradable crops by over—valuation of the exchange rate and
protection of the industrial sector. The sane study found this
indirect nechanisn to be by far the nost significant way of taxing
agriculture, overwhelning even the apparent protection provided by
pricing policy for inported food crops. On average, the total
effect fron pricing and the hidden tax was equivalent to a tax of
36-40Z on export crops, and a tax of 5-6Z on inports (table-2.3).
In other countries - not included in the above study - the effect
of the pricing and exchange rate policy has been even worse for
agriculture. In Tanzania by 1984, official prices for export crops
had fallen in real terms to about half their levels of 1970, in
spite of higher border prices. In the late 1970s and 1980s in Togo,
the farm price for coffee was a third of border price in Cameroon
and Ghana cocoa producers received less than half the world price,
and in Senegal, groundnut producers only received about half the
export value [World Bank, 1986, and Caswell, 1985].
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TABLE - 2.3
Direct and Indirect Protection of Agriculture (1980-84)
(Percentages)4
Countries.













Argentina Iheat -13 -37 - - -
Brazil Soybean -19 -14 Iheat -7 -14
Chile Grapes 0 -7 Iheat +9 -7
Colunbia Coffee -5 -34 Iheat +9 -34
Cote d'lvoire Cocoa -21 -26 Rice +16 -26
Doainican Republic Coffee -32 -19 Rice +26 -19
Egypt Cotton -22 -14 Iheat -21 -14
Ghana Cocoa +34 -89 Rice +118 -89
Malaysia Rubber -18 -10 Rice +68 -10
Pakistan Cotton -7 -35 Iheat -21 -35
Philippines Copra -26 -28 Corn +26 -28
Sri-Lanka Rubber -31 -31 Rice +11 -31
Thailand Rice -15 -19 - - -
Turkey Tobacco -28 -35 Iheat -3 -35
Zaabia Tobacco +7 -57 Corn -9 -57
Korea (South) - - - Rice +86 -12
Morocco - - - Iheat 0 -8
Portugal Toaatoes +17 -13 Iheat +26 -13
AVERAGE -11 -29 AVERAGE +21 -27
Source: Anne O.lrueger, et, al.,[1988] 'Agricultural Incentives in Developing Countries:




percentage deviation froi the prices that would have prevailed in a well functioning free
trade aarket.
^It is the direct intervention bj the government through subsidies and/or taxes. If the figure
is in plus, it neans that the producers are subsidised, and if in ninus , they are taxed.
cIt is an indirect goverment intervention through the eichange rate nechanisn.
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Through depressed pricing policies in developing countries, the
exports are reduced and imports are increased. As quoted in the
World Bank Report [1986, p.69], the International Food Research
Institute (IFPRI) studied the evolution of the Argentine and
Chilean economies and the effects of pricing and exchange rate
policies on agriculture. The study showed that, if agricultural
prices between 1952 and 1972 had been 10% higher than they in fact
were — when the government was taxing farmers heavily, total
agricultural output would have gradually increased to a level
approximately 9% higher, on an annual basis, than it actually was
over the period. These measures depress food production and can be
very costly if maintained over long periods.
2.2.2.2 Such low-price policies have an important unintended
effect over a period of time. Countries in which producer prices
have been severely depressed have consistently found production
declining.
A study by Sturzennegger (forthcoming) as quoted by Knudsen and
Nash [1990, p.55] confirmed that, in the early 1960s, Sri Lanka
accounted for a third of world tea exports, while Kenya's market
share was less than 3%. Over the ensuing decades, however, SriLanka
taxed the sector quite severely; average tax rates were over 50% in
the 1970s and over 35% in the late 1970s to mid 1980's. Kenya's
taxation was much more reasonable; in 1985, rates were on a sliding
scale based on the world price, with the top average rate about
15%. By the early 1980s Sri Lanka's share of the market had
declined to 19%, while Kenya's had risen to more than (triple) 9%.
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In Argentina, another country with a strong policy bias against
exports, it has been estimated that a more neutral policy
environment could have doubled agricultural exports.
Another effect of such pricing policies is to encourage — in some
cases, virtually force — producers to smuggle their crops out of
the country. Ghana's cocoa Marketing Board's pricing policies,
combined with over-valuation of the exchange rate, raised the
effective taxation of cocoa from an already-high 54% in the late
1960s to 89% in the late 70s. Ghana's resultant market share
dropped from 40% to 18%. Neighbouring Cote d'lvoire's rose from 9
to 29%. A significant part of the increase in exports from Cote
d'lvoire came from Cocoa smuggled out of Ghana. Ghana's pricing
policies not only impoverished the Ghananian producers, but also
deprived the treasury of revenue [Knudson and Nash, 1990].
2.2.3 Trading policies.
The necessary corollary to pricing policies that cause domestic
prices to deviate from their international levels is restricting
trade with the outside world. This is often done by giving a state
organisation marketer exclusive authority to export or import the
crop. But even where this is not done, governments impose a variety
of other controls on international trade in agriculture products.
In a large sample of developing countries, about 48% of food items
and 37% of agricultural raw materials are affected by non-tariff
measures, (Tariffs are not counted here as restrictions), [Erzan,
et, al., 1988]. The effect of such restrictions is often to
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partially conpensate for the anti-agricultural bias implicit in
policies of exchange over-valuation and industrial protection,
though the public justification is usually to promote self
sufficiency in food. Such restrictive tendencies of policy-makers
have been reinforced by the industrial countries' agricultural
policies that have depressed and destabilised prices of major food
crops.
Governments in developing countries restrict imports because they
believe, with some justification, that if cheap imports were freely
available, the effects would be devastating. But the government's
exchange-rate and industrial policies create much more serious
problems for agriculture than would external competition, even from
subsidised products. Restriction and taxes when applied to exports
have the effect of keeping domestic prices low. In many countries,
the major purpose is to raise revenue for the government by taxing
export producers.
In other words, the policies are aimed at keeping domestic prices
low for consumers — as with beef in Mexico — or for agro-
industrial processors — as with cotton in Venezuela and Pakistan
and logs in Belize. When the price difference is large, the
restrictions are widely evaded. The negative effects of depressing
prices are large as already discussed. But trade restrictions have
negative effects that go beyond their impact on prices. The
licensing procedure itself is typically onerous. In Madagascar,
despite recent trade policy reforms, exporters still are required
to have 51 documents stamped and verified on average, three times.
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An average shipment requires three working days just for the paper
work. Giving bureaucrats such extensive powers also fuels rent-
seeking and corruption, further discouraging exporters.
2.2.4. State Marketing Organisations.
One Study [Knudsen and Nash, 1990. p.51] concludes that state
enterprises, usually organised as government-owned corporations^,
distort agricultural sectors throughout the developing world. They
operate in (and often monopolise) markets for agricultural inputs,
outputs, services and trade. These state organisations, not only
procure the agricultural products at very low prices but they are
inefficient and ineffective. It is also widely alleged that they
are corrupt in the sense that there is misuse of resources,
widespread disregard for legal rules and regulations.
Governments often justify their involvement in marketing with the
argument that the private sector is inefficient and can be
monopolised by a small number of traders. There is little evidence
that this is generally true. New boards proliferated, in Tanzania
in the mid 1970s, for example, there were ten state agencies
handling production, processing,transport and marketing of 42
crops. These boards often displaced private traders that were more
efficient. This has been documented, for example in Kenya,
Indonesia, Senegal, Sri Lanka, and Tanzania [Lele and Christianson,
1988; World Bank, 1986; Bryceson, 1985].
Numerous studies, as quoted in the World Bank Report [1986, p.86]
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have indicated that public sector marketing agencies can be
relatively inefficient. Staffing is one problem. Key managers are
often chosen for political reasons. Even if the top management is
competent, it is often pressured into expanding staff for political
reasons. Flexibility in staffing is often lacking. Competence and
morale often deteriorates. Financial problems are common. Funds may
be inadequate or released at wrong time. Public agencies also often
have unrealistic and inconsistent mandates to generate government
revenue, provide cheap food and create employment.
A study by World Bank [1985] as quoted in Maddock [1987, p.296]
confirmed that state owned enterprises have typically been net
consumers of resources rather than income generators and it has
been estimated that in the period 1976-79, net budgetary payments
to nonfinancial state owned enterprises in developing countries
averaged more than 3X of the GDP.
Perhaps more important, the state agencies find it hard to handle
the sheer complexity of the markets, because they operate
inflexibly. They can not adopt readily to changing the market
conditions. State organisations simply do not respond flexibly like
this, because it is politically difficult for them to quickly shed
labour and take other cost-cutting measures in a timely manner.
Bureaucratic inertia delays decisions, so that a response to a
given market condition may be completely inappropriate to the
conditions at the time the response is finally made [Naddock,
1987].
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As complex centrally controlled systems are open to corruption, it
is difficult for public agencies to adopt the differentiated
pricing policies which are needed to promote efficient trade. But
the costs of not doing so can be great. For example, when an agency
offers a single price for grades of crop, farmers want to sell it
only their lowest quality grade. When the agency is in charge of
exporting the crop, as in the case of the Rice Marketing Board in
Guyana, the low quality of its supplies discourages foreign buyers.
Estimates of the magnitude of the corruption are hard to come by,
but to give some idea of its seriousness, reports from Senegal
indicate that the government admitted fraudulent losses of the
major state marketing agency ONCAD of an amount equal to 44% of the
public sector investment budget [Knudsen and Nash, 1990, p.58]. In
addition to the direct siphoning-off of funds [Bryceson, 1985; Nim
Caswell,1985]; leakage of supplies purchased by the state marketing
agencies into the higher priced parallel market are common
[Hopecraft, 1987].
Conclnsion.
This chapter started by looking at the agricultural policies
adopted by the developing countries. It was found that mostly in
agriculture, prices are set to meet the political objectives, where
producers are heavily taxed and the consumers are subsidised. On
the other hand, protecting industries from the true cost of
agriculture has resulted in substantial discrimination against
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agriculture.
The conflict of policies, such as suppressing crop prices and
subsidising farm inputs, have resulted in a large scale waste of
resources, away from helping the poor because, subsidies are mainly
used for political purposes.
State marketing agencies are mostly found to be inefficient and
political affected organisations. They cannot handle the complexity
of markets because they operate inflexibly.
These are the problems of agricultural policies in developing
countries, the problems governments are supposed to try and solve.
This costly intervention, in private production and marketing is
unjustified. In developing countries, it benefits primarily the
relatively well-off.
In this case there can be two positions: First, the extreme
position in which there should be a completely free market
(liberalisation), where governments should not intervene as
exemplified by Bates [1981, 1983, 1988] in his work. Second, there
should be the significant state involvement as exemplified by Smith
[1990, 1991] in his work.
The next chapter will review the two different arguments [by Bates




Low incne countries/econoaies, with 1984 gross national product (GNP) per person
of less than $400.
2Hiddle incase countries/econoaies, with 1984 GNP per person of $400 or sore.
3
In many cases, stabilisation policies have caused donestic prices in sone years to
exceed world prices, but the average effect over the price cycle is to depress then.
4
In a few countries of Africa, for exanple, Tanzania, Caaeroon, Senegal, producer
cooperatives have also operated as state agencies when the goveronents begin to
appoint Managers and approve budgets.
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CHAPTER - 3
3 AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AMD THE RELEVANT
ARGUMENTS.
The objective of this chapter is to review the two very different
arguments with regard to the agricultural policies in developing
countries. One argument is about the free market as exemplified by
Bates; and the other is about a significant state involvement as
exemplified by Smith.
3.1 Bates' Arguments.
"For decades, researchers have examined difficulties bedevilling
the growth of farming in Third World nations. They have pointed to
factors originating in the physical and biological environments of
farmers, and they have isolated social and economic impediments as
well. A consensus has emerged that the most important factors are
the nature of the incentives offered to producers. Physical and
biological factors, it is held, are constraints that farmers can
transcend, provided they are given sufficient incentives to do so"
[Bates, 1981, p.2].
In the words of Theodore Schultz [1976], as quoted in Bates [Ibid],
"Incentives to guide and reward farmers are a critical component.
Once there are investment opportunities and efficient incentives,
farmers will turn sand into goldt\ Further, Schultz [Bates, Ibid],
argues that "the Third World governments undermine the productive
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potential of their farm population. A major source of the problem
of Third World agriculture is bad policy".
According to Bates [1981], agricultural policy consists of
governmental actions that affect the incomes of rural producers by
influencing the prices these producers face in the major markets
which determine their incomes.
In describing the agricultural policies of African states;
government intervention is found in three markets: the markets for
agricultural commodities, the markets for inputs into farming, and
the markets for the goods that farmers buy from the urban-
industrial sector. When governments intervene in markets, they
often do so in ways that harm the short-run interests of most
farmers. On one hand, by sheltering domestic industries from
competition, they increase the prices that farmers must pay for
goods from the urban areas. On the other hand, through the use of
state power, they lower the prices that farmers receive for their
products; alternatively they compete with them in supplying food to
the urban markets. And the benefits of the subsidies they confer on
farm inputs are reaped by the rich few. In addition, the farm
policies of governments are characterised by stress on projects
rather than prices. This is done in preference for lower farm costs
rather than increased farm revenues, and for widespread economic
inefficiency [Bates, 1981].
Bates [Ibid, p.43] further argues, that there are other aspects of
the situation which are important to consider. Among the most
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important are elite interests. Where the elite engages in the
production of a food item, policies are not employed to depress its
prices. For example, in the case of rice in Ghana, major rice farms
are owned by high-level public servants, with the result that rice
is sold at domestic prices that lie well above the world market
prices, and urban consumers suffer accordingly. Moreover, while the
general pattern of protection may be designed to favour the
consumer, the actual implementation of protective measures may
redistribute income from consumers to elite level officials. In
Kenya for example, the government banned the export of certain food
items in order to maintain low domestic prices. Nonetheless, in
practice, the world price often prevailed, because of smuggling.
Among the major purposes of government intervention is the pursuit
of certain social objectives: in developing areas to shift the
basis of their economies away from the production of agricultural
commodities and towards the production of manufactured goods, in
other words they want to move resources from agriculture to
industry; and therefore they set prices in markets in order to
capture resources from agriculture. Moreover, governments need
resources with which to implement these development programmes, and
to achieve their objectives, they need foreign exchange. In
countries where agriculture is the greatest source of income and
the principal source of export, it is natural that they should seek
to levy revenues from the rural sector. Out of commitment to
development, governments in Africa, like other developing
countries, therefore intervene in agricultural markets and extract
the resources they need to build a modern economy.
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While acknowledging the importance of government objectives and
reasons for state involvement in agricultural policy, we also
recognise that more personal motives colour political choices.
Governments want to stay in power. They must appease powerful
interests. And people turn to political action to secure special
advantages - rewards they are unable to secure by competing in the
marketing place. It is critical that analysts recognise the
importance of these forces. One obvious conclusion sometimes drawn
from economists' critiques of Third World agricultural programmes,
for example, is that governments should withdraw from agricultural
markets and let economic forces prevail. Such counsel is naturally
ignored by the policy makers as hopelessly naive. Similarly,
although governments intervene in markets to secure social
objectives, it is unrealistic to believe that these public
objectives are the sole force behind their choices.
In order to secure any objective, governments can choose from a
variety of techniques, for example, to strengthen the incentives
for food production, governments can increase the prices of farm
products, or they can subsidise the costs of farm implements.
Either action would result in better results for producers, but
government prefers the latter policy. They do so in part because of
its superior political attractions. And to increase output,
governments finance production programmes. But in doing so, they
introduce characteristic distortions. Given the level of resources
devoted to the programmes for example, they often create too many
projects; the programmes then fail because the resources have been
spread too thin. Such behaviour is nonsensical when analysed solely
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in teras of stated objectives, but it becomes understandable once
we consider the political calculations underlying the choices of
governments [Bates, 1981].
With regard to the price policies, Bates [1988, p.342], further
says that, studies in other areas suggest that this configuration
of pricing decisions is common in the developing nations.
The other form of government intervention as described by Bates
[1988, p.338] is the 'over-valuation of currency', which he calls
the 'Non-Bureaucratic form of intervention'. Many developing
governments maintain an overvalued currency. Over-valuation in
addition to lowering the export earnings of agriculture, lowers the
prices paid for foreign imports. It cheapens the cost of importing
plant, machinery and other equipment needed to build an industrial
sector. But items other than plant and equipment can be imported,
and among these other commodities is food. As a consequence of
over-valuation, African food producers face higher levels of
competition from foreign food stuffs. And in search of low-price
food, African governments do little to protect their domestic food
markets from foreign products - products whose prices have
artificially been lowered as a consequence of public policies.
In the longer run, however, the structure of the payoffs achieved
by the coalition changes. Farmers adjust in response to pricing
policies, so they produce less. The result in the export market is
fewer exports and less foreign exchange. To support low food
prices, governments must provide additional supplies, either by
46
subsidising local production or by financing imports from abroad.
But throughout Africa, states are undergoing fiscal crises; they
lack both revenues and foreign exchange. Moreover, they find allies
among foreign donors and international creditors, who pressure
governments to make adjustments that will lessen the burden of
their debts, [Bates, 1988]. The question is, why do governments in
developing countries select this pattern of agricultural policies?
Bates [1988, pp.343-358] gives several explanations for their
choices as below:
3.1.1. The overriding public interest of poor societies is in rapid
economic growth. And the policy choices represent their commitment
to rapid development, a commitment that implies supplanting
agriculture by industry. The policy choices that have been made
are, in keeping with the prescriptions forwarded in leading
development theories (after 1960s). According to these theories, to
secure higher levels of per capita income, nations should move from
production of primary products to production of manufactured goods.
To fulfil their plans, governments need revenues; they also need
foreign exchange. In most African nations, agriculture represents
the single largest sector in the domestic economy, and in many it
represents the principal source of foreign exchange. It is
therefore natural that in seeking to fulfil these objectives, the
government should intervene in these markets in an effort to set
prices in a way that transfers resources from agriculture to the
"industrialisation" sector of the economy: the state itself and the
urban industrial and manufacturing firms.
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3.1.2 Urban consumers constitute a vigilant and potent pressure
group demanding low-priced food. Urban consumers are potent because
they are geographically concentrated and strategically located. At
times of higher prices, influential elites are likely to ally with
the urban masses, to shift their political loyalties and replace
those in power. Thus it was that protest over food shortages and
rising prices that formed a critical prelude to the coups and coup
attempts in Ghana, Liberia, Kenya, and Guinea.
Only occasionally, however, are farmers powerful. For example, in
West Africa, urban bureaucratic elites have entered rice farming,
and where they have done so, they have won protected commodity
prices and subsidised prices for farm inputs, [Pearson.R Scot, et,
al., 1981]. In East Africa, similar elites maintain large scale
wheat farms; they too have employed their political influence to
avoid adverse pricing policies. But most farms are owned by members
of the peasantry, not the elites, and they are politically weak
and most often they are taxed.
3.1.3 When governments want more food, they prefer to secure it by
embarking on more projects rather than offering higher prices.
Adopting policies in support of higher prices for agricultural
commodities would be politically costly to African governments.
Because the benefits could not be restricted to the faithful or
withheld from the politically disloyal. Project-based policies
suffer less from this liability. Officials can exercise discretion
in locating projects, they can also exercise discretion in staffing
them. For example, in Northern Ghana in the late 1970s, subsidised
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credit was given to large scale merchandised producers who were
close allies of the military government. In Zambia, access to
subsidised inputs could best be obtained by most rural dwellers by
membership in Agricultural Cooperative Societies. The societies
were formed by local units of the governing party and access to
inputs is contingent on political loyalty. In Senegal, the rural
base of the governing party is dominated by the 'Mourides', a
religious sect, whose major source of income is from groundnut
production, and are supported by massive amounts of subsidised
credit and other farm inputs.
3.1.4 In the markets for agricultural products, public monopsonies
depress the prices of commodities below the market price. At these
prices, demand exceeds supply. Those in charge of the market can
bestow the right of entry. Those who are permitted to secure the
goods at the government price can reap the benefit of selling it at
the market price. Persons given access to the market thus come to
owe their fortunes to the favour of those in charge. Members of the
Cocoa Marketing Board in Ghana, for example, frequently allowed
private trading by persons whose political backing they wished to
secure. Such persons came from the highest levels of the Ghanian
government. In Kenya maize market, issuance of movement permits by
the director of the Maize and produce Marketing Board was used to
create an indebted and loyal political following. Granting access
to markets where the price of commodities has been artificially
lowered as a matter of government policy thus becomes a valuable
instrument in the accumulation of political influence. In this way
market regulations thus become a source of political control.
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Finally, Bates, conclude that governments are driven to spend in
ways that maintains them in power. And competition for power
appears to have driven political elites to extract resources from
agriculture at a rate that has caused private individuals to
withdraw resources from that sector or at least to fail to make
further investment in it. The pattern of price intervention,
represents the form of political pact among organised political
interests, the costs of which are transferred to unorganised
interests who are excluded from the price setting coalition.
Members of the pact are labour, industry, and government; small
scale farmers constitute its victims and large scale farmers stand
as passive allies, politically neutralised through subsidy
programmes.
Further, Bates [Ibid] points out that governments are not just
irrelevant in the development process, but they actually impede it.
By altering market prices, governments distort markets; they create
incentives for resources to flow in to uses other than those in
which they would be economically most productive. By regulating
entry in to markets, governments generate rents, economic premium
which lie above what the market would confer. They thereby create
incentives for people to invest, not in activities that are
economically productive but in the search for political favour.
In the discussion that follows, we look at the arguments put




Ghai and Smith [1987, pp.39-52] assert, with regard to the
agricultural policy in African countries that, the entire African
region is treated as one unit with similar problems and
performance. This is a gross over-simplification of reality and is
likely to result in a misleading policy prescription and action
programme. There are various manifestations of the crisis, and
different people have chosen to highlight its different aspects. At
its most fundamental level, the crisis is reflected in the
increasing numbers suffering from hunger and malnutrition.
Both authors [Ibid] further point out that one school of thought
argues that depressed domestic agriculture prices are at the heart
of agrarian difficulties in Africa. Another school of thought
highlights the role of surplus extraction from the peasantry. Other
such apparent differences may be explained in terms of bloated
civil services and the deterioration in international terms of
trade or by the exploitation by bureaucratic bourgeoisie and
operation of world economics.
Some commentators have stressed the role of two exogenous factors
in the agriculture crisis, the 'weather and political
disturbances'. Both these factors appear to have some validity for
certain countries. Some consider the set of arguments associated
with accelerating population growth and deterioration of the
environment. No doubt, with limited sources - land and technology-,
rapid population growth can intensify agricultural problems through
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declining yields and productivity, but the evidence does not bear
out the contention that countries with more rapid population growth
have experienced lower growth agriculture.
Whatever node of analysis is adopted, it is clear that at the most
general level, the level and growth of agricultural output is
likely to be determined largely by incentives and resources made
available to the sector by the government. The term incentives and
resources covers a wide range of activities such as attractive
prices, access to inputs and consumer goods, efficient transport
and marketing network, and an adequate investment in research and
technology in the broadest sense. The last point is particularly
important in the context both of a rapidly changing agricultural
system from shifting to settled agriculture and of the need to
raise yields and productivity to ensure an attractive income to
farmers. By all accounts the absence of suitable innovations in
technological packages has been an important element in the failure
of agricultural growth.
Smith and Thomson [1990] state that, government intervention in
agricultural markets, particularly in Africa, has been heavily
criticised in the past decade. Marketing Boards have been
stigmatised as inefficient, ineffective and corrupt - government
institutions to suppress the rural peasants and a source of rent
for privileged individuals. The general policy recommendation has
been to reduce government intervention to a minimum. The result in
the 1980s has been a general thrust towards liberalisation in
economic affairs stimulated in many countries by a feeling that
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government provision of goods and services was inefficient or that
massive government intervention in the economy was costly and
counter-productive. In other countries also, moves towards
liberalisation have occurred mainly as a result of pressure from
donor agencies for structural adjustments in an attempt to resolve
balance of payments and debts problems [Smith and Thomson, 1991],
Further, they [Ibid] argue that, although the details vary in
different countries, the focus of liberalisation has generally been
on "getting the price right" and reducing the role of government in
the economy. More especially, in the agricultural sector there have
been calls to make more use of "border" or international prices, as
a basis for agricultural pricing; to remove or to reduce
agricultural inputs subsidies, for example on fertilisers, and also
general food subsidies; and to encourage private sector
participation in agricultural and food marketing by delegating most
government-run marketing activities to them and removing barriers
to private sector participation such as inter-seasonal and pan-
territorial price setting.
Given the potential scope for governments in terms of improving and
stabilising market functions, and the existence of some state
intervention which has a successful operational record, this seems
a rather extreme response. A more systematic analysis of the
reasons for government failure could identify possibilities of
reforms, rather than removal [Smith and Thomson, p.10, 1990].
They [Ibid, 1990, p.12] further say that the inefficiency of state
53
agencies is not inevitable. Much depends on their objectives, the
obligations placed on both the institution, and its employees, and
whether these are enforceable. In some countries, farmers'
organisations have played an effective role as pressure groups in
ensuring state organisation efficiency. In most countries the state
marketing agencies operate alongside the private and cooperative
sector. In recent years there have been several moves which have
allowed the private sector to play a more active and secure role in
food grain marketing activities. However, in future years, food
security and produce price stability and support are likely to
remain important government objectives and governments are likely
to retain state control agencies to control international trade, by
acting as buyers and sellers of last resort and maintain food
reserve stock.
Finally they [Smith and Thomson, p.5, 1990] say that, much of the
discussion of liberalisation of agriculture marketing has been in
the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, where there has been
considerable external pressure to undertake fairly rigorous
adjustment programmes.
Asian countries already have an institutional frame work wherein
the public and private sector co-exist. Which has provided a stable
environment conducive to agricultural growth. As a result, in many
countries, agricultural markets are reasonably well integrated,
with adequate physical infrastructure. This means that the nature
of implementation problems associated with liberalisation are
significantly less acute than those faced by many African
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governments. This provides the opportunities for the public sector
now to withdraw at least to some extent from those areas which no
longer require the same degree of public sector involvement [Smith
and Thomson, p.18, 1991].
Smith and Thomson [1990], justify government intervention on the
following main points:
3.2.1. Market Regulation.
In nearly all circumstances, there is a need for the government to
provide a framework of regulations covering items such as
standardised weights and measures, grading schemes to reduce
transactions costs and minimum quality standards relating physical,
nutritional and health standards of products.





Agricultural production is notoriously susceptible to a variety of
risks which can have a profound effect especially in low income,
agriculturally dominated economies. Due to variable weather
conditions, pests and diseases, coupled with a price inelastic
demand for domestically marketed surpluses leads to income
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instability for producers. In theory, risk-averse farmers can
protect themselves against the effects of instability through
borrowing in credit markets, insurance or the use of futures
markets but in practice these options rarely exist for small
farmers in low income countries.
Low income domestic consumers can also be profoundly affected by
agricultural production instability through its effects on food
prices which are a major item of expenditure for the low income
groups. In this regard, consumers can reduce the impact of
shortages of any particular food item by switching to substitutes
but the possibilities for this are sometimes limited. Storage is an
alternative method of overcoming the effects of variable food
supplies. Though the public sector stock holding is, of course,
costly, the government is in a much better position to be risk-
neutral and to commit capital to inter-seasonal storage than
private traders. On the other hand, the international price
instability in an open economy can also destabilise the incomes of
domestic producers and consumers by influencing the domestic price
level.
3.2.3. Imperfect Information.
Agricultural production is spatially dispersed, it is typically
carried out by a large number of small producers, and output and
prices are subject to wide fluctuations. These factors collectively
explain why information is so important. Information, though
important, is so costly that small producers and traders would
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encounter higher opportunity costs in obtaining it privately and
the possibility of benefiting from it is circumscribed by the small
amount of produce which they may wish to sell or produce. For this
reason the case for government involvement is clearly made,
otherwise the information would be limited to certain groups linked
by kinship, caste, tribe or nationality.
3.2.4 Income Distribution.
Producers in most areas may be deprived of access to marketing
facilities. In this regard, government may set up public sector
marketing channels or introduce pan-territorial pricing to assist
these people.
3.2.5 Externalities.
Agriculture marketing, involving the bulking of produce from
numerous individual farmers and its subsequent distribution to
countless consumers offers some interesting examples of
externalities, often of a negative nature. A classical case is the
potential sale of contaminated food stuffs which justifies, and
requires, the public provision of food safety regulations.
3.2.6 Food Security.
Low income domestic consumers can be profoundly affected by
agricultural production instability through its effects on food
prices which are a major item of expenditure for the low income
groups. Consumers can reduce the impact of shortages of any
particular food item by switching to substitutes but the
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possibilities for this are sometimes limited.
3.3 Main points of Bates and Smiths arguments:
Bates' Argaaeats Saiths* Arguaeats
Bates justifies the free aarket with the
arguments that:
- Governaents are driven to spend in a way
that aaintain thea in power,
- They utilise the incoae eitracted froa
agriculture (by depressing the fara prices)
for political purpose, for eiaaple:
- serve elite's interests,
- offer low food price to urban consuaers,
- subsidies are aisused and offered aainly
to the political loyal,
- shelter doaestic industries,
- The indirect intervention of govemnents
■ainly adopting over-valuation policy, low¬
ers the earning of export crops,
- Offering subsidies on fara inputs and suppr¬
essing crop prices results in a wastage of
resources, instead of helping the producers
and poor consuners.
- Vhen the econoay of any country depends aai-
nly on agriculture and the incoae derived
froa it is aisused, there will be disaster
in the agriculture sector and the whole
econoay of the country.
- Bence the governaents should withdraw froa
■arkets and let the econoaic forces prevail.
Saith justifies the goveraaeat's significant
involveaent in agriculture on the basis of the
following Bain arguaents:
- A governaent aay be the best organisation
to undertake iaportation particularly where
concessional supplies or governaent -to-
governaent negotiations are concerned.
- The uncertainties of international trade
and possibilities of doaestic eaergencies
aake it desirable for governaents to
aaintain a food reserve stock, regardless
of the effectiveness of the private sector.
- Adoption of a coapletely laissez-faire
policy with regard to food grains with
responsibilities vested in private iaport
export is highly unlikely, given the price
variability in the international grain
aarket, particularly rice A the destabilis-
ation effects this could have on doaestic
producer A consuaer prices.
- Finally, the aain circuastances which
aay justify governaent intervention in
agricultural aarkets, includes the presence
of risk and instability; iaperfect inforaa-




In the debate between the writers, Smith's points regarding
agricultural policies, in which he argues for significant State
involvement, are well taken. But, if the state comes along and
makes things worse, he may still be wrong. Particularly where there
is a corrupt government, Smith may be theoretically right, but in
practice the consequences may be worse.
On the other hand, Bates' opinion in which he argues for the
prevailing economic forces and the complete withdrawal of the state
from agricultural markets (liberalisation) is not enough.
The writers continue to comment on a particular historical echo, so
they are not neutral. They hold that, in the 1960s and 1970s, all
the problems were solvable by the state involvement. The early
1980s saw the beginning of the world debt crisis, the collapse of
growth rates in the developing world and so on. With regard to this
period, Bates' statement regarding free market holds water.
However, the same cannot be said about the 1990s. What seems to be
true now is that people, who believe in the power of the market
place, while still seeing some role for the government. A kind of
messy mixture.





AGRICULTURAL MARKETING: A CASE FOR LIBERALISATION.
The object of this chapter is to examine a case for privatisation
and liberalisation in general and with regard to agriculture in
particular. These two concepts form the basis for the whole
discussion.
This chapter is organised as follows: The case for privatisation
and liberalisation in general, and with the agriculture sector in
particular is described in sections 4.1 and 4.2 respectively.
Activities amenable to market and Government are summarised in
section 4.3.
4.1 Privatisation and Liberalisation in General.
Privatisation has received unambiguous acclaim in the developed
world led by the USA and the Conservative government in the U.K.
The 'Thatcher privatisation model' [see for example, Heald, 1988]
has been widely hailed as a symbol of "successful privatisation".
One simple reason why a government privatises or liberalises is
because it has reached a stage where it is no longer able to
provide most of the services and goods to the public as it used to
in the past. The days of abundant resources and excessive spending
are over. In fact rising costs, shrinking revenues and federal aid
cutbacks have grown to a stage that warrants immediate attention on
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the part of governments.
In most cases of privatisation, external persuasion has been
involved, be it as a strictly advisory input in the form of project
aid such as the USAID-supported 'Bolsa' grain exchange project in
Ecuador or as a precondition for further external capital inflows
and monetary support by World Bank,IMF, bilateral and multilateral
finance consortium and donor groups. In some countries,
liberalisation and privatisation have been facilitated by
'structural adjustment loans, a favoured recent element in World
Bank lending programmes [see Reusse, 1987, p.305].
Nowadays, because of the internal and external pressure,
privatisation and liberalisation are on the economic policy agenda
of most developing countries. It is a topic on which the volumes of
writing and discussions have far outstripped the quantum of action.
It is also a subject which has very different meanings in the hands
of different commentators. The changing trends towards
privatisation or public-private sector co-operation as a strategy
for growth is becoming a popular goal among many governments of the
world.
Privatisation in developing countries has been undertaken in a
number of ways, including complete divestment by selling shares in
the organisation: a strategy dependent for its success on the
existence of a strong capital market. An alternative has been to
lease the enterprise to a private sector organisation with
government taking a share of any subsequent profits. In some cases
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state owned enterprises (SOEs) have been liquidated and the market
deregulated to encourage the private sector to take over the
functions concerned. This last approach has been widely adopted in
service industries where private contractors have been encouraged
to provide services previously supplied centrally. While the main
focus of privatisation in developing countries has to date been on
the industrial sector, recently greater attention has been given to
the role of government in agriculture.
4.2 The Agriculture sector:A case for Privatisation/Liberalisation.
In developing countries mainly dependent on agriculture, a central
component of the recommendations for structural adjustment
presently being considered is the liberalisation of agricultural
marketing. This involves not only the question of pricing policy,
the removal of subsidies and the realignment of exchange rates but
also an increase in the role of the private sector, in the belief
that greater competition in marketing will lead to increased
efficiency and will permit a reduction in the high level of costs
presently borne by governments in the support of State-owned
marketing organisations.
In practice, opportunities for privatisation or reducing government
involvement in the agriculture sector may be somewhat limited. In
contrast to the industrial or infrastructural sectors, where public
ownership is common, government involvement in direct agriculture
production is often fairly low. In many developing countries, a
major part of agricultural production is undertaken by small holder
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farmers, the village or landlord. Clearly, in these circumstances a
major share of agricultural production is in private hands anyway.
Where governments do have large land holdings, there are
opportunities to turn it over to private production.
Given that government land holdings may be relatively small and
that a larger proportion of agricultural production is likely to be
private already, it seems probable that the main targets for
privatisation will be institutions servicing the sector, including
those supplying inputs and those which market output. These are
both areas where governments in developing countries have typically
taken a major role. State marketing organisations in particular
seems likely to become a major focus because, in many ways, they
reflect the problem of SOEs in developing countries.
In practice, outright divestment of such organisations in their
existing form may be difficult since as loss making concerns, they
are likely to be unattractive to private investors. An alternative
approach is to liquidate the organisation and let the private
sector take over its functions. This approach will usually be
accompanied by a range of measures to deregulate the market and
free it from government control.
Generally in agriculture, the precise legal situation is normally
hard to ascertain. An example of this is the implementation of
divestment/deregulation/decontrol decrees and the degree of law
enforcement. Neither public nor private participants in the system
are able to define the situation precisely.
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Nevertheless, a selective approach and appropriate speed and time
of implementation might be safer. In which only one or two
commodities at a time are subjected to deregulation and perhaps
only certain functions of existing state organisations such as
processing, transport, rural assembly or wholesale/retail
distribution are initially considered for privatisation. An
advantage of the selective approach is the opportunity to avoid
mistakes experienced in the first liberalisation [see Reusse,1987,
p.306].
Past experiences [see, World Development, vol.17, no.5, 1989] of
liberalisation and privatisation in the agriculture sector confirm
that, liberalisation is a process rather than a one shot event in
which the government leaves the market. It involves fundamental
reallocation of roles between the public and private sector. Even
where there are the chances of complete divestment in agricultural
marketing, it is not enough to say that states should stop doing
certain things.
The state must take new responsibilities, such as providing public
information systems and infrastructural development, in order to
facilitate the private sectors' ability to respond to its new
opportunities. Particularly in countries that have little prior
experience with liberalisation, the reallocation of roles involves
a process of learning by doing, in which both the public and
private sector gradually find out what changes in the 'rules of the
games' are desirable and feasible. The best case of government
intervention is in the activities where individuals do not absorb
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the full costs or benefits of their actions, that is, where there
are significant externalities. Table 4.1, exemplifies some of the
main activities in the agriculture sector, some of which are
amenable to market and some to government solutions.
Table 4.1
4.3. Activities amenable to Market and Government Solution.











ii. Risks and Futures Markets;
-price instability/Minim; support
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Most developing countries lack capital markets of a size sufficient
to finance rural infrastructure, such as large irrigation projects,
roads and electricity. These activities are not amenable to the
market solution because people do not have the capital assets to
invest in these projects. Consequently, the government has to carry
out such investment because the state can borrow money from the
world financial markets, primarily from the World Bank.
In these activities, the beneficiaries are clearly an identifiable
group of users, from whom the costs can be recovered through taxes
or rent. There is clearly a role for the state as well as the
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■arket because if proper prices are not charged on projects like
irrigation or electricity, people will misuse then, resulting in
adverse after-effects. The classical example was the use of
electricity in Egypt, where the people were getting cheap
electricity when it was surplus. But when the population grew,
electricity demand also grew very rapidly. Because of these
unrealistically low prices in comparison to other sources of
energy, in the end there was an electricity shortages [Khalid
Ikram, 1980, pp.264-65].
4.3.2 Prices and futures Markets.
Artificial control on prices and monopoly behaviour by government
in buying and selling distorts a market. Producers and consumers
should be free to produce or sell and buy respectively, whatever
they want and whatever they feel will profit them. There are few
cases where the absence of an important market may justify or
necessitate a limited state role. For example: the absence of
futures markets and price instability^, and measures to directly
support the incomes of the poor farmers in ways that do not distort
price signals.
None of these policies are without costs, however, usually the best
policies are those that are aimed directly at the root of the
problem, rather than symptoms. For example, two primary reasons for
the failure of farmers and agro-processors to insure themselves in
international future markets may be macro economic policies that
generate uncertainty as to the level of real exchange rate and
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restrictions on trading in foreign currencies. Here, the best
policy would be to improve the macro economic and exchange rate
policies, rather than trying to create an alternative insurance
scheme by stabilising prices as suggested by Knudson and Nash
[1991] in their study.
They [Ibid, 1991] say that, if government intends to stabilise
prices, perhaps because the commodity is basic staple food for the
poor or the prices are highly volatile, the experience of many
countries show that it is crucial that the government pursue this
goal in a manner that avoids government control and ownership of
the crops. Stabilising prices by the system of variable border
taxes and possibly subsidies instead of by direct procurement makes
the system transparent and predictable, assuming it operates by
well known rules. This system also minimises the possibilities of
distortion of pricing in the distribution chain (that is, by
regulating, processing, and distribution margins). A lesson of
experience is that the system should operate under rules that do
not break the link between domestic and international prices except
at times of severe instability. The purpose of stabilisation is to
insure against the risks associated with international commodity
price movement.
4.3.3 Research.
In agriculture, this includes carrying out or sponsoring either
basic or applied research that leads to the development of inputs
or techniques that could not (realistically) be patented.
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Governments all over the world carry out this function, though many
governments (for example USA) extend their research activities into
areas where private markets could be expected to work well if given
a chance, since the resulting products could be patented and
privately marketed for example, hybrid seeds or mechanical hardware
production.
4.3.4 Fertilisers.
There is a significant role for marketing in supplying or
distributing fertilisers. In the public sector, subsidies offered
favour the big farmers [see chapter II] and the cost is further
magnified by the inefficient way in which these subsidies are
administered. Hence, subsidies negate whatever equity benefit might
otherwise have accrued.
As far as the fertiliser production is concerned, various studies
have confirmed that private sector fertiliser plants are more
productive as compared to public sector plants [Srinivasan, 1986],
During the field work by the author in Pakistan, it was confirmed
that the same situation exists there.
4.4.5 Credit.
Government involvement in subsidised rural credit for the producers
is based on the perception that credit would otherwise be
unavailable or available only at exploitative rates. But, yet when
surveys have been done, it turns out that most farmers have access
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to other private sources of credit, and these credit markets are
competitive, not monopolistic [Harris, 1983; Singh, 1983; Well,
1983].
This does not mean that there is no role for the state or its
involvement is not justified. Past experience, for example in rice
marketing in Thailand shows that, governments can play a
significant role in providing credit to traders and/or millers as
well as producers, to promote competition and to keep stock with
them when prices fell down. The traders and millers who need money
on a large scale for installation of machinery and procurement of
crops, will find it difficult to borrow from the market at certain
times of year for seasonal crops. So clearly there is a role for
the state as well as the market, because if proper market rate
interest is charged, there will neither be a question of misusing
it nor a drain on the government budget.
Conclusion.
This chapter began by looking at the privatisation and
liberalisation in general. The latter part of this chapter has been
focussed on the case of privatisation and liberalisation in the
context of agriculture sector.
It was concluded that, in general, liberalisation or regulatory
reform is better able than privatisation to bring about gains in
economic efficiency.
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As far as the case of privatisation in agriculture marketing is
concerned, privatisation 'model' in general, cannot be proposed.
There are clearly many approaches to the allocation of agricultural
marketing responsibilities between private and public sector, the
approach chosen in any country depends on the particular
circumstances of the country.
In practice, the complete divestment of the agriculture sector is
difficult. Even where outright privatisation takes place, arguments
in the body of the chapter suggest that government will retain a
degree of control. This is most likely to occur where governments
seek to pursue non-commercial objectives or the activities where
individuals do not absorb the full costs or benefits of their
actions, such as maintaining food security, price instability,
market information, and infrastructural development. In these
cases, the private sector would be unlikely to undertake these
functions.
In brief, the foregoing analysis amounts to asserting that, the
activities which are beyond the approach market solution should be
left to market government.
The next chapter, will focus on the economic structure of Pakistan
in general, and the role of agriculture.
Foot. Note ■





PAKISTAN'S ECONOMY IN GENERAL AND AGRICULTURE IH PARTICULAR.
In this chapter, to understand the background of Pakistan, a brief
review of its geography, and politics is undertaken, before
describing the economy in general and agriculture in particular.
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.1 presents the
geographical background of Pakistan. The brief political history is
described in section 5.2. The position of Pakistan's economy and
its structure is the subject of the rest of the chapter.
5.1 Geographical Background of Pakistan.
Although Pakistan is a new and young state - it emerged as a
sovereign state, on August, 14, 1947 — it is an old land because
the Indus Valley contains the monuments of an ancient and well
developed civilisation that flourished at least as early as 2500
B.C. Excavation of 'Mohen-Jo-Daro' in Sindh gives evidence of
planned urban communities and civilisation.
The present Pakistan, with an area of 79,6095 square kilometres, is
divided into four provinces namely: Punjab, Sindh, North West
Frontier Province (NWFP), and Baluchistan. Islamabad is the capital
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Rote: a. Population figures are on the basis of 1981 census.
b. Includes Federal Capital Territory of Islaiabad.
c. Excludes the Population of Federal capital Islamabad.
Soirees:'Pakistan's Econoiy Key Indicators'(May, 1990), Rational Bank of Pakistan, Planning
and Research Division, Karachi; Econoaic Survey of Pakistan [1988-90] Government of
Pakistan, Islamabad.
Pakistan touches the Himalayan foot-hills and Hindu-Kush mountains
in the North and is bounded by India in the East and the South. It
borders Iran and Afghanistan on the West. Along the mountain ranges
of Himalaya and Hindu Kush in the North of Pakistan, lies the
Soviet Socialist Republics. The disputed territory of the States of
Jammu and Kashmir and the agencies of Gilgit and Baltistan are
adjacent to the North-East of Pakistan [fig: 5.A].
Pakistan is a land of great scenic contrasts, varying from the
snow-covered peaks of the Himalayas in the North of Pakistan to the
arid desert of Sindh in the South. Pakistan can be broadly divided
in to three distinct geographical regions:(i) The mountainous North
and North-West; (ii) the table-land of Baluchistan to the West of
mountain wall, and (iii) the plain of the Indus River basin.
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The entire Mountainous region is composed of young and soft
sedimentary rock. Lying outside the mountain-wall and ringed by it
on three sides is the arid plateau of Baluchistan. The altitude of
the plateau varies from 1,000 to 3,000 feet above sea level, with
peaks of over 6,000 feet in the surrounding mountains. It is
largely barren desert and stony plain, handicapped by lack of water
and subject to extremes of heat and cold. The plain of the Indus
Basin stretches from the foot-hills of the Himalayas in the North-
East and the Salt Range in the North-West to the Arabian Sea. The
river Indus and its tributaries — namely Ravi, Chenab, and Jhelum
— provide the very life blood to this arid region, whose economy
is literally build around the rivers.
Pakistan lies wholly outside the tropics, and although its climate
is generally classified as 'Tropical Monsoon' it is in fact
'Continental' in its character. Rainfall is low and both diurnal
and annual ranges of temperatures are considerable. The hottest
month of the year is June, the coldest month is January, the driest
month is October, and the wettest month is July. During the summer,
day temperatures are quite high everywhere in Pakistan; the mercury
often rises to well over 110°F (43.3°C) and the mean July
temperature is above 90°F(32.2°C). The seasonal — winter and
summer — mean temperature and rainfall at selected centres
(Capital Cities of Pakistan) in 1988 is shown in the table-5.2.
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TABLE-5.2
MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM MEAN TEMPERATURE IN MAIN CITIES OF PAKISTAN.
Cities. Mean Temperature °C
Rainfall in
millimetresMinimum. Maximum.
Karachi, 21.14 32.8 160
Lahore, 18.8 31.9 815
Peshawar, 16.7 30.5 367
Rawalpindi/Islamabad, 14.9 29.5 1259
Quetta, 9.1 25.9 259
Source: 'Pakistan at a glance* (1990), Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan,
Islamabad.
5.2 A Brief Political History of Pakistan.
On August 14, 1947, the Indian sub-continent was divided in to two
countries — India and Pakistan. Pakistan emerged as sovereign
State consisting of East and West Pakistan under the leadership of
Quaid-i-Azam Mohamad Ali Jinnah but he died quite soon after. The
two parts of Pakistan — East Pakistan and West Pakistan — were
separated by 1000 miles of Indian territory. For eleven years after
the independence of Pakistan, it operated under a parliamentary
system, during which time, no national election was held.
In March 1956, an Islamic Republic was proclaimed after the
Constituent Assembly adopted a draft constitution drawn up the
previous month. Several Governments rose and fell, and in October
1958 president Sikandar Mirza declared Martial Law and handed over
power to General Mohammad Ayub Khan, who appointed himself as Chief
Marshal Law Administrator. In 1962 Ayub Khan brought in a
Presidential system of Government, but in 1969 he resigned, handing
over power to the army under the leadership of General Mohammad
Yehya Khan, who re-imposed Martial Law.
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Under the new - 1956 - constitution, the first ever general
election was held in December 1970 which resulted in a break
between the Eastern and Western part of Pakistan. The Awani League,
under the leadership of Shaikh Mujibur Rahman gained the majority
of vote in the eastern part of Pakistan (present Bangladesh), and
the Pakistan's Peoples Party (PPP) under the leadership of Zulfiqar
Ali Bhutto, gained the majority in the western part of Pakistan
(existing Pakistan). Negotiation to form a coalition broke down and
civil war ensued, lasting until December 1971 when the eastern part
declared itself an independent nation, Bangladesh. President Yehya
Khan resigned and handed leadership of remaining western part
(existing Pakistan) to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1971, who governed up
to 1977.
Following the elections for the next term in March 1977, the
opposition — Pakistan National Alliance — with the alliance of
different parties, challenged the victory of Bhutto. Widespread
rioting ensued and in due course a military coup in July 1977
brought into power General Zia, initially as chief Marshal Law
administrator. Bhutto was arrested and soon executed. Public
pressure for the Government to abolish Marshal Law and bring back
democracy resulted in parliamentary elections in 1985 on a non¬
party basis because the political parties were banned. Mohammad
Khan Junejo was appointed as Prime Minister and according to the
8th amendment of 1973 constitution, ultimate powers with President
Zia-ul-Haque. Later on, in March 1988, Assemblies were dissolved.
Zia-ul-Haque died in air crash on 17th August 1988, Ghulam Ishaq
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Khan -- Chairman of the Senate -- on the basis of the
constitution, became the President and announced the date for the
general election. On the basis of the majority of the seats,
Benazir Bhutto — daughter of ex-Prime Minister — became the Prime
Minister of Pakistan on December 1988. On August 6, 1990 the
elected assembly was dissolved by the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan,
and dismissed the Government of Benazir Bhutto. Mr Ghulam Mustafa
Jatoi the leader of combined opposition party was appointed as the
caretaker Prime Minister, and announced that the next election will
be held on October 24, 1990.
In 1991, the general election was held on a party basis in which
Nawas Sharif was elected as Prime Minister.
On the whole, it seems that about half of the time since
independence (1947) to date, Pakistan has remained under the Army
rule.
5.3. The Economy of Pakistan in General.
5.3.1 Economic Decision Making in Pakistan.
The different types of decisions that are taken by the state
authorities are divided into four main categories, mainly on the
basis of the duration or time period of the economic problem or
choice with which the decision is concerned. The nature of the
decision, the level of state authority which takes it, the
objective to be achieved, the nature of the problem to be solved,
and the economic means available to solve it [table - 5.3].
77\
Table 5.3
Economic Decision Making by the State Authority (An illustration of
key decisions).
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rains).
Raising revenues for a. Direct A indirect
functioning of the taies,
State Machinery, b. Foreign A domestic
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4. Structural Changes Central Government i.Equitable distribution of a. Land Reforms A
economic assets,
ii.Strengthening the economic
A bargaining conditions of












Source: Viqar Ahmed and Rashid Ahmed, [1984] 'The Management of Pakistan's Economy', p.46, Oxford Universit;
Press, Karachi.
78
5.3.1.1 The Structure of Economic Decision Making ill Pakistan.
In Pakistan, the planning machinery is headed by the National
Economic Council (NEC) as the supreme policy making body in the
economic sphere. It has the President or the Prime Minister of
Pakistan as the chairman, all Federal Ministers in charge of
Development Ministries, and Provincial Governors as members. In
addition, a number of other persons are invited to attend the
meeting of the NEC as and when the agenda relates to matters
concerning them.
The functions of NEC are:
(a) to review the overall economic situation in Pakistan.
(b) to formulate plans with respect to financial, commercial,
and economic policies and economic development.
(c) to approve the Five Year Plans, the Annual Development Plans,
and Provincial Development Schemes in the public sector.
5.3.1.2 The Planning Machinery in Pakistan- A Critical Appraisal.
In Pakistan's history, one major obstacle which has stood in the
way of establishing a sound, efficient, and independent planning
authority is the lack of an effective administrative machinery and
this has greatly limited the task of development policy and
planning. Some of the factors which still continue to be major
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hindrances and act as administrative obstacles and bottlenecks to
planning as described by Viqar Ahmed and Rashid Ahmed [1984] are:
(i). Lack of Competent Personnel.
Qualified and competent persons are not attracted to join the
planning bodies in the country mainly due to: low salaries, poor
placement, promotional policies, and frequent and irrational
transfer of personnel.
(ii). Dilatory procedure.
In Pakistan, documents and files must follow a prescribed series of
stages through the administrative layers, which is a very lengthy
process hence the delay in decisions.
(iii). Lack of Co-ordination.
In many cases, the co-ordination of development activities has
become extremely difficult, because responsibility for different
aspects of a project or programme are divided among many Ministries
and agencies.
(iv). Inadequate preparatory work on projects.
When a politically desirable project has been identified, a
feasibility study has to be undertaken to determine whether it is
practicable and justified. But due to the political reasons
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(favouritism), there is no feasibility study of the projects.
5.3.2 Forces which Influence the Economic Decision-Making.
As the economic decisions in Pakistan are being considered, they
are not taken in a vacuum. They are influenced by individuals,
vested interest groups and various economic classes, for the simple
reason that the decisions themselves can have an important impact
on, and greatly influence the economic condition and well-being of
these different groups. In some cases an economic decision might be
taken purely in response to a set of economic conditions and the
groups favourably affected might not have made a conscious effort
to obtain the decision in their favour. But if, as a result of the
decision, certain groups are adversely affected they will exert
pressure to have the decision changed or an alternative path
followed which does not affect them so unfavourably [Viqar and
Rashid, 1984, p.54].
Some of the groups which play an important role in influencing the




Sew of the forces vhicfa influenex- the Ecomic Decision-Hating in Pakistan.




ii. Medium size farmers
iii. Snail size farners,
tenants, landless
labourers
Land holdings (more than 150
acres)









Ownership of industrial assets
Trade Unions.
3. Trading Sector i. Big trading firms




Control trade A influence
prices.
4. Foreign sectors i. Western aid-giving Play a major role in financing
countries (Consortitm, development plans A giving
i.e, U.S.A, U.K, France, balance of payment support.
W.Germany,Italy).
ii. Loan giving agencies
(World Bank, IMF and
Asian Development Bank)
iii. Other loan giving agencies
(USSR, Japan).
5. Other important i. Bureaucracy Central State Power
groups. ii. Urban groups A
(workers, and students). Create disturbances.
Source: Viqar Ahmed and Rashid Ahmed, [1984] 'The Management of Pakistan's Economy',
p.55, Oxford University Press, Karachi.
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5.3.3: An Overview of the Economic Policies in Pakistan in General.
It is widely believed that the economic policies of the Government
of Pakistan have been concerned primarily with accelerating the
growth rate of GNP only, and because of this, the social sector has
been neglected.
During the period when Pakistan came in to existence, it inherited
an economy which was widely regarded as an economic 'wasteland'.
The 1950s were characterised by the initial difficulties of
breaking the age-long stagnation in the economy. A high rate of
industrialisation and considerable industrial progress were
accompanied by neglect of the agriculture.
The 1960's witnessed a focus on policy support for agriculture by
introducing the high yielding varieties and fertilisers together
with the introduction of incentives for private investment in
industry. In retrospect, the incentives were probably too lavish,
even wasteful. However, at that stage the paramount national
concern was to overcome the inertia and to get the economy moving.
The intervention of disturbing factors notably the postponement of
Consortium aid to Pakistan in July 1965 and the Indo-Pakistan war
in September 1965 imparted a sense of urgency to the short term
task of maintaining the growth momentum of the economy in a hostile
climate [Omar Noman, 1988; and Viqar Ahmed and Rashid Ahmed 1984].
During 1970s, a policy of widespread nationalisation of industries
was followed, but it failed because of mainly the political
/
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reasons. On the other hand there is a feudal system in Pakistan in
which the majority of the farmers are landless. Realising the
importance of agriculture, the land reforms took place with the
objective to limit the size of land holdings and to distribute it
to the landless farmers as incentive so they would be motivated to
work harder and improve the agricultural production by using the
modern technology as much as possible. But it is widely believed
that the situation has not changed to a great extent , even after
couple of land reforms because the land reforms were not
implemented properly. Generally poor, these tenants are small
farmers, using mostly primitive farming techniques and the majority
of these farmers are farming without their own land.
There was denationalisation by the Zia-ul-Haque Government in the
late 1970s. The Zia Government, with regard to increasing the
agriculture output, implemented policies aimed at reclaiming
water-logged land, and re-orienting agricultural credit in favour
of the small farmers. In 1987-88, a number of policy measures to
ensure better returns to farmers and to accelerate the pace of
development in agriculture were introduced, along with schemes of
crop insurance, covering wheat and rice.
The National Commission on Agriculture' which was set-up by the
order of Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo in 1986, submitted its
report in 1988. The Commission evolved a comprehensive strategy to
raise the growth rate in agriculture to 5X per annum during the
next 15 years.
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During the Zia regime (1977-1988), the Government was committed to
the introduction of an Islamic economic system such as Zakat,
Usher, and Iqra Taxes, levied on the personal savings, agricultural
produce, and imports/exports respectively, whilst all banking
transactions are in principle based on Islamic modes of financing.
The fundamental principle of these is profit and loss sharing.
In view of the previous discussion, it seems that in the past there
had been a frequent change of Government in Pakistan, especially in
1970s and 1980s. Every Government announced its own policies and
development programmes. For example in the early 1070s, the Bhutto
Government announced the 'three points' based (socialism) programme
— 'Roti, Kapra owr Makan' (bread, cloth, and shelter). During the
Zia regime, Mohammad Khan Junejo — Prime Minister at that time —
announced a five point programme, and Zia-ul-Haque's programme was
based mainly on the principles of Islamic economy.
5.3.4 Economic Outturn in Pakistan.
The term economic outturn used here means the economic change or
economic progress of any country. There are different views to
measure the economic development or economic performance of any
country, some people measure the economic development of any
country by GDP or GNP, and per capita income, whereas others by
keeping in view the development of social sectors such as literacy
rate, health and life expectancy. In the author's view, both
factors are important for measuring the economy of any country; but
the simplest find most commonly used measure of economic development
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is the level of change in the national income rather in the gross
national product (GNP). If one is interested to know the level and
the rate of change in the living standard of the people, per capita
income would be the best indicator. For general purposes on country
level, the measure adopted is the rate of growth of GNP. If
international or inter-regional comparisons of living standards are
to be made, a rough measure is per capita income during a given
year.
The Gross Domestic Production in Pakistan was Rs: 35,773 million in
1972-73, and Rs: 86,166 million for the year 1987-88 at constant
factor cost of 1959-60. This shows a real growth of 140% in the
last one and a half decades. The Gross National Product as an
indicator of overall economic activity has increased almost 137% on
average since 1970-71 to 1987-88. For example, in 1970-71 it was
Rs: 32,664 million and in 1987-88 Rs: 88,887 million. This means
that approximately same is the case of GNP as GDP (table-5.5, fig:-
5.5.A), [Economic Survey of Pakistan, 1987-88].
On the whole, Pakistan's economy has expanded at well over an
average of 6% per annum in the past one and a half decades. It
seems that the economy of Pakistan from the GNP point of view is
satisfactory because since 1947, the GNP has increased at the rate
of 5.1% per annum. Since the population grew at a rate of 2.8%,
personal incomes increased by only 2.3%. However, even at this
rate, the income of the average Pakistani (Per Capita Income) in
the 1980s is more than double that at the time of independence [The
Economist Intelligence Unit, 'Pakistan and Afghanistan', 1989, no:
2, p.19].
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Since 1947, Pakistan's economy has gone through a profound change
from the GNP point of view, because it is about five times larger
and more modernised. It provides two and half times as much income
(per capita income) to a population nearly three times the size of
that in 1947. It is much more open in the sense that it trades a
large proportion of its output with the outside world. These
statistics confirm that a significant change has occurred [Viqar
Ahmed and Rashid Ahmed, 1984].
As far as the growth rate of GDP in Pakistan is concerned, each
decade it tells a different story. In terms of the increase of GDP
in the 1950s, Pakistan did two and half times as well as the low
income countries (table-5.6). The difference was in the 1960s but
the situation changed in the 1970s. The growth of the low income
Asian countries picked up and that of Pakistan declined. The
worrying thing about this picture of performance is that the
economy seemed to be losing momentum in the 1970's. Although
Pakistan's national product (GNP) continued to increase at a rate
higher than the average for all low income countries. The 1980s
have turned the picture around once again; and Pakistan's
performance is twice as good as that of low income countries.
To measure the economy of a country, there are also some other
factors need to be taken into account, that is, social sector such
as education, health, and standard of living. Pakistan's
achievement in terms of social progress is somewhat less striking
[table-5.7]. The most disappointing feature of its development
experience is in the area of education which has not improved much,
because at present its literacy rate is 24% whereas the low income
countries' literacy rate is 49%.
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TABLE-5.6
Real GDP growth rate as an annual average in percentage.
1950-60 1950-75 1960-70 1970-80 1980-87 1988
a
Low Incoae Countries :
Africa, 1.4 2.4 4.2 4.0 0.4 3.1
Asia, - 1.7 3.0 3.8 6.1 8.5
Pakistan, — 4.6 6.7 4.8 6.7 6.3
Middle Incoae Countries**: 2.2 4.0 5.5 5.8 3.1 3.5
c
Developing Countries : - - 4.9 5.4 3.7 4.3
Industrial Countries'*: 4.2 3.0 3.4 4.2 2.3 2.8
Source: - David Moravetz, [1976] 'Twenty five Years (1950-75) of
economic development; World Bank, World Development
Report [1990],
Note: The categories of the economies described in the World Bank
Annual Report 1990 are as:
Countries with GNP per capita of $545 or less.
^
= = = = more than $545 but less than $6000.
cSince 1989 World Development Report,the Developing Countries group
was dropped.
^Countries with GNP per capita income of $6000 or more.
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TABLE - 5.7
Social Sector of Pakistan with Cross Country Comparisons.
Coutry/Regioi. Per Capita iicoie










Eigk Iicoie Coaatries1. 17080 76 25 09 -
Kiddle Iicoie Coutriei'1. 1930 66 98 52 70
Loi Iicoie Coutriesc. 320 60 124 72 49
lalajsia. 1940 70 55 23 60
Tkailaad. 1000 65 88 30 86
Pkilippiies. (30 64 72 44 83
Iidoiesii. 440 61 128 68 62
Sri-Laika. 420 71 63 21 86
Pakistai. 350 55 149 107 24
Iidia. 340 58 150 97 36
Ckiia (Kail). 330 70 55 23 60
Bkitai. 180 48 171 127 10
Baigladesk. 170 51 144 118 26
Source: World Bank, World Development Annual Report [1990],
Note:
aCountries with GNP per capita $6000 or more in 1988.
^Countries with GNP per capita more than $545 but less than $6000.
cCountries with GNP per capita $ 545 or less.
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Table 5.7, indicates that in Pakistan, though the health facilities
have helped to cut the child death rate from 149 per thousand in
1965 to 107 per thousand at present, it is still a very high death
rate in comparison to the other low income countries. The health
status of the people depends up on a number of factors which
include: the nature and the quality of the available health
services, income level, nutrition, sanitation, housing, drinking
water, and other environmental variables. Thus it is not surprising
to say that the existing health conditions in Pakistan are
generally unsatisfactory and that the health services are quite
inadequate and unevenly distributed. The quality of life also
depends upon access to safe drinking water, waste disposal, and
general sanitation.
In Pakistan, both in urban and rural areas, there are serious
deficiencies of such facilities. Access to safe drinking water is
available to only 26.8% of the total population. But most of these
facilities are concentrated in urban areas only. Generally to
improve the social sector, the need, remains in any society to
organise the special programmes for small vulnerable groups of
people. They are not in a position to adequately participate in
normal social and economic life on equal footing with the large
groups of population.
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5.3.5 Pakistan's Balance of Trade and Balance of Payents.
5.3.5.1 Balance of Trade.
No country in the world is self sufficient in the sense of
supplying all its needs from within its own borders, every country
has to import or export. As far as the pattern of Pakistan's
foreign trade is concerned, it is similar to that of many other
under-developed countries. Table-5.8 shows the position of
Pakistan's exports and imports. It indicates that Pakistan has had
a negative Balance of Trade for almost all the years. The most
important source for improving the balance of trade in Pakistan is
the country's own foreign exchange earnings through foreign
remittances. This may be supplemented by foreign exchange reserves
accumulated in the past and foreign assistance in the form of
loans, grants, and direct investment.
Table - 5.8
Pakistan: Summary of Balance of Trade, Balance of Payieat, 1 workers remittances fro* abroad.
(U.S Billion dollar at constant prices).
Years Export. Iaports. Trade Balance. Total
Reaittances.
Current Account Balance'
1972-73 531 518 13 136.00 n.a
1977-78 1283 2751 - 1468 1156.33 - 605
1978-79 1644 3816 - 2172 n.a -1114
1979-80 2341 4857 - 2516 1744.14 -1140
1980-81 2799 5563 - 2764 n.a -1037
1981-82 2319 5769 - 3450 n.a -1534
1982-83 2627 5616 - 2989 2885.67 - 517
1983-84 2669 5616 - 2989 2737.44 - 997
1984-85 2457 6009 - 3552 2446.00 -1680
1985-86 2942 5984 - 3042 2595.31 -1236
1986-87 3498 5792 - 2294 2278.56 - 719
1987-88 4362 6919 - 2557 2012.60 -1682
1988-89 4634 7207 - 2573 1986.99 -1934
aIt iaclides set 101 factor 101 services, set investnest iicone, aid let private traisfers or set workers
renittaice.
Soiree: Ecoioiic Sirvej of Pakistu [1989-90], Govermeit of Pakistaa, Islamabad, pp.151,173.
lote: l-a = lot available.
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The remittances from abroad, particularly from the Middle East have
been a major source of foreign exchange earnings for the last
decade. Its importance can be judged from the fact that remittances
exceeded the country's merchandisable export earnings during 1982-
83 and 1983-84. Workers remittances were $136 million or about 18%
of merchandisable export during 1972-72. Within a decade, they
reached the level of $2886 million in 1982-83 and surpassed the
merchandisable export earnings by about 10% [table-5.8]. In
Pakistan, the remittances constituted the largest source of foreign
exchange earnings. Remittances were four times greater than net aid
flows to Pakistan. It seems that their volume was substantial in
relation to the size of the economy. Keeping in view the
significance of remittances, if the capital market is liberalised,
there will be no black marketing in foreign exchange, [Omer oman,
1988, pp.162-63].
In 1987-88, to improve the Balance of Trade, the Government of
Pakistan announced a three year export policy, which aimed to
reduce the trade deficit by promoting higher-value added exports by
liberalising the regulations governing the import of raw materials,
by banning the import of certain type of machinery to protect local
industry by making the exports of rice and cotton to some extent
accessible to the private sector and encouraging counter-trading
[The Europa World Year Book, p.2074, 1988]. But the liberalisation
policies were not actually implemented.
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5.3.5.1.1. Direction of Pakistan's Trade.
Pakistan after partition (1947) was primarily an exporter of
agricultural products and an importer of manufacturing goods mainly
consumer goods. The trade was with virtually all regions of the
world, but with the needs of foreign assistance, the trade with the
developed countries increased at a higher rate, particularly with
U.S.A, Japan, and Western-Europe. With the process of
industrialisation, the pattern of trade underwent certain changes
because imports from the industrial countries tended to decrease
with the production of import substitutes at home. The import of
raw materials for manufacturing increased and thus did the trade
with the developing countries.
Pakistan nowadays imports, especially: machinery, transport
equipment, manufactured goods — construction, iron and steel —
chemicals, petroleum and petroleum products, vegetable oil, fats
and milk.
On the export side, other than agricultural products; manufactures
particularly cotton - based industrial products, wool, hides, and
skins, fish, and minerals are exported to all regions of the world
such as, Japan, U.S.A, United Kingdom, Canada, Middle East,
Africa, Central America, South America, HongKong, Indonesia,
Singapore and Oceania (Australia and New Zealand).
The major trading partners of Pakistan are: Japan, U.S.A, Saudi
Arabia, West Germany, and United Kingdom.
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5.3.5.2 Pakistan's Balance of Payents.
The term Balance of Payments is used in a wider sense which
includes all items of receipts and payments of a country over a
year on the current account. Pakistan's Balance of Payments since
independence has always remained in deficit (table-5.8 and fig:
5.8-A).
To meet the balance of payments requirements, the country finds
some external resources like aid, loans or credits. In this regard
Pakistan receives aid from OPEC countries bilaterally as well as
through the international agencies, including the Islamic
Development Bank and OPEC fund for development. Pakistan is also
regular recipient of aid from the World Bank and World Bank
sponsored aid - to - Pakistan from a consortium comprising the
developed countries. The IMF also provides aid as balance of
payments support under various arrangements.
Regarding the future, the improvement in the balance of payments
will depend on:
(a) how Pakistan increases the export surplus.
(b) Pakistan's ability to produce import substitutes.
(c) prices of exports and imports.
(d) export of human capital.
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5.3.6 Economic Structure of Pakistan.
The economy of Pakistan consists of three main sectors - Primary,
Secondary, and Tertiary sectors - as shown in, table-5.9 and fig:
5.9.A.
5.3.6.1 The Primary Sector.
The primary sector contains agriculture - all agriculture crops,
livestock, fishing and forestry - and mining. In this case nearly
95% of the primary sector is agriculture. The agriculture sector
accounts for a quarter of GNP. The average share of the primary
sector as a percentage of GNP from 1970-71 to 1987-88 was 30%. The
share of mining and quarrying sector at constant factor cost of
1959-60 was 2.85% during 1987-88 in total agriculture production.
In GNP, and GDP, the share of Mining and Querying was only 0.63%
and 0.82% respectively [Economic Survey of Pakistan, 1987-88],
[table-5.10; fig:-5.10-A].
The primary sector is dominated by crop production, with livestock
contributing very little to the output. The principal food and cash
crops are: rice, wheat (staple food), sugar-cane, cotton and maize.
Cotton, the leading cash crop is vital for the country's textile
industry. Cotton together with rice, constituted the principal
foreign exchange earner, accounting for 47% of export revenue in
1985-86. Pakistan is one of the largest suppliers of cotton and
rice, [National Westminster Bank,1987]. The position of each main
crop is discussed below as described by the Commission Report
[Government of Pakistan, Commission Report, 1988]:
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5.3.G.1.1 Cotton.
The present cotton scenario is exciting. Production levels
increased from an average of 0.3 million tonnes in the early 1960s
to 1.4 million tonnes in 1988-89 [table-5-11 and fig:-5-ll.A].
The area under cotton doubled over the same period [table-5.12],
primarily as a result of the increased canal water supplies and
ground water development. But a more important contributing factor
was the recent break-through in yields, attaining levels of 595
kg/ha. The main factor was the new high yielding varieties (HYV)
like MNH-93 and NIAB-78, which evolved in the years 1980 and 1983
respectively and were sown extensively, mainly in Punjab [Ibid,
p. 143].
TABLE - 5.12
LAID II PAKISTAI AID AIKA DIDKK CULTIYATIOI.
(Million Hectares).
Years Total Area Forest Area Cropped Area Area Under Different Crops.
Yheat. Hice. Cotton. Sugar-cane.
1947-48 79.61 1.38 11.63 3,954 790 1,327 189
1955-56 - 1.28 13.89 4,521 969 1,407 286
1960-61 - 1.68 14.86 4,639 1,181 1,293 388
1965-66 - 2.08 15.54 5,155 1,393 1,561 597
1970-71 - 2.83 16.62 5,977 1,503 1,733 636
1975-76 - 2.84 18.02 6,111 1,710 1,852 700
1980-81 - 2.85 19.33 6,984 1,933 2,108 825
1985-86 - 3.12 20.28 7,403 1,863 2,364 780
1989-90 - 2.92 20.90 7,755 2,115 2,617 842
Source: Kconoaic Survey of Pakistan [1989-90], Governaent of Pakistan, Islamabad.
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5.3.6.1.2 Wheat.
As far as the wheat production is concerned, it has increased
fivefold since 1949-50, [table-5.11 and fig:-5-ll.A] mainly because
the new varieties introduced in 1980-85. The area expansion also
shows a clear trend over the entire period, virtually doubling from
3.95 million hectares to 7.4 million hectares in the period 1948-
86. It is also important to recognise that with the increased water
availability and improved water use efficiency, many farmers
produce more than one crop (double cropping). In the barani (rain
fed areas), yield levels, even when compared with those of the
traditional farmers in Punjab and Sindh, are exceptionally low. The
main point here is that the crops like cotton, wheat, and sugar¬
cane do not require as much water as rice [Ibid, p.130].
5.3.6.1.3 Sugar-cane.
With sugar-cane, the acreage under its production has expanded very
rapidly, from 190,000 hectares in 1974-48 to 842,000 hectares in
1989-90, (table-5.12). Cane yields, however, have been low,
stagnating between 35 and 39 tons/hec, with the result that
production increases have come, primarily from area growth [Ibid,
p.150].
5.3.6.1.4 Rice.
Drawing the historical picture for rice is somewhat more complex
than for wheat and cotton as three separate categories need to be
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distinguished by variety: Basmati, Irri, and other traditional
rice. The total area under rice more than doubled, between 1948 and
1980, from 790,000 hectares to about 2 million hectares, [table-
5.12]. Since then the total area has remained around the same. The
reason for the stagnation in area is because, rice uses water
intensively and expansion by area is held back by the limited
availability of the water. However, there is considerable scope for
shifting some of the existing rice area from the present low value
to higher value rice.
Rice yields were virtually stagnant at less than 1 tonne/ha until
mid -sixties, it rose by 50% in the next five years and more
steadily to 1.7 ton/ha in 1986-87. This overall measure of yields
is, however, deceptive as it combines higher and faster rising
yields of Irri rice with lower and stagnant yields of Basmati and
other non-Irri — old traditional varieties. The quantities of the
old traditional varieties produced at the moment is negligible
[Government of Pakistan, Commission Report, 1988, p.138]. The Rice,
which is the main focus in this study, will be discussed latter on
in detail.
5.3.6.2 The Secondary Sector.
The secondary sector consists of manufacturing and processing. The
average share of the secondary sector in the GNP, since 1971 to
1988 is 16% [table-5.9].
Except for a few years, the secondary sector appears to be lagging
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because of the slow pace of private investment, and government
investment in infrastructure. The problem of a lethargic business
investment community in past has also been partially because of
the difficult sanctioning procedures that must be followed to build
new businesses. The restrictive regulations have also kept
investors, especially foreign investors, from such activities as
the seed business, feed milling, fertiliser manufacturers, sugar
refining, machine manufacture, and repair services ['The
Econogram', p.5, April, 1989].
5.3.6.3 The Tertiary Sector.
The tertiary sector comprises services such as construction,
electricity, gas distribution, transportation, storage,
communication, wholesale, retail trade, banking, insurance,public
administration and defence. The average share of the tertiary
sector in the GNP since 1971 to 1988 is 50%, [table-5.9]. With
reference to table-5.9; and fig:-5.9-A, the tertiary sector is the
major sector. It seems that, the Government is spending much on
tertiary sector by offering the job opportunities.
Table-5.13 shows that the current expenditure of the government is
roughly three-quarters of the total expenditure since 1983-84.
The share of current expenditure was 60% in 1979-80 out of total
expenditures, and 66.3% in 1982-83. The major portion of current
expenditure is utilised for the defence purpose. For example in
1982-83 only, expenditure on defence was 40.2% out of the total
current expenditures [Economic survey , 1988-89].
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TABLE 5-13.






PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXP:
CURRENT EXP; DVLPMT; EXP;
1979-80 32824 21805 60.1 39.9
1980-81 37839 25800 59.4 40.5
1981-82 44544 26469 62.7 37.3
1982-83 57738 29383 66.3 33.7
1983-84 71945 28057 72.0 28.0
1984-85 83796 33050 71.7 28.3
1985-86 94685 39777 70.4 29.6
1986-87 116242 36160 76.3 23.7
1987-88 133645 46728 74.0 25.9
1988-89 153805 46734 76.7 23.3
1989-90 160629 56000 74.1 25.9
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan, [1989-90] p.131,
Note:
aCurrent subsidies are included in the current expenditures.
^Development subsidies are included in the development expenditures.
On the other hand, the development expenditure is around one-fourth
of the total expenditure. Therefore it is clear that the
development side in the past has been neglected. In terms of
current and development expenditures, the proportions were 74:26 in
1988-89, and 77:23 in 1989-90. The major portion of the development
spending is utilised in the physical infrastructure such as water,
power, transport and housing. Not more than 8% has been spent on
agriculture in recent years [table-5.14].
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TABLE - 5.14
STRUCTURE OF DEVELOPMENT AND CURRENT EXPENDITURES IN PAKISTAN (in
PERCENTAGE).
CURRENT EXPENDITURES. DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES.
Years Years.
SECTOR. SECTOR.
1982-83 87-88 88-89 1982-83 87-88 88-89
Defence. 40.2 36.0 33.6 Agriculture 18.7 8.5 7.5
Interest payments 19.3 23.5 24.2 (incl; fertiliser subsidy)
Current Subsidies 4.8 5.3 6.6 Physical Infrastructure. 66.2 61.6 63.4
Social Services 12.8 14.1 13.5 Social Infrastructure. 15.1 29.9 29.1
Gen: Adiinistrat: 7.2 7.0 8.5
Others. 15.7 14.1 13.6
Total in percent 100 100 100 Total in Percent 100 100 100
Source: Econonic Survey of Pakistan, [1988-89] pp.83-86.
5.4 The Public and the Private Sector in the Economy.
In Pakistan, in the earlier stages, especially in the fifties and
sixties, there was a deep commitment to the role of private sector
in the economic development. The public sector was limited either
to the provision of essential public utility services like
transport, electricity, and water or in the industrial sector to
those considered essential for defence purposes.
As a result of the Government's policy of nationalisation in the
early seventies and with the diminished role of the private sector
in undertaking major new investment, especially in manufacturing,
the public sector had begun to play a far more important part in
the country's overall development effort. In 1979-80 it accounted
for about 11% of the total industrial output and about 70% of the
total investment. It had complete control over domestic banking and
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insurance and a monopoly in the export of raw cotton and rice
[Viqar Ahmed and Rashid Ahmed 1984],
5.4.1 Ownership Pattern in the Agriculture Sector.
Since independence to date, agriculture has been and is the largest
single contributor to the national output. Most of the agricultural
land, and its production in Pakistan is in private hands. But there
are a number of important questions regarding the ownership pattern
in the agricultural sector. Perhaps the most important and
controversial regards the extent to which the uneven size
distribution of land holdings and the existence of tenancy
relations hindered or expedited agricultural growth [Viqar Ahmed
and Rashid Ahmed, 1984].
5.4.2 Ownership Pattern in the Industrial Sector.
As already described, the industrialisation in Pakistan during the
fifties and sixties was carried out mainly by the private sector.
In 1970s, the new Government reversed the pro-industrial policies
which had been followed earlier, and for the first time the private
sector in industry felt itself faced with a more hostile economic
and political environment. Nationalisation, which was introduced
mainly in the intermediate and capital goods industries, only
marginally influenced the concentration of ownership of industrial
assets, but the takeover of the banking and insurance sector by the
Government did help break the link between the industrial and
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financial capital. With the private sector not investing in
industry, the public sector stepped in with Major investments in
the heavy and intermediate goods industry and, by the end of
seventies, it emerged as the major shareholder of the industrial
assets. Table-5.15 indicate that the share of private investment
was very low during 1970s in comparison to other years.
TABLE-5.15
GIOSS FIXED IIRESTIEIT BT PUBLIC AID PRIVATE SECTOR (AT CUUEIT PRICE] (in percentage).
Years. Agriculture Sector Manufacturing Sector Others. Total.
Public. Private. Public. Private. Public Private Public Private.
1972-73 N.A N.A 9.8 90.1 64.5 35.48 65.17 34.8
1973-74 10.7 89.2 27.1 72.8 75.19 24.80 63.82 36.17
1974-75 28.2 71.7 42.5 57.4 78.20 21.79 69.55 30.44
1975-76 20.0 79.9 63.6 36.3 78.94 21.05 67.68 32.31
1976-77 22.35 77.64 68.1 31.8 76.51 23.48 66.92 33.07
1977-78 13.78 86.2 74.3 25.6 74.47 25.52 66.38 33.61
1978-79 15.70 84.2 72.8 27.1 73.64 26.35 65.97 34.02
1979-80 14.61 85.3 65.2 34.7 70.97 29.02 62.06 39.93
1980-81 9.8 90.5 52.6 47.41 72.56 27.43 60.73 39.26
1981-82 15.02 84.9 51.1 48.84 74.46 25.53 63.56 36.43
1982-83 19.39 80.6 48.7 51.27 72.45 27.51 61.68 38.31
1983-84 16.85 83.14 44.4 55.65 69.36 30.64 56.85 43.14
1984-85 16.64 83.3 29.9 70.0 73.19 26.80 58.61 41.38
1985-86 20.74 79.2 28.4 71.56 73.39 26.60 58.82 41.17
1986-87 18.94 81.0 19.1 80.8 75.01 24.98 59.33 40.66
1987-88 20.24 79.7 17.09 82.6 73.44 26.66 56.78 43.21
N.A= Not available.
Source: Adopted froa, 'Annual report', State Bank of Pakistan, [1987-88], pp.17.21.
5.4.3 Ownership Pattern in other sectors.
In the service sector, transport and communications, railways and
air travel have traditionally been in the public sector. Road
transport, which had been at the time of Independence, solely in
the hands of the private sector, is now also significantly
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controlled by the public sector. With the expansion of public
sector transport operations, and the setting up of the National
Logistic Cell in the late 1970s, public sector control in terms of
passenger transport is approximately one-third and for goods
haulage it is about 30%. Utilities like water, gas, and electricity
have traditionally been controlled by the public sector. The
retail trade has been almost completely controlled by the private
sector except for a few very small number of Government controlled
'co-operatives' and 'utility stores'.
As far as foreign investment is concerned, in a number of
developing countries like Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore, it
has been very high, however, this has not been the case in
Pakistan. In the manufacturing sector, for example, only about 10
to 15% of the total industrial assets in 1979-80 were controlled by
foreign firms, mainly in the pharmaceutical and fertiliser
industries. In banking and insurance there have been traditional
British-based banks but more recently foreign banks from the Middle
East have also begun operation in the country [Viqar Ahmed and
Rashid Ahmed, 1984].
5.4.4 The Current Situation of the Private sector.
The situation, since the Zia Government, has changed to a great
extent regarding the restoration of private sector confidence and
motivation in order to revive investment in agriculture and
industry. This is being done by:
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a) denationalisation of certain public sector projects,
b) protection of the rights of investors,
c) offering a package of fiscal and other incentives,
d) relaxation of economic control,
A number of industries which were run inefficiently are
denationalised and/or privatised. A number of incentives have also
been offered to the private sector, the most important of which is
the tax holiday. A number of concessions in import duties and
income tax have also been given.
5.5 Importance of Agriculture in Pakistan Economy.
At the time of independence, Pakistan was predominantly an
agricultural country. Both the major share of GDP and the bulk of
the labour force emanated from this sector. Over 99% of the
country's exports consisted of primary commodities [Viqar Ahmed and
Rashid Ahmed , 1984].
In 1950, agriculture accounted for 53% of the GNP, since then the
share of agriculture in GNP has declined steadily and in 1988 it
was just under 24%. However, agriculture's contribution to other
spheres of Pakistan's economy is even greater than its share in the
GNP. For example, it provides employment for about 50% of the
labour force and directly accounts for about 30% of the total
exports. If one takes into account the raw material content of
cotton textiles and other agro-based manufactured exports, its
share would be over 60% of the total exports.
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In tens of imports, the share of agriculture was lower in the
early 1980s compared to the 1970s because agricultural growth
resulted in increasing self-sufficiency in wheat. In recent years
the import share has risen again because of higher imports of
agricultural inputs and declining self-sufficiency in edible oil
and sugar. In the 1980s agricultural imports accounted for around
14X of total import [table-5.16]. Even though the importance of
agriculture has been recognised in developing countries, it has
never been regarded as a leading sector. Policies related to
agriculture have reflected this fact.
Table - 5.16
Share of Agriculture in (Pakistan) GNP, Imports and Exports.
(1960-1987).
Year Share of Agrical- Total Agricaltural Iaports Agriciltiral exports*
tare la GIF (I) Eaplojaeat
(by decade) Level Share ii Total Level Share ii'1 Share in total
loiiial Real (I) (ii OS) i ) Iiports (X) (ia OS) i) total export Agri: output
(X) (X)
1960-61 11.66 13.66 59.30 - - - - -
1969-70 36.83 38.88 - - 111.72 33.1 3.33
1970-71 35.35 37.31 - - 136.50 32.6 1.00
1971-72 35.95 37.57 - - 317.09 11.8 8.12
19T2-T3 35.10 35.65 58.60 205 25.8 223.16 39.1 10.80
1973-71 31.12 31.58 330 21.2 101.75 39.1 11.27
1971-75 32.02 32.53 171 22.1 198.18 18.0 11.71
1975-76 31.23 32.56 115 20.1 195.15 13.7 12.79
19T6-7T 31.08 32.01 365 15.3 166.87 10.9 10.15
1977-78 29.38 29.76 182 17.1 168.10 35.7 9.16
1978-79 28.11 28.92 811 22.9 552.90 32.3 10.11
1979-80 27.16 28.78 591 12.5 993.71 12.0 15.83
1980-81 26.52 28.28 52.72 630 11.7 1295.35 13.8 17.89
1981-82 26.16 27.15 701 12.1 863.67 31.7 10.92
1982.83 21.70 26.30 610 12.0 809.88 30.0 11.38
1983.81 22.19 23.71 878 15.1 800.37 28.9 11.71
1981-85 23.00 21.61 981 16.6 721.31 28.9 10.09
1985.86 22.6T 21.16 991 17.6 1062.19 31.6 11.25
1986-87 22.01 23.87 19.21 763 11.2 973.15 26.0 13.01
Soirees: Pakistaa Ecoaoiic Strvej 1987-88; Pakistaa Statistical Year Book, 1988; Eaiid, et, al.,[1990], Trade,
Exchaage Rate, aad Agricaltaral Priciag Policies ia Pakistaa, p.135, The Rorld Baak.
lote:
^Exports of priaarj coiaodities.




Pakistan is rich in land resources and possesses all kinds of soil.
Along with land, it has both types of climate — hot and cold. The
economy of Pakistan is agrarian in nature. The predominance of the
agricultural sector is usually one of the main characteristics of
developing countries like Pakistan, in the sense that agriculture
is not only the largest contributor to the national income but the
major source of employment, and foreign exchange earnings. It is
also the provider of food grain especially for the growing urban
population and for the generation of the profits to finance
development efforts.
It is thus evident that a programme for overall economic
development must lay great emphasis on agricultural development.
Any credible programme for growth, greater savings and investments,
improved technology, and removal of social balances would be
incomplete without agriculture making a major contribution. At the
same time it should also get its due share of the resulting
benefits.
The proportionate contribution of agriculture in the national
economic framework tends to diminish as other sectors emerge and
expand, its role and functions continue to grow in both depth and
range.




AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN PAKISTAN.
In this chapter, a brief review of Pakistan's agricultural policy
is undertaken. The object of this chapter is to discuss the types
of government intervention in agriculture sector. This chapter is
organised under the different categories. Section 6.1. presents the
agricultural policies applied by the Government of Pakistan, & in
section 6.2 agriculture taxes and Subsidies have been summarised.
6.1 Agricultural Policies k Government intervention in Pakistan.
Agriculture is the mainstay of Pakistan's economy. It not only
provides the surplus for investment in the manufacturing sector but
also to meet other expenditures of the government. This surplus is
extracted by government intervention through direct taxation and
also indirectly through government control over the prices received
by farmers for their crop. Typically, what this means is that
farmers receive lower prices than what they would get without
government intervention in price determination.
Pakistan like other developing countries, has implemented a complex
set of pricing, subsidy and tax policies which have altered over
time the nature of incentives facing the agriculture sector. Some
policies, such as those determining the level of the foreign
exchange rate, are aimed principally at inducing activity in other
sectors, yet by influencing the level of prices received and paid
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by farmers for traded commodities and inputs. These policies have
important incentive or disincentive implications for the
agricultural sector as well. Other policies call for specific
subsidies, price support or taxes aimed at the agricultural sector.
Government intervention in agriculture has taken many forms over
the years. Along with indirect intervention arising from over¬
valuation of the rupee, the most important types of direct
intervention included the government monopoly on international
trade in rice and cotton, government control of internal trade in
wheat, and (at times) regulation of domestic sales of flour at
cheap prices through the network of ration shops in cities only.
Over the last three decades, government intervention has had
negative effects on the producer prices, (hence, the output and
export earnings) of wheat , rice and cotton in Pakistan. These
outcomes were the result of a strategy designed to keep domestic
prices low and to build up the country's industrial sector by
protecting it from overseas competition [Hamid, et, al., 1990].
One study [Ender Gary, 1990, pp.1-10] about government intervention
in agriculture shows that the main intervention in Pakistan's
agriculture sector can be divided into three groups: support price
and state trading, input subsidies, and investment in
infrastructure. The fourth category would include the over¬
valuation of the exchange rate.
Overall, control of trade was the agricultural intervention with
the greatest impact on producers and consumers alike. As far as the
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agriculture subsidies are concerned, the sane study [Ibid]
estimated that in Pakistani agriculture, its aggregate producer's
subsidy equivalence^ (PSE) is below zero. In other words, the
Government's support to agriculture is amounting to taxation,
rather than support. The agricultural commodities covered in this
study are: cotton, wheat, Basmati rice, and Irri rice. These crops
compose 45X of the value added in agriculture. Measured policies
include: state control of trade, price support, food rationing, and
input subsidies for example, fertilisers, credit, irrigation, and
electricity. Other agriculture crops not included in this study
are: sugar, vegetable oils, oil seeds, and poultry. Important
policies — the effect of which have not been measured, include:
exchange rate over-valuation, exempting agriculture from income
taxation, public investment in irrigation, and electricity. The
estimates were made for the year 1982 through 1986.
The agricultural policies applied by the Government of Pakistan are
described as follows under the categories of input policy, pricing
policies, direct and indirect taxes and subsidies:
6.2.1. Input Policy and Snbsidies.
In Pakistan, like many other developing countries, the input for
agriculture is provided with the help of subsidies. In agriculture,
subsidies are justifiable as a means of introducing and
popularising new technologies, but problems arise when introductory
subsidies tend to perpetuate on various pretexts long after the
introductory stage is over and also create many distortions
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[Commission, report, 1988, p.517],
It is important to distinguish the subsidies to agricultural
producers from those that are provided to consumers of agricultural
products. Many subsidies although meant for the benefit of
producers in reality have benefited urban consumers. Agricultural
products ranging from wheat flour, rice, sugar and edible oils were
sold at less than the market price: the difference being paid to
them from the current account of the government budget. Besides
these consumer subsidies, there are producer subsidies on cost of
inputs like fertiliser, agriculture machinery, tube-wells,
pesticides, and seeds. These producer subsidies are also known as
development subsidies as they are budgeted and paid through the
development budget.
The major government subsidies presently to the agriculture sector
are for fertiliser, water, and credit. Minor subsidies have also
been available for, seeds, plant protection, heavy earth moving
machinery and tube-wells. Of these, seeds and plant protection
subsidies have been phased out.
6.2.1.1 Fertilisers.
Fertiliser is one of the most important agricultural inputs.
Chemical fertilisers were first imported in to Pakistan in 1952,
while domestically produced fertilisers became available from 1957.
Most Nitrogen fertilisers are domestically produced with
supplementary amounts imported, for the most part, by the Federal
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Directorate of Fertiliser imports. Phosphate fertilisers are
largely imported (table-6.1).
Table - 6.1.
Fertiliser Consumption And Source of Supply.




1970-71 N 251.5 140.1 56
P205 30.5 4.5 15
K20 1.2 0 0
Total 283.2 144.6 51
1975-76 N 441.6 316.5 72
P205 103.6 10.6 10
K20 2.9 0 0
Total 548.1 327.1 60
1980-81 N 842.9 580.9 69
P205 226.9 57.7 25
K20 9.6 0 0
Total 1,079.4 638.6 59
1985-86 N 1,128.4 1,016.0 93
P205 350.1 93.0 26
K20 33.3 0 0
Total 1,511.5 1,190.0 73
Source: Comission Report [1988, p.617] 'Report of the National Couission on
Agriculture*, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Government of Pakistan.
The government fixes the retail price of imported fertilisers.
Until recently, most of the subsidies have been provided on the
imported Phosphatic fertilisers. The subsidy on nitrogen fertiliser
produced locally, has already been phased out [Commission report,
1988].
Until 1986, in the case of local production of fertiliser, a tax
was levied on the (old) low cost plants while the (new) high cost
plants were reimbursed the difference between government fixed
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price and the cost plus guaranteed minimum profits. During the
field work interviews, it was stated by the respondents that, the
high cost plants are mostly in the public sector, which were
reimbursed by the private sector plants.
In the Seventh Five Year Plan [Government of Pakistan, 1988-1993,
p.166] it is clearly mentioned that the subsidy on imported
phosphatic and potassic fertilisers will be phased out gradually
over a period of 3 and 6 years respectively.
As far as the distribution of fertilisers are concerned, one study
[Commission report, 1988, p.243] confirms that there is a fairly
efficient distribution network through the private sector in the
country.
6.2.1.2 Seeds.
Improved seeds constitute perhaps the most important component of
the 'green revolution'. A quantum jump in agriculture productivity
comes where better seeds of improved varieties become available.
However, the production of a better yielding variety is a function
of research, while a subsidy on seeds is meant merely to introduce
the farmers to selected seeds of good quality with tested viability
and a high degree of purity.
Available information (table-6.2) shows that, in Pakistan, the
total amount of subsidy on all agriculture seeds reached Rs: 29
million and then declined. Finally, the subsidy has been phased out




Direct Subsidies to Agriculture Producers.
(Rs: Millions).
YEARS.
DIRECT SUBSIDIES, (Bl) .
Fertilisers Tube-Wells Plant
Protection Seeds Total
1972-73 207.0 22 128 3 360
1973-74 278.0 10 63 12 363
1974-75 326.0 16 112 - 491
1975-76 607.0 24 241 6 878
1976-77 381.0 48 424 6 859
1977-78 617.0 20 347 25 1009
1978-79 1692.0 24 267 8 1991
1979-80 2454.0 22 218 29 2723
1980-81 2457.0 20 - 2 2479
1981-82 1794.0 24 - 8 1826
1982-83 1948.0 24 - 8 1980
1983-84 1690.0 16 - - 1706
1984-85 1501.0 16 - - 1517
1985-86 2408.0 16 - - 2424
1986-87 2026.0 18 - - 2044
Sources: Qureshi, S.F, et, al,.[1987], ' Taxes and Subsidies on Agricultural
Producers*,pp.553-54, table.1, PIDE,Islamabod, Pakistan; Coawission Report, [1988,
pp.517-540] 'Report of the National Coaaission of Agriculture*, Ministry of Food A
Agriculture, Govenaent of Pakistan, Islanabod.
6.2.1.3 Tube-wells.
In Pakistan, water is the nost critical input in agriculture. There
are several limitations on the supply of the surface irrigation
water while most of the country is too dry to support the rain-fed
agriculture. To encourage the use of subsoil water as a supplement
to surface water supplies, the government has encouraged
installation of tube-wells by giving a subsidy on the cost of tube-
O
wells. About 37% of the total irrigation water supply to crops
comes from tube-wells. Their contribution becomes particularly
critical at times of failure of rains and shortages of waters in
storage dams. The beneficial effects of tube-wells are associated
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not only with enhanced supply of irrigation but also with land
improvement through lowering of the underground water table
[Commission Report, 1988, p.524].
The rate of subsidy on diesel tube-wells varies by type of areas -
preference being given to the barani (rain-fed) areas. The average
proportion of subsidised tube-wells over last ten years was 27%.
The latest figures (1985-86) show that out of 55822 private diesel
tube-wells, 14959 are subsidised. The subsidy on electric tube-
wells is Rs: 30,000 per unit which is taken by Water and Power
Development Authority (WAPDA) for extending the power line. The
subsidy, however, is not specially targeted for small farmers but
under the rules they are to be given preference. The total average
annual amount of subsidy of private tube-wells installed in
Pakistan, is Rs: 21 million from 1972-73 to 86-87 [Commission
Report, 1988, p.524].
6.2.1.4. Irrigation.
Pakistan's agriculture is predominantly Irrigated and is based on
probably one of the oldest and largest contiguous gravity flow
irrigation systems in the world. But its economic output per unit
of water derived at the source is also perhaps the lowest in the
world, [Mahmood and Walters, 1990, p.45]. For agriculture - barani
(rain-fed) or Irrigated - land and water go together. Where the
water supply is under human control the agriculture system is
considered Irrigated; where such conditions do not exist, the
resultant agriculture is considered barani. Pakistan is well
120
endowed with water resources and about three quarter of its
cultivated lands are Irrigated. The soils and the irrigation system
of the Indus Basin are the most valuable resources of the country.
As far as the cost of the irrigation is concerned, the capital cost
of Irrigation work has normally been recovered through the sale
price of land in canal colonies and the water rates (Irrigation
charges/Abiana) charged on a regular basis are supposed to cover
the operation and maintenance (0 and M) charges of irrigation
works. In recent years the 0 and M charges have increased
considerably and much of this increase is ascribed to the inclusion
of some expenses that do not strictly qualify as 0 and M charges,
because it includes the Salinity Control and Reclamation Project
(SCARP) expenses as well. However, the land reclamation charges can
not be legitimately considered as irrigation expenses. The position
of 0 and M costs and recoveries excluding SCARP operation is
mentioned in table-6.3 and table-6.4.
Table — 6.3.
Operation and maintenance (O & H) Cost (excluding the SCARP operation) A Recoveries
fran Irrigation Charges.








ITa 1 '""i i Total























Source: Co^ission Report, 1988, p.526.
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The situation changes radically when SCARP operations are included
in operation and Maintenance, as shown in table-6.4.
Table - 6.4
Operation and Maintenance (O and H) Cost (including SCARP operation) A Recoveries
froa Irrigation Charges.
(Rs: per acre of cropped area).
Punjab Sindh NWPP Baluchistan. Total.
Total Annual Cost. 55.52 73.26 143.30 43.75 315.83
Total Recoveries. 32.30 26.52 40.46 35.72 135.00
Difference. -180.83
Source: Caranission Report, 1988, p.527.
In the existing irrigation system, there is overuse (misuse) of
water, hence the problem of waterlogging and salinity. In Pakistan,
12 million acres of land is waterlogged and 10 million saline
[World Bank Report, 1982].
In the irrigation system, it has been observed that other than
misuse of water, there is also a misuse of funds. There is no hard
proof but it is widely believed that there is widespread corruption
in irrigation. It is observed that the department invests large
amounts but there are press criticisms about the expenditures on
maintenance of canals, sale of water, and the payments of salaries
only on paper to the workers.
Table-6.3 indicates that irrigation, excluding SCARP operation is
subsidised at the rate of Rs: 116.83 per acre, whereas table-6.4
indicates that irrigation, including SCARP operation is being
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subsidised at the rate of Rs: 180.83 per acre. The total subsidies
on irrigation are Mentioned in table-6.14.
6.2.1.5 Credit Policy.
Agriculture producers receive interest free short term loans as
well as low interest medium and long term loans. The subsidy on
institutional loans such as those advanced by the Banks is
calculated by taking the difference between the lending rate and
the rate at which the State Bank advance loans to these
institutions. Thus there is an 8% subsidy on Agriculture
Development Bank (ADBP) loans. It was 3% on cooperative loans until
1982-83. It increased to 4% in next two years and jumped to 9.5% in
1985-86.
The interest rate structure in Pakistan is controlled by the State
Bank of Pakistan (the Central Bank). Apparently the rates are low
compared with those charged by the informal credit sector. The
total subsidised amount (table-6.5) of credit may not give a true
picture of the subsidy on credit because the total amount of the
loss suffered by the institutions concerned in recovering the full
cost of their advances should be taken as the subsidy. Although the
exact amount of the defaulted credit is not available, it is widely






















SourcesCQureshi, S.F, et, al,.[1987], * Taxes and Subsidies on Agricultural
Producers', pp.553-54, table.1, PIDE, Islaaabad,Pakistan; Coaaission Report, [1988,
pp.517-540] 'Report of the National Coaaission of Agriculture', Ministry of Food A
Agriculture, Governaent of Pakistan, I sianabod.
Despite the very impressive expansion in agriculture credit , there
is ample evidence to support the fact that the credit is not
reaching a vast majority of farmers, particularly small ones
[Mahmood and Walters, 1990, p.57]. In this regard, one study
[Knudsen and Nash, 1990, p.78] confirms that only 25 to 50% of
loans funds went to increase agricultural investment in Pakistan.
Under another scheme, interest free loans are provided to farmers,
with a maximum of Rs:12000 per borrower, per year subject to limit
of Rs: 1000 per acre. Loans are payable in one year. However, there
is a general complaint that these loans do not reach the small
deserving farmers because of the large scale misuse of proxy loans,
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family loaning, and paper loaning. Subsidised interest rates,
though well intentioned, have also played a role in misdirecting
credit and impeded efforts to target loans to small farmers [Scot,
et, al. , 1988]. It is also popularly believed that the banking
personnel, mostly in public sector, charge illegal commissions
while granting loans.
One study [commission report, 1988, p.443] concludes that there are
four major problems regarding access to institutional credit.
These are:
a. The actual flow of credit to the small farmers still remains
very limited.
b. Complex procedures for advancing agricultural loans by the
commercial banks.
c. Delayed disbursement of credit even after it has been
approved due to unnecessary documentary requirements.
d. Interest rates charged on agriculture loans are high,
particularly for the low income farmers in the less developed
areas.
6.2.2 Agriculture output Pricing Policy.
3
In Pakistan, the determination of support prices is a balancing
act of different conflicting interests. The growers regard the
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support prices as a cost-plus mechanism which guarantees the
producers their costs and some profit, the higher the better. When
international prices rise they expect the support prices to pass on
the full advantage to producers but when the international price
falls they want the government to stabilise prices at the former
high level. The consumer interest usually calls for keeping the
prices down and that coincides with the interests of domestic
processors of the agricultural raw materials and exporters of
agricultural commodities. The effort of the government is to
balance the various interests but it often serves the interests of
the pressure group.
In Pakistan, since independence (1947), the government's main
concern is regulating agricultural prices to keep the cost of food
low for the urban industrial workers and provide cheap raw
materials for domestic industries. Thus, the agriculture pricing
policy in Pakistan followed the development strategy which sought
to channel resources away from the massive agricultural population
to the urban industrial entrepreneur. This was done by keeping the
prices of manufacturing goods above the world level through import
controls and the prices of agricultural products below the world
level through the compulsory procurement of major agricultural
crops at predetermined prices and the imposition of domestic taxes
and export duties on agricultural commodities thereby making the
inter-sectoral terms of trade unfavourable to agriculture [Griffin,
1969, p.27].
One study [Commission Report, 1988, p.530], has estimated the
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transfers from the crops sub-sector through the pricing mechanism
as mentioned in table-6.6. It reveals that even without the effect
of overvalued foreign exchange rate, the transfers due solely to
pricing measures were very substantial, which assumed massive
proportions when the exchange effect was added. It showed a very
significant and steady improvement since 1980-81 so that the pure
pricing effect in 1985-86 was reduced to an insignificant amount
equal to 1.7% of the sector value added.
Tnhlp - K.fi
Transfer frm Crops Sub-Sector through Pricing Mecbanin.
1980-81 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86
a. Total Price Transfers
at official exchange rate.
(Rs: Million). 21676 13325 17187 1970
As X of Sector Value Added. 30.2 14.5 15.8 1.7
b. Total Price Transfers at
Equilibrium Exchange Kate:
(Rs: Million). 43520 32295 35134 18966
As X of Sector Value Added. 60.7 36.1 32.3 15.9
Source: Hanid and Nabi [1986], *A Comparative Study of Political Econony of
Agriculture Pricing Policies.
Along with the exchange rate regime which was applied to
agriculture, it's burden was further exacerbated by the imposition
of export taxes which had the effect of depressing the domestic
produce prices.
The industrial sector was shielded from the effects of exchange
regimes by a system of export subsidies, bonuses, rebates, refund
of import duties and other tariff and non-tariff barriers, while it
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was a direct beneficiary of export duties on the primary
agricultural commodities and cheap imports due to the overvalued
exchange rate.
Agriculture has also suffered from subsidised imports of wheat,
edible oil and powdered milk. Not only are these surplus products
dumped on the Pakistani market at low prices subsidised by
exporting countries but the Government of Pakistan has also been
subsidising their domestic prices. The result has been a heavy
penalty on domestic producers.
One study [Hamid, et, al. , 1990, p.97] concludes that other than
indirect (overvalued exchange rate) interference, there were three
major considerations driving the direct price intervention system
in Pakistan. The first was balance of payments considerations.
Government policies generally attempted to either maximise foreign
exchange earning in the case of export crops such as cotton and
rice or minimise the imports in the case of deficit crops — wheat
and sugar. Second was political considerations which prompted the
Government to adopt policies to protect urban consumers against
increases in food prices. The third was budgetary considerations
which imposed an upper limit on subsidies and created a need to
generate revenues. There were obvious conflicts between policies
appropriate for each of these three factors.
Because of the above three factors, price policy applied by the
government for various crops were different. In Pakistan
agriculture, cotton, rice, wheat, and sugar-cane are the major cash
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and food crops. In the section that follows, the author highlight
the general policies applied to these crops - based on the work of
Hamid, et, al., [1990]. The policy for rice which is the main theme
of this study will be discussed in chapters 7, 8 and 9.
6.2.2.1. Wheat.
The Government's primary objective for price intervention in wheat
was to provide urban consumers with wheat flour at low prices. The
second objective was to protect the farmers against seasonal price
fluctuation. This was done by supplying wheat flour through a
Government controlled system at a fixed price. The wheat procured
by the Government as part of its support price policy was supplied
to the ration shops after processing. These shops provided the
flour at a fixed low price to the consumers. Therefore the two
objectives — cheap food for urban consumers and price stability
for producers — were inter-linked and an understanding of
Government intervention in wheat can best be achieved by looking at
the overall working of the wheat procurement and rationing system.
6.2.2.1.2 Administrative Structure of Procurement and Rationing
for wheat.
The Federal Government makes the policy decisions regarding the
procurement price of wheat, its issue price to the mills and the
flour price for the consumers at the ration shops. The actual
operation of procurement and ration system was the responsibility
of the Provincial Government and the Food Department was the
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responsible agency.
The ration shop system consisted of specially licensed private
retail outlets through which a fixed quantity of wheat per person
per day at very subsidised rates was distributed. The subsidy
became very large: about Rs: 2 billion a year in 1973-74 and 1974-
75, or more than 10% of the Government's current expenditure.
Therefore, the Government was forced to increase the price of
ration shop flour a number of times [Hamid, et, al., 1990].
It was evident that the costs to the Government of operating this
system were much greater that the benefits to the consumers. For
example in 1975, flour in ration shops was sold at Rs: 1 (one) per
k.g compared to the open market price of about Rs:1.30 per kg, that
is, a benefit of Rs: 0.30 per kg to the consumers. The cost of the
wheat subsidy for 1974-75 was Rs: 2119 million, while during that
year total release of wheat by Government was less than 2 million
tons, that is, the cost to Government was over Rs: 1 per kg, more
than three times the benefit to the consumers [Hamid, et, al. ,
1990].
The direct administrative cost of operating the procurement and
rationing system was not very large. The total establishment cost
— in salary and allowances -- of the concerned Government
departments in 1985 was about Rs: 150 million, that is, about 25%
of the total expenditure on Agricultural Research and Extension in
that year. In other words the administrative costs, though
significant, were not too great [Hamid, et, al., 1990].
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The lore important cost of the rationing system was the cost of the
subsidy and the corruption it had engendered. According to one
study [Alderman, et, al., 1987] only 20% of the subsidised wheat
supplied by the Government to the flour mills was actually
purchased by the consumers in the ration shops. This study shows
that the benefit — that is, the difference between the open market
price and the ration shop price times the quantity purchased —
received by consumers was only Rs: 250 million in 1985-86. However,
the cost of the subsidy to the Government was Rs: 1800 million.
That is to say that under this programme, Rs: 1550 million worth of
subsidy was lost because of corruption and waste.
Another study [International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)
Report no:4, May 1988], as quoted in the 'ECONOGRAM'[p.2, April
1988], stated that some ration system mills which used to supply
flour to the ration depots, only functioned on paper. They earned a
profit by setting the low priced Government wheat in the higher-
priced open market. This fraudulent practice was possible in
connivance with some Food Department officials, and Ration Depot
Holders. Approximately 72% of the wheat released to the ration
system mills never reached its targeted consumers, that is, the
poor third of the society, but leaked to a open market. It is
evident that the prime beneficiaries of the system were not the
consumers but the ration shop owners who maintained false records
of sales to ration card holders, the flour mill operators who
actually processed and sold the wheat in the open market; and the
staff of the Food Department who were supposed to police the
system.
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Although no hard evidence is available, newspaper reports of the
period and interviews with some of the people involved indicate
that smuggling of wheat to India was widespread during most of the
1960s and first half of the 1970s [Hamid, et, al. , 1990]. The
reason for this was that price of wheat in India was substantially
higher than in Pakistan as shown in table-6.7.
Table - 6.7.
Harvest Wheat Price in Pakistan and Indian Punjab.
(Rs: per 100 kg)*






Source: Agriculture statistics of Pakistan (various Years); the statistical
Abstract of Punjab (India).
'Prices are in local currencies at the official exchange rate. However, the
difference would be even greater, if converted at the equilibrium exchange rate.
6.2.2.2 Sugar-cane.
In Pakistan, there are very few areas where the climate and the
soil are ideal for sugar-cane cultivation. In 1949-50 about 200,000
hectares, or 1.6% of total cropped area was under sugar-cane. By
1959-60 it expanded to about 400,000 hectares and 900,000 hectares
in 1984-85. Pakistan inherited only 2 sugar mills and in the 1960s
the number reached to twenty. In 1985-86 the total number of sugar
mills in the public and private sector was thirty nine. Having an
annual production capacity of 1075,000 tons of sugar-cane and
39,000 tons of beet sugar.
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One study [Hamid, et. al., 1990] confirms that, in sugar economy,
there are three interest groups namely; the farmers, the consumers
and the sugar-mill owners. On pricing, the farmers inside the mill
zone, the mill owners and consumers have conflicting interests.
Until 1983 the conflict between the farmers and the mill-owners was
latent because the government fixed the price of sugar-cane to keep
the farmers happy, and the price of sugar was fixed to ensure a
good profit to the mill owners. The consumer was the loser but he
was given the impression that the government was very concerned
about him since it was supplying him with 'cheap' sugar through the
ration system. By creating an artificial scarcity through
restrictions on imports and keeping the ration shop price below the
open market price (though substantially above the import price)
the Government was able to create this illusion for the consumers.
Like wheat flour, the rationing of sugar also resulted in
widespread corruption because as long as the open market price was
above the ration shop price it paid the ration shop owners and
others to divert a part of the quota to the open market. This was
done by getting false ration cards issued. Such cards may have been
as much as 20X of the total. However, in the case of sugar the cost
of the corruption was not born by the Government as there was no
subsidy on sugar sold through the ration shops.
In the same study [Ibid, p.110] it was further concluded that, from
1962 to 1977, when open market sales were illegal, an active black
market developed and there was a substantial difference between the
open market and the ration shop prices. For example, in 1974-75 the
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black market price was Rs: 8.00 to Rs: 10.00 per kg compared to the
ration shop price of Rs: 4.60 per kg. Although no guess can be made
about the proportion of sugar sold on the black market, according
to the available evidence it tended to increase over time and by
1977 it continued a significant proportion of the total.
6.2.2.3 Cotton.
Cotton is the principal cash crop of Pakistan, the significance of
which can be judged from the fact that it alone accounts for about
11% of the total cropped area or about 2,500,000 hectares which is
more than any other cash crop. The crop as a whole along with
cotton manufacturing contribute about 40% to the total foreign
exchange earnings.
With cotton, the identifiable interest groups in the earlier system
were the cotton growers, the middleman, the ginners, and the export
traders who participated in the Karachi and the International
Cotton Exchange. The Karachi Cotton Exchange was linked to the
International Cotton Exchange based in London where in addition to
spot trading, buyers and sellers could also do forward trading.
However, because there was no price setting by the Government,
group conflicts as we see them now , in the sense that one group
can influence the prices more compared another, did not exist.
Up to the 1960s, the role of the Government in cotton trade was
fairly passive. Pakistan adopted the regime of multiple exchange
rates. In implementing this regime, the government had several
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considerations, the most important of which was industrialisation
of the economy.
Furthermore, because of Government's discretionary role in
implementing its multiple exchange rate policy, various distinct
groups emerged in cotton trade: cotton growers, ginners, yarn
manufacturers and cloth manufacturers. Group interests and
conflicts until 1972 were focussed mainly on influencing the
government's discretionary power regarding the exchange rate used
for each group. After 1972 the story changed rather dramatically.
First of all, 1972 was the year of a major devaluation of Pakistani
rupee and abolition of the multiple exchange regime. It was also a
period of commodity price boom in the international markets and as
a result exporters made substantial profits on cotton trade. The
Government saw this as an opportunity to raise additional revenue,
so, first it levied an export duty on raw cotton and then it
decided to takeover the lucrative cotton trade by establishing a
government monopoly in the export of cotton but unlike RECP it
relied on voluntary procurement. The reason for this was the
existence of a large domestic textile industry which also purchased
cotton directly from the ginners. With the setting up of 'Cotton
Export Corporation' (CEC), forward trading in cotton and the Cotton
Exchange in Karachi became redundant and was abolished.
6.2.2.4. With regard to the price policy for different crops,
Pakistan has a long history of price intervention designed to
protect the interests of urban consumers, industrialists and
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workers. With the result that from potential exporter of food
grains it becane a net importer in the 1960s. On average, the
inflation adjusted border price for wheat, at about Rs: 2400 per
ton over the period, was higher than the corresponding producer
price. But this was not always so. In the late 1960s and early
1970s, for instance, it was lower which suggests greater
variability of border prices compared to producer prices [see
Hamid, et, al., 1990].
The nominal protection rate or the ratio of the domestic prices
paid to farmers relative to the equivalent international price -
the import or export price adjusted for the transportation cost -
is shown in table -6.8.
In table-6.8, it is clear that in most years, there was negative
nominal protection, that is, the price policy taxed wheat growers.
On average, the negative nominal rate of protection was around 10%.
Since on average consumer prices were also less than the border
prices, it appears that the Government used direct intervention to
maintain lower consumer prices. The inflation adjusted producer
price of cotton has followed the movements in the border price but
it has consistently remained below the latter. In other words
throughout the period there was a tax on cotton growers. On
average, nominal rate of protection was -19%. The tax was not as
high as it was on rice. The tax was highest in the 1970s when there




Nominal Protection Rate (NPR) of Major Crops (Producer
Prices/Transport Cost - l)a
Year Wheat Basnati Rice Irri Rice Cotton Sugar-cane.
1960-61 0.03 - — -0.15 —
1961-62 -0.06 - - -0.21 5.44
1962-63 -0.10 - - -0.18 2.61
1963-64 -0.07 -0.13 - -0.14 1.26
1964-65 0.04 -0.19 - -0.02 1.85
1965-66 0.02 -0.10 - -0.14 1.25
1966-67 0.23 0.06 - -0.15 2.28
1967-68 0.08 -0.31 - -0.15 4.20
1968-69 0.51 -0.15 - -0.16 10.95
1969-70 0.53 -0.02 - -0.15 3.74
1970-71 0.45 -0.01 -0.47 -0.05 2.41
1971-72 0.08 -0.41 -0.23 -0.33 -0.31
1972-73 -0.30 -0.51 -0.56 -0.23 -0.19
1973-74 -0.48 -0.67 -0.79 -0.35 -0.42
1974-75 -0.48 -0.49 -0.69 -0.31 -0.67
1975-76 -0.38 -0.55 -0.45 -0.22 -0.18
1976-77 -0.18 -0.12 -0.09 -0.40 -0.15
1977-78 -0.27 -0.39 -0.40 -0.17 -0.20
1978-79 -0.28 -0.63 -0.47 -0.08 -0.21
1979-80 -0.21 -0.61 -0.50 -0.26 -0.56
1980-81 -0.25 -0.52 -0.54 -0.34 -0.58
1981-82 -0.30 -0.51 -0.42 -0.17 -0.48
1982-83 -0.21 -0.53 -0.19 -0.26 -0.22
1983-84 -0.43 -0.53 -0.18 -0.06 -0.18
1984-85 -0.33 -0.60 -0.29 -0.22 -0.18
1985-86 -0.11 -0.62 -0.01 -0.19 0.05
1986-87 -0.32 -0.60 -0.03 -0.08 0.35
Mean. -0.10 -0.38 -0.29 -0.19 1.24
S.D 0.28 0.23 0.32 0.09 2.54
aAll producer and Border prices are inflation adjusted.
Source: Haaid.et, al., [1990], 'Trade Exchange Rate, and Agricultural Pricing
Policies in Pakistan', table 4.3.1-4.
Inflation adjusted producer price of sugar-cane has declined
steadily since 1962 when it was several tines the border price.
However, the border prices have fluctuated widely. For the period
as a whole the average nominal rate of protection is positive. In
the 1960s the sugar-cane growers were heavily protected, especially
for the year 1968-69 there was a a large implicit subsidy to the
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sugar-cane growers and after the 1970s until recently, a
substantial tax on them.
Looking at table-6.8, it is clear that Government taxing of
agriculture has shifted to Basmati rice. This is the main theme of
our discussion which we will discuss in the next chapter.
6.2.3 Taxes and Subsidies on Agriculture Sector.
The fiscal burden on agricultural producers takes into account open
and concealed^ taxes and subsidies affecting agricultural
producers in both output and input markets. Table-6.9 mirrors, the
tax and subsidy practice in Pakistan.
TABLE - 6.9







Profit/Loss by the State Agency
Cesses on different crops,
iii. Concealed Taxes.
Over Valuation of Exchange Rate.










Open taxation of the agricultural sector comprises of two broad
r
categories of taxes. Land tax, agricultural income tax and Usher
are the three taxes in the first category that affect producers
directly as their disposable income is reduced as a result of the
imposition of these taxes [table-6.10]. This is happening despite
the fact that the method of tax collection (water charges) by the
revenue department is inefficient. Tax is charged on the
cultivated land only personally by one of the lowest grade
employees of the revenue department, who is authorised to show on
record that the land is cultivated or uncultivated. Such taxes can
still be paid directly into the bank by the producers. It is also
widely believed that more than 90% of the producers are unaware
about the official tax rates and the majority pay tax without
getting the tax payment receipts.
Table-6.10




Land Revenue Agri: Income Usher
(Land Tax) Taxa. Total.
1972-73 168 03.00 _ 171.0
1973-74 196 05.40 - 201.4
1974-75 228 04.00 - 232.0
1975-76 260 06.00 - 266.0
1976-77 236 - - 236.0
1977-78 125 01.00 - 126.0
1978-79 291 03.00 - 294.0
1979-80 172 02.60 - 174.6
1980-81 226 09.00 - 235.0
1981-82 286 01.40 - 287.4
1982-83 249 02.00 177.00 428.0
1983-84 209 03.00 265.00 468.0
1984-85 280 02.00 253.00 535.0
1985-86 290 03.00 226.00 519.0
1986-87 298 02.00 140.00 440.0
Soirees: Qareski, S.F, et, al,.[198T], ' Taxes aid Sibsidies oi Agricaltiral Prodacers', pp.553-54, Table.l,
FIDE, Islaiabod, Pakistai; Coiiission Report, [1988, pp.517-540] 'Report of tbe Rational Conission of
Agriealtnre', Ministrj of Food aid Agricaltire, Gorerueit of Fakistai, Islaiabod.
aIt is lisioier as it is lot tax oi agriciltiral iacoies as coiveitioiallf uderstood. It is gradual surcharge on
laid reveue litk high exeiptioa limit aid loi rates.
^It is u Islamic lerj iiposed oilj oi the Sui Sect of Rislii land oners.
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A number of indirect taxes (table-6.11) on agricultural commodities
from the second category adversely affect prices received by
agriculture. These comprises cesses (fees) on different crops —
mainly sugar-cane and cotton, export duties on rice and cotton and
profit and/or loss of the Rice Export Corporation and Cotton Export
Corporation. The revenue from such taxes is, by far, more
important in magnitude than the direct taxes on producers.
TABLE—6.11


















1972-73 442.0 120.0 - 128 _ 22 712
1973-74 192.0 110.0 -76 464 - 27 717
1974-75 335.0 115.0 -228 333 - 24 579
1975-76 340.0 90.0 -61 241 353 29 992
1976-77 01.0 80.0 142 58 57 34 402
1977-78 - 101.0 220 - 114 36 471
1978-79 - 85.0 -152 - 289 25 247
1979-80 - 130.0 151 - 711 23 1015
1980-81 500.0 135.0 724 - 454 37 1850
1981-82 150.0 142.0 -237 - 234 59 348
1982-83 462.0 154.0 77 - 667 50 1410
1983-84 265.0 95.0 46 - 576 54 1036
1984-85 300.0 185.0 -72 - 406 59 878
1985-86 834.0 229.0 -2456 - 343 48 -1002
1986-87 84.0 242.0 -1994 - 89 55 -1526
Sources:Qureshi, S.F, et, al,.[1987], ' Taxes and Subsidies on Agricultural
Producers*,pp.553-54, table.1, PIDE, Islanabod, Pakistan; Coauission Report, [1988,
pp.517-540] 'Report of the National Coaaission of Agriculture', Ministry of Food A
Agriculture, Govenaent of Pakistan, Islaaabod.
Note: a = Cotton Export Corporation of Pakistan,
b = Rice Export Corporation of Pakistan.
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As described in the earlier sections, the government intervene in
agriculture sector indirectly, through the exchange rate mechanism.
For example, if the Pakistani rupee is overvalued, foreign currency
becomes cheaper relative to Pakistani rupee. To a farmer, for
example selling rice to a foreign customer, an overvalued exchange
rate implies that he gets fewer rupees for every ton of agriculture
product that he sells abroad compared to when the exchange rate is
in equilibrium. This mechanism (of over-valuation) is known as
concealed taxes.
The agricultural producers in Pakistan have always been subject to
concealed taxes. During the 1950s and 1960s, agricultural exports
suffered an income loss through an overvalued exchange rate. After
the devaluation in 1972, this source of concealed taxation was
replaced by open taxes in the form of export duties and profit from
monopoly trading corporation.
In addition to the open taxes, farmers are forced to pay taxes (or
receive subsidy) if the prices of the products sold by them are
kept lower (higher) than those that prevail in the international
market. The size of the tax or subsidy to producers is measured by
the difference between the value of output at domestic prices and
the value of output at world prices. The rate of tax or subsidy for
different crops can be measured by the divergence of the Nominal
Protection Coefficients (NPCs) from a value of 1. The NPC with a
value greater than 1 implies a subsidy while the NPC of value less
than 1 implies a tax (table-6.8).
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The evidence on the extent of concealed taxes for wheat, Basmati
rice, and Irri rice, Cotton and sugar-cane are mentioned in table-
6.12. The important subsidies are subsidies on: (1)fertiliser,
(2)tube-wells, (3) plant protection, (4)seeds, (5)electricity,
(6)water, and (7)credit, (table - 5.13 & 5.14). The subsidies on
electricity, water and credit do not appear in government budgets.
The subsidies on other items are budgeted and paid through the
development budgets.
Table-6.12
Concealed Taxes On Agricultural Producers.
(Rs: Million)
Concealed Taxes (A3). Total Taxes.
TEAKS. (A1+A2+A3)a






























































657.26 -305.93 1119.51 2003.50
3371.55 -509.97 9533.60 10449.60
869.86 1099.22 7869.00 8680.00
1266.51 1669.44 5178.15 6436.15
4598.10 -1200.85 3054.67 3692.67
6979.35 -1369.66 10753.35 11350.35
-22.69 -2047.06 1001.46 1542.64
691.47 -2682.91 2720.15 3909.75
1666.92 905.96 8241.80 10326.80
-1253.39 -683.90 2963.25 3598.65
1391.22 1062.00 6294.23 8132.23
1686.23 1897.48 7626.36 9130.36
4437.07 -6176.03 6046.77 7459.77
-1476.50 -5258.33 -2066.33 -2549.33
-2984.17 -6352.50 3658.80 2572.80
Sources: Qureshi, S.F, et, al,.[1987], ' Taxes and Subsidies on
Agricultural Producers', pp.553-54, Table.1, PIDE, Islamabod,
Pakistan; Commission Report, [1988, pp.517-540] 'Report of the
National Commission of Agriculture', Ministry of Food &
Agriculture, Government of Pakistan, Islamabod.
Note:
aAl = Direct Taxes, (Table-6.10).
A2 = Indirect Taxes, (Table-6.11).
A3 = Concealed Taxes, (Table-6.14).
142
A consolidated picture of taxes and subsidies shown in table-6.13,
throws up a number of conclusions which are briefly listed
[Qureshi, S.K; et, al., 1987]:
a. Net taxes on farmer-producers record negative values in three
out of fifteen years.
b. The yield from direct taxes on land and/or agricultural produce
has not declined in absolute terms yet it shows a declining trend
when measured as a proportion of agriculture value added. The
assessments of, and collection from 'USHER', have been much lower
than the estimated potential of this tax.
c. The revenue from taxes on agricultural commodities from export
duties and/or from the profits of State trading corporations has
been large in some years. However, this source of revenue exhibits
a large measure of instability and cannot be relied on to finance
development programmes on a continuing sustained basis.
d. Concealed taxation on agricultural commodities due primarily to
trade and exchange rate policies has been heavy.
e. Open subsidies on inputs have grown in magnitude over time. The
Government has eliminated subsidies on plant protection, seeds, and
some other minor items. There is also a stated Government policy
goal regarding the elimination of fertiliser subsidies.
f. Concealed subsidies on irrigation, credit and electrified tube-
wells have increased significantly. The water and Power Development
Authority (WAPDA), through fuel adjustment charges, has been




Net Tax Burden on Agricultural Producers.
(Rs: Millions).
Total Taxesa- Total Subsidies^
YEARS.
Total Taxes Total Subsidies Net Tax Burden.
(A1+A2+A3) (B1+B2)
1972-73 2203.5 400 1603.5
1973-74 10449.6 384 10065.6
1974-75 8680.0 830 7850.0
1975-76 6436.15 1252 5184.15
1976-77 3692.67 1253 2439.67
1977-78 11350.35 1373 9977.00
1978-79 1542.64 2380 -837.36
1979-80 3909.75 3067 842.75
1980-81 10326.80 3159 7211.00
1981-82 3598.65 2762 836.65
1982-83 8132.23 2912 5220.23
1983-84 9130.36 3161 5969.36
1984-85 7459.77 3737 3722.77
1985-86 -2549.33 4790 -7339.33
1986-87 2572.8 5294 -2721.20
Sources: Qureshi, S.F, et, al,.[1987], * Taxes and Subsidies on Agricultural
Producers',pp.553-54, table.1, PIDE, Islamabad, Pakistan; Couuission Report, [1988,
pp.517-540] 'Report of the National Cauaission of Agriculture', Ministry of Food A
Agriculture, Govemaent of Pakistan,Islamabad.
Note:
"Total Tax includes: Al+A2=A3 or Direct Tax, Indirect Tax & Concealed Tax
respectively.
**Total subsidies includes: B1+B2 or Direct subsidies and indirect subsidies
respectively.
Note: for details see table no: 6.2, 6.10, 6.11, 6.12, A 6.14.
Table-6.13 shows that producers are taxed in twelve out of fifteen
years. In reality, producers are always taxed, while keeping in
view the Misuse and Misdirection of subsidies offered to the
producers, the inefficient way of collecting direct taxes, and the
corruption in export and procurenent procedures. For example, the
total subsidy amount on credit (table-6.14, column-1) nay not give
the true picture as it includes the amount of the loss suffered by








CREDIT IRRIGATION ELECTRICITY TOTAL.
1972-73 23 -25 42 40
1973-74 37 -75 59 21
1974-75 34 150 155 339
1975-76 45 189 140 374
1976-77 54 169 171 394
1977-78 44 113 207 364
1978-79 48 274 67 389
1979-80 116 244 -16 344
1980-81 180 588 -88 680
1981-82 265 682 -11 936
1982-83 349 683 -100 932
1983-84 524 1084 -153 1455
1984-85 661 1456 103 2220
1985-86 923 1428 15 2366
1986-87 1064 1811 375 3250
Sources: Qureshi, S.F, et, al,.[1987], ' Taxes and Subsidies on
Agricultural Producers', pp.553-54, Table.1, PIDE, Islamabad,
Pakistan; Commission Report, [1988, pp.517-540] 'Report of the
National Commission of Agriculture', Ministry of Food and
Agriculture, Government of Pakistan, Islamabod.
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Another study [Commission Report, 1988, p.538] concludes that in
aggregate, 40 to 60% of the value added in agriculture was
transferred out of agriculture during the period 1960-1985, thus
making agriculture the most heavily taxed sector of the economy.
The major beneficiary of these transfers was the manufacturing
sector. The agriculture sector has been made to bear an extremely
unfair share of the cost of country's industrialisation as well as
the urban consumption.
This continuous massive transfer of resources out of agriculture
seriously diminished the sector's capacity to renew or increase its
capital at a rate commensurate with the needs of the country. The
consequences are now manifest in serious shortages of edible oils,
sugar, pulses, meat and milk and a shaky self sufficiency in wheat.
If the cost of lost production (30 to 50%) in agriculture is added
to the transferred sources, it would show that whatever
industrialisation has been achieved, it has been achieved at an
unacceptable cost to the economy.
The third and recent study [Hamid, et, al., 1990, p.127] confirms
that intervention in the agriculture sector resulted, on average,
in resources being transferred out of agriculture. Price related
transfers range from 4% of GDP (9% of the agriculture GDP) in the
early 1960s to about 9% of GDP (25% of agriculture GDP) in early
1970s and about 2.5% of GDP (10% of agriculture GDP) during the
last two years (1983-84, 1984-85).
Gary Ender [1990, p.3-4] discussing the government's intervention
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in Pakistan agriculture concludes that the main intervention can be
put in three groups: support price and state trading, input
7
subsidies, and investment in infrastructure . A fourth category
would include the over-valuation of the exchange rate. Overall,
control of trade was the intervention in agriculture with the
greatest impact on producers and consumers alike. The commodities
covered in this study are: cotton, wheat, Basmati rice, and Irri
rice. These crops compose 45% of the value added in agriculture.
The measured policies include: state control of trade, price
support, food rationing, and input subsidies such as fertiliser,
credit, irrigation, and electricity. The major commodities not
estimated in this study include:sugar, vegetable oils/oil-seeds,
and poultry. Important policies—the effect of which have not been
measured include: exchange rate over-valuation, exempting
agriculture from income taxation, public investment in irrigation,
and electricity.
As far as the agriculture subsidy is concerned, in the study [Ibid]
it was found that in agriculture its aggregate PSE is below zero.
In other words, the government's support to agriculture is
amounting to taxation, rather than support at an average rate of
23% (1982-1986). The estimates were made for year 1982 through
1986, as shown in table-6.15.
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TABLE - 6.15
Producer's Subsidy Equivalence (PSE)^ in Pakistan.
Items Units 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 Average
1982-1986
1.Producer Value, Mln: Rs 40,176 41,318 45,940 52,157 60,762 48,071
2. Support price,
State Control of = -11,257 -13,672 -15,628 -7,460 -22,714 -14,146
trade.
3. Subsidies,
- Fertiliser, = 1514 963 908 1732 1295 1283
- Credit, 235 236 477 569 627 449
- Electricity, 683 714 739 808 963 782
- Irrigation, 497 543 617 760 841 652
Total policy = -8,327 -11,116 -12,887 -3,590 -18,988 -10,982
transfers (2-3)
PSE (per unit value) PERCENT -21 -27 -28 -7 -31 -23
Source: Gary Ender [1990, p.4] 'Covernaent Intervention in Pakistan's Agriculture',
USDA staff report no:9027, New York.
Note:
A producer subsidy equivalent aeasures the effects on producer revenue of all
agriculture-specific Government policies or, in other words, the value to the
producer of all the Government's policies. One could say that the PSE, when
expressed in currency terms, is the amount that would compensate producers for the
removal of all policies. This definition is given by Dr. Gary Ender.
6.2.4 Effects of Government Intervention in Agriculture sector.
How large were the price interventions in Pakistan's agriculture
sector? A simple way to answer this question is to calculate the
nominal protection rate (NPR) which is calculated as: Producer
price/Transport cost Adjusted Border Price - 1. The NPR with value
greater than 1 implies a subsidy while the NPR of value less than 1
implies a tax. Table-6.8, which has already been discussed, gives
the clear picture of Pakistan's agriculture intervention.
How would have agriculture performed in the absence of the price
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intervention? One study [Hantid, et, al., 1990, p.126] calculated
this, the estimated distortions in prices, along with supply
elasticity estimates, were used to estimate the output, export, and
foreign exchange earnings effects of price intervention. It was
found that the maximum output losses for the long run price
intervention may have reduced the actual outputs (compared to the
potential) of wheat by 12%, Irri rice by 25%, Basmati rice by 32%
and cotton by 44%.
The same study [Ibid, p.126] - using data on demand elasticities
and assuming infinite export elasticities (a dubious assumption for
Basmati rice) - calculates the export effects of price
intervention. For three export crops, the 'cost' of direct price
intervention in terms of reduced exports was 40% for Basmati rice,
37% for Irri rice, and 13% for cotton. The maximum export 'losses'
were in the long-run because of both direct and indirect
distortions. These were: 65% for Basmati rice, 68% for Irri rice,
and 76% for cotton. Note that losses are overstated since import
costs of greater input requirements for additional output are not
taken into account in the analysis.
The combined effect of intervention on Pakistan's foreign exchange
earnings was substantial [Hamid, et, al.,1990, p.126]). The
average foreign exchange earning 'foregone' in the short run due to
direct price interventions as a proportion of Pakistan's total
foreign exchange earnings were about 17%. In the long run, however,
taking into account both direct and indirect interventions, the
foreign exchange 'losses' increase to almost 150%. In the 1980s,
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because of the nore liberal policies, the intervention in
agriculture prices in Pakistan was greatly curtailed and the
exchange rate became more realistic.
CONCLUSION.
This chapter began by looking at the agricultural policies
implemented by the government of Pakistan. It was found that
Pakistan, like other developing countries, has implemented a very
complex set of pricing, subsidy and tax policies. The Government
has usually intervened in the agriculture sector in different ways:
through direct price intervention, direct subsidies and taxes. The
other way is the indirect intervention through: control over
exchange rates — the Rupee remained mostly overvalued —; indirect
taxes and subsidies. Overall it was estimated and found that the
producers were mostly taxed and prices were distorted, and
subsidies offered were mostly misdirected and misused.
The broad conclusion that emerges in this chapter is that the
government has attempted to balance three major considerations in
agriculture intervention: (i) maximising foreign exchange earnings
to support the balance of payments, (ii) the Government's own
revenue needs, (iii) the political consideration to keep food
prices low for urban consumers. However, given that three are
interrelated, pursuing one soon led to problems with another, so
that it has been a tightrope walk.
Distortions in producer prices due to Government intervention
impose significant costs on the economy of the country in terms of
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foregone output, export losses and foreign exchange losses.
However, it has been observed in the last few years that the
Government has made a sustained effort to reduce the intervention
in the agriculture sector. The steps taken so far include reduction
in input subsidies, and elimination of the rationing system. Also
the over-valuation of the Rupee has been substantially reduced. As
the State monopolies in the export of rice and cotton are
concerned, the Government has recently announced measures to
liberalise these markets, however, it is too early to say what
implementation measures will be in practice.
The next chapter which is the main theme of our study, is focussed
on the paddy/rice varieties, production, procurement and milling.
FOOTNOTES.
'it is the Producer Subsidy Equivalent Measure. It Measures the effects on revenue
of all agriculture - specific CovernMent Policies. One could say that the PSE, when
expressed in currency terms, is the amount that would compensate producers for the
removal of all policies. PSE can be positive indicating that policies subsidies
producers; and negative, indicating taxing of producer.
2
This figure is controversial, because one source [commission report,1988, p.524]
gives the figure as 37Z, where as in other source [Hamid, et, al., 1990, p.9] it
shows 16%.
3
It is a minimum price fixed on the basis of the cost of production and offered by
the government.
^These are taxes which are hidden under an overvalued exchange rate mechanism. For
detailed analyses of this aspect for an earlier period, [Applyard, 1987), [Cheong
and D'Silva, 1984] [Gotch and Brown, 1980].
^It is misnomer as it is not a tax on agricultural incomes as conveniently
understood. It is gradual surcharge on land revenue with a high exemption limit and
low rates.
®It is an Islamic levy imposed only on the Suni sect of Muslim land owners, charged
at fixed percentage, on production.
7
Many people would not call investment in an irrigation facility a subsidy, but it
is included when measuring the intervention.
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CHAPTER - 7
PADDY/RICE PRICES. MILLING AND THE FUNCTIONS OF RECP.
The aim of this chapter is to describe in brief the policies of the
Government of Pakistan with regard to the procurement of paddy and
pricing of Paddy/Rice and also to review the functions and
organisational structure of RECP, which deals with rice.
This chapter is organised as follows: very briefly, the importance
of rice in Pakistan is discussed in the opening section. Section
two deals with the rice varieties in Pakistan and in general. The
area, production, and yield of Paddy are summarised in section
three. The procurement and pricing policies of Paddy/Rice are
described in section 4 and the functions and organisational
structure of the RECP is the subject of rest of the chapter.
7.1 Importance of Rice in Pakistan.
As already described in the last chapter, Cotton and Rice are the
major crops of Pakistan's agriculture sector. Before 1972, when
Bangladesh was a part of Pakistan, Jute and Cotton were the major
export crops. Though the large quantity of rice was produced at
that time, but was sufficient only to feed the people of both the
parts (East and West) of Pakistan. In 1972, when Eastern part of
Pakistan (present Bangladesh) was separated, rice became the major
export crop of Pakistan. Since then, Pakistan has been among the
major rice exporting countries in the world.
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Rice does not feed only the 120 million people of Pakistan, but
also is a valuable source of foreign exchange earnings. In
Pakistan, rice occupies second place in importance as an export
crop after cotton, and second place following wheat, in importance
as food crop. In 1989-90, 12% of land in agricultural crops in
Pakistan was devoted to the production of rice and about 15% of the
nation's value added by agricultural crops was contributed by rice
[Economic Survey of Pakistan, 1989-90, p.146-47].
7.2 Paddy/Rice Varieties in General.
There are about 7000 botanical rice varieties, of which about 400
have been identified in India alone. The United States Department
of Agriculture (USDA) has tested more than 5000 varieties in the
last few years, of which only a small percentage are of real value
[J.C Abbot, et, al., 1972, p.8]. New and improved varieties are
also constantly being developed.
In the developed countries like U.S.A, Japan, China, Australia,
Italy, and Republic of Korea, where the rice is grown, the number
of rice varieties grown are very limited. In contrast, the number
of varieties cultivated in most developing countries are often very
large. Many varieties of rice that are cultivated are not properly
identified and there are no regular price quotations for them. Here
it is worth while to note that the prices are always quoted
regularly of very few varieties.
From the botanical point of view all the rice varieties come under
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the species of 'OryZa Sativa'. This species is further divided in
to main two sub-species — Indica, and Japonica^ [Slayton Thomas,
1984, p. 14]. Indica is very important in the sense that the major
area in the world is cultivated under Indica sub-species. The main
varieties which comes under Indica species are long grain and
medium grain as mentioned in fig:-7.A. Long grain varieties consist
of fine varieties like Basmatii and coarse varieties like Irri.
The fine — Aromatic/scented — rice variety is produced only in
Pakistan, and recently in India and Thailand. The Coarse variety
— low quality — is mainly produced in China, U.S.A, Thailand,
India, Australia, Italy, and Pakistan. The Aromatic variety of rice
is sold at prices roughly double that of the coarse rice variety.
This type of rice is consumed mostly by rich people.
On the other hand, the Japonica sub-species of rice which is round
shaped, is found mainly in Japan, the Korea, Taiwan, parts of
China, Brazil, and Australia. Because of the cooking
characteristics, the demand for this type of rice is relatively
limited to Indonesia, and South Korea being the principal importers
[Barker, Randolph, et, al. , 1985].
Rice is a highly differentiated product and in practice its market
is segmented. Distinctions for dividing the rice market into
separate 'sub-markets' are based on four separate considerations,
three of which relate to the product itself — long grain, Medium
grain, and Round grain, and the other, to the degree of processing
— whole-milled, semi-milled/brown, Par-boiled, and broken.
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Fig:-7.A
MAIN RICE VARIETIES IN GENERAL.
1
Sources: Slayton Thoaas [1984] '¥orld Eice Markets: its Structure and workings; Barker,
fiandolph, et, al., [1985], 'Eice Econoiy of Asia'.
Mote:
a. According to some agronomists, Japonica is not the species but it is a trademark naue.
b. High quality rice variety.
c. Low quality variety.
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Quantity estimates of the different rice types and qualities
traded in the world during the last decade suggest the following
distribution: 75% to 85% long grain, while the rest are medium and
short grain, and in terms of quality, about 60% are high grade with
less than 20% broken [Nick Amin, 1987, p.15].
Generally speaking, there are hundreds of known rice varieties,
grown in different parts of the world and they differ in grain
quality, yield, physical features, sensitivity to light, resistance
to stress (bad weather, pests, and diseases), responsiveness to
fertilisers and cultivation methods.
7.2.1 Rice varieties in Pakistan.
There are different varieties of rice produced in Pakistan,
depending upon the suitability of climate and soil, but mainly
there are two types — fine (Basmati) and coarse (Irri) varieties.
The Irri rice which is a high yielding variety was introduced in
Pakistan in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Before the introduction
of Irri rice, many local varieties like 'Sugdasi', 'Kangni',
'Bidri', and 'Sighro' were grown. But nowadays the rice varieties
are limited to Basmati, Irri, and very few other traditional
varieties. Basmati rice is produced in a particular part of the
Punjab province of Pakistan, like Shekhupura, Gujranwala, and
Sialkot districts. This area is known as 'Kolar Area'. The Irri
rice variety is mainly produced in Sindh, and Punjab.
The Government of Pakistan is trying to shift the rice area from
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low value coarse varieties to the high value rice. Research has
long been undertaken at different agricultural research centres in
Pakistan, to produce the Basmati or other similar types of rice in
a wide area. In this regard few varieties like 'DR82', 'DR83',
'Lateefy', and 'Shadab' varieties have been developed but have not
yet actively been introduced to the producer to any great extent.
According to one of the senior officials in the Pakistan
Agriculture Research Council (PARC), the Council (PARC) recommend
the modern technological methods of production and seed varieties
from their experiments to the farmers through the Agriculture
extension wings. But it has been observed that their
recommendations are kept in the offices and are not distributed to
the farmers.
According to one respondent, in field work interviews in Pakistan,
Basmati-370 — the original fine variety — can not be grown in all
rice growing areas of Pakistan, except the 'Kolar Area', because it
needs a particular type of climate and soil. If the same Basmatii
rice is brought to the other areas of the same province or even to
the same district, it will not produce the same quality and same
quantity. However, other Basmatii varieties have been introduced,
which are not so similar in taste, and as such are not preferred
to Basmatii-370.
The varieties of paddy/rice being procured by RECP for export















It seens that in Pakistan there are two sain types — high and low
quality rice. No variety of rice has been developed yet to meet the
needs of intermediate level consumers and which could compete
successfully with other non-Aromatic long grain rice exporting
countries such as Thailand, and U.S.A.
7.2.2 Rice Varieties and the Consumer's Taste.
There are different varieties of rice liked and disliked by the
consumers of the different nations in the world. In some countries
consumers like rice to have no special natural smell, on the other
hand, there is a liking for scented/aromatic Basmatii rice. The
aromatic rice varieties are grown in very few places around the
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world. Because of its cooking characteristics, there is a high
demand of these varieties, specially in Middle East. These
varieties are sold at a premium price and consumed by rich people.
Again in Basmati there are different varieties with more and less
aromatic types.
Par-boiled rice is consumed only in parts of India, Sri Lanka,
Africa, Mauritus, and Bangladesh.
People especially in Africa and other low income countries consume
rice with a high percentage of broken (low quality rice) due to
their low income. Because if the percentage of broken rice is
greater, the price achieved will be less. In this regard, the
careful attention to consumers preferences from the taste and the
income point of view is at the heart of successful marketing.
7.3. Breakdown of Rice Area. Production and Yield in Pakistan.
In Pakistan, Punjab and Sindh are the two main rice producing
provinces , together contributing about 85% to 89% of the total
output. Basmati rice is almost exclusively grown in the Punjab
province except for a small quantity produced in Nasirabad division
of Baluchistan province. Sindh province occupies a predominant
position for the production of coarse varieties, the provincial
share in some years being almost two thirds of the total (table-
7.1).
7.3.1 On the whole, the total area under rice production is about
8 to 10% of total cropped area (table-7.2).
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TABLE - 7.1.




















































































Total. 943.2 2069.8 227.9 3240.9
Source: 'Agricultural Statistics of Pakistan' [1988-89], Government




AREA UNDER RICE CROPS, (Million Hectares).
TOTAL AREA, AND ABKA UNDER RICE CROPS.
YEARS. Total Cropped Index no; Area under Index no; Area of Rice
area (Million Rice Crops. as percentage
Hectares.) Million Hect; of total Cropped
area.
1971-72 16.60 100 1.45 100 8.73
1972-73 16.93 101.98 1.48 102.06 8.74
1973-74 18.23 109.81 1.51 104.13 8.28
1974-75 17.37 104.63 1.60 110.34 9.21
1975-76 18.02 108.55 1.71 117.93 9.48
1976-77 18.21 109.69 1.74 120.00 9.55
1977-78 18.49 111.38 1.89 130.34 10.22
1978-79 19.30 116.26 2.02 139.31 10.46
1979-80 19.22 115.78 2.03 140.00 10.56
1980-81 19.33 116.44 1.93 133.10 9.48
1981-82 19.78 119.15 1.97 135.86 9.95
1982-83 20.13 121.26 1.97 135.86 9.78
1983-84 19.99 120.42 1.99 137.24 9.95
1984-85 19.92 120.00 1.99 137.24 9.98
1985-86 20.28 122.16 1.86 128.27 9.17
1986-87 20.38 122.77 2.06 142.06 10.10
1987-88 20.90 122.77 1.96 135.17 9.37
1988-89 20.90 125.90 2.04 140.68 9.76
1989-90 20.90 125.90 2.11 145.51 10.09
Source : 'Economic Survey of Pakistan ,' [1989-90], Government o
Pakistan, Finance Division , Islamabad.
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Figure:-7.3.A indicates that the area under Irri rice has increased
more in comparison to the area under Basmatii rice, whereas the area
under other traditional rice varieties has been decreasing. On
average between 1977-78 to 1986-87, the area under Basmati, Irri,
and other traditional varieties is 38.7%, 47%, and 14.3%
respectively out of the total rice cropped area (Fig:-7.3.B).
7.3.2 On average, the total production of rice between 1975-76 to
1987-88 was 3.16 Billion tonnes. Which include Basmati, Irri, and
other rice varieties at 28%, 59%, and 13% respectively (FIG:-
7.4.A). The same figure also shows that the share of Basmati, Irri,
and other rice in total rice production in 1975-76 was 25%, 49%,
and 26%. In 1987-88 it reached 29%, 64%, and 7% respectively. This
means that the production of Basmati rice is not going to increase
as much as the production of Irri rice. On the other hand, the
production of other traditional varieties is going to decline.
7.3.3 On the whole, the per hectare yield of rice, including all
varieties, on average between 1977 to 1987 is 1.5 mt/ha. The
average per hectare yield of Basmati, Irri and other varieties is
1.4, 2.2, and 1.1 mt/ha [Agricultural Statistics of Pakistan,
1988].
Comparing the per hectare yield of rice in Pakistan with other rice
producing countries, it seems that Pakistan's per hectare yield is
low. The average yield between 1976-80 in Pakistan was about 2.3
metric tonnes per hectare, whereas China, Japan, South Korea, and
Taiwan produce about 3.77, 5.71, 5.38, and 4.42 metric tonnes
respectively [Barker, Randolph, et, al., 1985].
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Fig:—7.3-A
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7.4 Background of Paddy/Rice Policies in Pakistan.
Prior to the 1970s rice exports were not very important in
Pakistan. The reasons were twofold. First, since East Pakistan was
a rice deficit area most of the rice surplus of West Pakistan went
there. Second, the international market for fine quality -Basmatii-
rice was still fairly small.
The creation of Bangladesh in 1971 resulted in the diversion of the
rice previously shipped to East Pakistan to the international
market, and the oil price increase in 1973 led to rapid growth in
the demand for Basmatii rice in the Middle East. Since then, in
setting the procurement price of rice, particularly the Basmatii
variety, revenue considerations have been dominant. All along the
Government has acted on the assumption that the elasticities of
supply and international demand for Basmatii rice are low,
therefore, to maximise its revenue it has attempted to keep the
international price high by restricting exports, and created a
large wedge between the international price and the domestic
price^.
However, to prevent the low producer price resulting in high
domestic consumption of Basmatii rice the government introduced
monopoly procurement - scheme and allowed only limited sales in the
domestic market. The Bhutto Government, to maximise its revenue,
attempted to stop leakages into the domestic market through
smuggling by continuously expanding Government's role in the rice
trade and ultimately nationalising the rice milling sector in 1976.
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The measures had major economic and political implications for the
Bhutto Government. On the economic side there were two
consequences. The first was the impact it had on the country's rice
exports which declined in 1972-73 and did not pick up again until
1975-76 despite the increasing trend in output in these years. It
is widely believed that the difference was simply smuggled out of
the country. Second, the rice trade involved a large number of
small traders working with low profit margins. They, along with the
private rice mills, provided employment to a large section of the
rural non-farm middle and lower-middle class. As a result of the
reforms, and in the absence of other business opportunities, many
among these class were rendered unemployed.
The political consequences of the nationalisation were very bad for
the P.P.P Government. Bhutto could not survive and his Government
fell to a military coup in July 1977. Rice mills were returned back
to the private sector by the Zia Government soon after the coup of
1977.
After the 1977 military coup, middlemen were allowed to operate
again. Until 1986-87, rice exports were a Rice Export Corporation
(R.E.C) monopoly. The R.E.C regulated and curtailed the activity of
private traders through a large number of legal measures. These
measures were enshrined in the manual 'Monopoly Procurement Scheme'
under the auspices of the provincial Food Department. The document
of over one hundred pages in length covered the entire procurement
process. The R.E.C, armed with this set of rules, was able to
influence and direct the activities of rice traders. In particular,
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the rules regarding licensing and appointment of rice dealers and
mill owners, the movement of rice across districts, the quotas
allowed to dealers for release in the domestic market, and quality
control inspection of the procured rice, gave the Government
considerable leverage over the rice traders.
One study [Hamid, et, al., 1990, p.115] confirmed that an important
source of corruption in the system arose at the quality control
stage of procurement and resulted from R.E.C having the sole
monopoly of export.
In the same study [Ibid, p.115], it was confirmed that another
important factor contributing to corruption in the system of price
controls, referred to earlier, concerned the dealer's quota for
release into the local market where prices were considerably
higher. Because control was exercised by Food inspectors whose
salaries bear no relation to their controlling power, there was
corruption. By bribing Food Inspectors, rice dealers were able to
sell in the market larger quantities than their allowed quotas.
7.5 Current Paddy Policies in Pakistan.
7.5.1 Criteria for Determining the Paddy Prices.
Prices for paddy and rice are determined and fixed separately. The
price for paddy is determined first, and then rice prices are fixed
keeping in view the process cost, and value of paddy by-products
such as, bran, husk, and brokens.
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What happens in practice is as follows: Agricultural Price
Commission (APCOM), established in 1981, has the primary
responsibility for making recommendations for producer prices well
before the rice sowing season begins. The commission submits a
'secret' document, titled 'Support Price Policy of Rice' to the
Ministry of Agriculture. This document contains a review of the
most recent domestic situation for rice, that is, acreage sown,
cost patterns, trade situation, mark ups, and profitability, based
on its own surveys and reports submitted by the Ministry of
Agriculture, Ministry of Commerce, Rice Export Corporation, and the
Planning Commission. This report is summarised in a memorandum
containing the price recommendations and is then submitted to the
Cabinet for approval and public announcement. In determining the
O
level of 'support price' of a commodity like rice, keeping in view
the different interests like producers, consumers, and traders, no
mathematical formula can be laid down for the purpose as a balance
has to be struck between multiple objectives some of which could be
mutually contradicting.
Support prices for the agricultural commodities are determined
either on the basis of the cost of production or what is termed as
the 'parity approach'. The cost of production for agricultural
crops is calculated by the Agriculture Price Commission (APCOM)
through field surveys on the basis of questionnaires and personal
interviews [Viqar Ahmed, and Rashid Ahmed, 1984, p.179]. The
'parity price' approach is used in order to correct imbalance in
terms of trade between the agricultural and non-agricultural
sectors. The parity price is an output price that will yield income
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which will buy the same quantity of other (non-agricultural)
products as it would in some specified period. Thus a balance can
be maintained between the prices of commodities sold by the
farmers and the commodities which they purchase. It can be
calculated through a comparative index of agricultural and non-
agricultural prices.
According to a APCOM report [APCOM, April 1990, p.32] the following
factors are considered while determining the support prices:
a) Domestic stock, procurement, and export of rice during
the last year.
b) Prices of Paddy in the domestic market.
c) World supply, demand, stock, trade and price situation.
d) Export parity price of Pakistani rice.
e) Differential between the support prices of various
coarse varieties of paddy.
f) Profit and loss in the export of Pakistani rice.
g) Cost of production for the current crop of Pakistani
rice (paddy).
h) Real prices of rice (paddy).
However, it is generally believed and the author was reliably
informed that the major criteria for determining the support price
is the cost of production. In this regard the author attempted to
interview the Chairman of Agriculture Price Commission (APCOM) in
Pakistan to know the exact method of price determination but he
declined to explain the system.
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7.5.2. Paddy Procurement Prices and Cost of Production.
Bearing in mind the level of Support prices especially for Basmati
paddy as shown in table-7.5, these are admittedly low in comparison
to the world prices. The producers of Basmati have been getting
only 57 to 67X of the export prices. On the other hand the prices
of the Basaatii rice in the domestic market are also low in
comparison to the export prices. This is indicative of the extent
of hidden taxation especially on Basmatii rice. As Basmatii rice in
the country is consumed by the rich people only due to the high
prices comparative to Irri rice, there seem no justification to
subsidise Basmatii rice for the rich people by lowering the support
price.
TAIL1-T.5.
RICES FOE TIE DIFFEEEVT V1KIETIES OF RICE.
(Rs: per 40 kgsj
BASSATI RICE IRRI BICE.
TEARS. Procareaeit F.O.B (Average) Rbole sale Procireieit F.O.B Export Price Ikolesale
Price. Cost. Export price Price Price. Cost. (Av; Yearly) Price.
(Yearly Ai; (Yearly Ax;)
1982-83 154 196 324 270 89 113 108 79
1983-84 160 217 325 274 92 137 94 99
1984-85 160 250 385 275 92 139 121 113
1985-88 175 233 445 296 95 142 103 117
1985-87 206 257 497 279 98 138 109 95
1987-88 250 - 510 292 99 - 146 95
1988-89 268 - 537 308 111 - 181 106
Soirees: DCS [1989] 'Rice Export Operatioi Stmdy*, Goxeraieat of Fakistu, Islaiabad; APCOI [1990] 'Support Price
Policy for Rice/Paddy't Goxerueat of Pakistaa, Islmbad; Agriculture Statistics [1988-89], Eiaistrj of Food A
Agriculture, Goxeraieat of Palistaa, Islaiabad.
With regard to the price, the farmers have approached the
Government many times. The explicit lobbying regarding price by
farmers and traders takes several forms. The most common method is
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to carry out newspaper campaigns, in the shape of articles and
'appeals' to the Government to revise its policy.
MUTALBAT, (It means the rice prices and the grower's demands)],
issued by the Pakistan 'Kissan' Board (Farmer's Association) in
Punjab. Producers claimed that 'RECP is corrupt and it earns huge
profits on Basmatii export by depressing the producer's prices, and
they are deprived from getting their proper prices. In this
connection, they made demands to the Government for higher prices'.
Further in the same pamphlet, they alleged that 'RECP's Inspectors
who are authorised to procure rice are corrupt. Because they
procure pure Basmatii from the producers but supply to the RECP by
mixing other low quality varieties. With regard to this matter,
once the issue was subsequently brought to the attention of the
Minister of Agriculture who in turn concurred with the views of the
board'. These groups also lobby the Federal cabinet directly by
sending delegations to the Ministers of Agriculture, Commerce, and
Finance or through the ministers from rice growing areas.
On the other hand, the price paid to the producers of Irri rice are
close to the export prices. But actually the producers of both —
Irri and Basmatii rice are paid mainly on the basis of the cost of
production (table-7.6).
In a very recent pamphlet of June 2nd 1991,
t ^ /
[CHAWALOON KI QIMAT KA TAAYUN OWR KISANNOO KE
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TABLE - 7.6.
COMPARISON OF COST OF PRODUCTION, AND SUPPORT PRICES FOR PADDY.
(Kupees per 40 Kg.)
TEAKS BASMATI VARIETY. IRRI VARIETY.
Cost of Support Profit Cost of Support Profit
Production . Price. Margin. Production. Price. Margin.
1982-83 85 88 3 53
1983-84 85 90 5 47 55 8
1984-85 86 90 4 48 55 7
1985-86 88 93 5 50 57 7
1986-87 93 102 9 52 57 5
1987-88 96 130 34 54 59 5
1988-89 97 135 38 56 65 9
Sources : United Consulting Group (UCG) [1989], "Rice Export Operation Study'
Volume-1 , Lahore; APCOM, [1990-91], * Support Price Policy for Rice (Paddy) crop
Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.
It can be seen from these tables that the margin of profit for both
Irri and Basmatii producers is very small. The price of coarse rice
in the world is low because of the low quality and the greater
competition of coarse rice variety in the world on one hand, and
the developed countries' agricultural policies on the other, which
will be discussed in chapter 10.
The Government procurement scheme has potential for increasing
regional tensions. Nearly all Basmatii is grown in Punjab, while
nearly all Irri is grown in Sindh. This specialisation results from
soil conditions. So, the compulsory procurement scheme benefited
the Sindh farmers at the expense of the R.E.C.'s profits because of
the poor international market and low international prices for
Irri rice. Now that procurement is voluntary, the R.E.C does not
have to purchase Irri, and it has not done so in the Punjab where
its price has fallen. This is because the domestic market is free
and has no outlet to export. So far R.E.C continues to purchase
Irri rice in Sindh but if losses on export of Irri rice continue to
increase then there is the possibility of it turning into an issue
having important implications for regional income distribution.
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7.5.3 Paddy Procurement Operation.
In Pakistan, the crop procurement programme for agricultural
commodities was started during the early 1950s. The major change
that has been taking place especially in paddy procurement during
the past years has been that the Rice Export Corporation of
Pakistan no longer uses the services of Provincial Food Department
for procurement of Paddy. Now, mainly the private millers procure
rice and the RECP also procures on its own, voluntarily, through
its subsidiaries but on very small scale and if necessary, PASSCO
on behalf of it^.
The RECP's two subsidiaries: Pakistan National Product Limited
Company (PNPLC), and Doabo Rice Mill Limited (DRM1) procure paddy
regularly for the milling operations of their units. This is
66,000 and 36,000 tonnes — 6% and 7X of Basmati and Irri
respectively as an average between 1983-84 to 1987-88 out of total
average paddy production. The remaining produce is procured by the
private sector. The private sector procures the paddy on the basis
of the market prices which are close to, but mostly little bit
above the support prices in some places due to competition.
One point should be noted here that for buying paddy, the millers
get loan from commercial banks — mostly in public sector — at the
market interest rate on their personal guarantee.
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7.5.4 Paddy Inspection.
As far as the paddy inspection is concerned, there is no standard
laboratory with public as well as private sector. Formal
specification and testing equipments are never or rarely used for
the purchase of paddy. The producers have no options but to agree
to the buyers analysis. Visual inspection is the norm for
determining the quality and price. While assessing the quality at
the inspection stage, the tolerance limits, scale of deductions,
and limits of rejections for different varieties are determined in
respect of the following characteristics:
- Moisture,
- Mixture of other varieties,
- Shrivelled grain,
- Dust and inert matter,
7.6.1. Rice Milling.
Rice Milling in Pakistan is classified into the following types of
units in terms of functions and scales.
7.6.1.1 Hullers.
The Hullers are attached to the traditional chakkies and are
located mostly in the rice producing areas. The total number of
hullers in operation in Pakistan is estimated at 1558. The actual
processing capacity of the hullers is 300 to 400 kg/hour of paddy.
The majority of rice milling units in Pakistan are of this type
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since the machinery is cheap and easy to operate and maintain
[United Consulting Group, 1989, p.146].
One Study [Japan International Co-operation Agency, 1986, p.3-19],
confirms that these units are extremely inefficient, giving total
milling recovery of only 60%. Nor is the product of good quality.
The grains are milled unevenly and the percentage of broken grain
is high, which is about 35% of the total.
7.6.1.2 Sheller Mills.
Shellers, in comparison to Hullers are better and are the medium
quality rice processing machines. These are the main commercial
rice milling units presently functioning in Pakistan. Their name
came from the under runner disk shellers which they use in the
husking process. Some of these units have up-graded their
operations through the use of imported rubber roll hullers. They
use rubber-roll hullers, manufactured by domestic factories or
imported from China, instead of disk shellers. The total number of
these mills is about 1000 [Japan International Co-operation Agency,
1986, p.3-20].
7.6.1.3 Modern rice Mills.
These are the latest and the best quality rice processing machines
because in these mills the percentage of broken grain is very low.
But the number of these types of machines is very small. In these
mills, rubber-roll huskers are used in husking processes. These
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machines, manufactured in West Germany and in Japan, have been
introduced in nine existing modern mills. Out of these nine mills,
eight are Government (RECP subsidiaries) mills and there is only
one mill in the private sector, six are situated in Punjab and two
in Sindh. These mills produce superior quality rice, both of
Basmati and other varieties, and also have facilities for par¬
boiling. In view of the limited capacity of these mills, most of
the rice procured for export comes from the Sheller units. The
quality of the output, however, does not conform to the standard
specifications required for export purposes necessitating re-
milling by RECP at its Karachi plants. The share of the modern
mills in the total rice milling capacity is estimated at 5% only
[table-7.7].
TABLE - 7.7.
Relative shares of milling in different type of Rice Mills.





Source: United Consulting Group [1989], table 6.1, p.148, Lahore.
During the fieldwork for this thesis,the author was informed by
senior officials of RECP, that the mills with RECP, which are
believed to be modern are in fact 20 to 30 years old. The
processed quality of rice is not so good because it contains a
larger proportion of brokens.
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From the above discussion, it seems that there is quite a small
number of modern mills. There is a lack of investment by the
private sector in the modern mills which requires more capital and
process the best quality rice. This may be because on the one hand
the private sector is not encouraged or properly paid by the RECP
on quality rice, or on the other hand they have had no outlet to
export rice. Hence they do not bother to invest in modern milling.
7.6.2 By-Products of Rice Milling





Approximately 20 to 22% husk is generated relative to the weight of
paddy depending on its variety and the type of machine. Presently
the major proportion of husk is used in brick making where it is
used as the fuel. These uses are uneconomical and not beneficial.
The other traditional uses are animal feeds in mixture with bran
and seed beds for rice farming.
The manufacturing of husk board and activated carbon are the two
potential uses of husk but they are still in the experimental
stages in Pakistan.
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The husk board is used as panel board in construction, quality
furniture, and possesses many characteristics like; resistance to
moisture, bacterial resistance, good strength, resistant to fire.
The activated carbon is used extensively in various industrial
processes such as refining of edible oil, beverage and food
products, water purification, and protection against toxic gases
[UCG, Vol-1, 1989].
7.6.2.2 Bran.
The production of rice bran is estimated at 8 to 9% of rice output.
One study [UCG, vol-1, 1989, p.173] confirms that the available
quantity of bran can produce 26,000 to 32,000 tonnes of edible oil,
but mostly it is consumed as animal feed. In some places, rice
bran is used as an ingredient of poultry feed. A very few
commercial mills sell bran to feed dealers of oil makers, mainly
for making laundry soap.
7.6.2.3 Broken.
With regard to the broken rice product, it is sold in the domestic
and international markets. The broken rice is sold at very cheap
prices in comparison to the whole rice.
7.7 Functions and the Organisation of RECP.
The Rice Export corporation of Pakistan (RECP) was incorporated on
August 22, 1974 at Karachi as a private limited company under the
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Company Act, 1913. The entire capital of the Corporation was
subscribed by the Government of Pakistan and it was intended to act
as an agent of the Government, having full monopoly on rice
exports. It was to undertake all operations connected with
procurement, milling, cleaning, storage, packing and arranging
exports.
7.7.1 Functions of the RECP.
The RECP is given the following functions to perform:
(i) to carry on the business of export of rice from Pakistan
including all operations connected with procurement, milling,
cleaning, storage, packaging and sales or export.
(ii) to take all measures necessary for promotion of exports of
rice from Pakistan, including internal and external publicity,
sending of sales missions to foreign countries and inviting foreign
purchase missions to visit Pakistan.
(iii) to collect and maintain adequate market intelligence in
respect of rice; and
(iv) to construct, purchase or acquire by lease the godowns,
cleaning plants, show-rooms, and business centres, required for the
corporation business.
The functions entrusted to RECP include the full range of
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operations involved in export sales. The functional integration of
the above activities under a single administrative control was
expected to ensure better export performance and timely corrective
action where necessary. RECP receives the guidelines from the
Ministry of Commerce, regarding the procurement prices, procurement
quantity, exports of rice on a regular basis.
7.7.2 Organisation Structure of the RECP.
The Corporation is headed by a Chairman, who is nominated by the
Government through the Ministry of Commerce. The Chairman is
assisted by a board of five Directors who are also appointed by
the Federal government. The Corporation being an autonomous body,
the Chairman enjoys full powers relating to its general
administration and operations subject to the policy guidelines of
the Government.






Deputy General Managers 12
Managers 42
Considering the number of the activities performed in the
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Corporation, the managerial level in terms of quantity seems more
than sufficient [UCG, vol-1, p.86, 1989],
7.7.3 Appointment System of Top Executives.
The management of some technical departments in RECP, for example
export operations, requires a number of professional and
operational skills for achieving a reasonable degree of success.
The skills include, among others, familiarity with product
characteristics, the international marketing environment and the
ability to forecast probable trends. However, the present system of
nomination of the top executives does not always ensure the
availability and development of the required skills.
The Chairman and the Directors are nominated directly by the
Government. In this regard, one study [UCG, 1989, Vol-1, p.88]
confirmed that their average tenure had been too short to permit
any major contribution for improvement. It was found that average
tenure of Chairman was only 2 years against 2 years and 5 months
for Directors, most of them also did not have any relevant
background before coming to RECP.
The international rice market environment is too complex to be
understood in a short period. Therefore, a new person requires some
time to get acquainted with the problems. By the time he is well
set, he is transferred to some other department, hence they do not
have the opportunity for improving efficiency.
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This whole situation could be termed as 'experimental leadership'.
The persons posted temporarily on deputation have basically a
training of basic public administration. Attempts to bring
'improvements' or his own ambition may push him to develop new
approaches. This implies 'experimentation' and a process of
learning through 'trial and error'. Here 'experimentation' in a
given time framework of a maximum of three years involves the risk
of vulnerability. Experimental leadership rarely permits one to
move ahead at a reasonable speed in some logical direction,
especially when dealing with complicated and highly competitive
international markets.
Under this environment the general tendency is not to undertake any
bold step which may place a reputation or even a career at stake.
This is one reason, why a newcomer generally lets the system work
the way it has been in the past. Due to this very fact, though the
operational environment of RECP has changed considerably on account
of the introduction of a voluntary procurement scheme plus exports
by the private sector; the internal structure, policies, procedures
and systems remain the same. Obviously routine administrative and
operational measures are least conducive for developing successful
export operations under dynamic environments.
7.7.4 Responsibilities of the Chairman.
The Chairman and the Board of Directors share the power of decision
making and policy formulation. The Chairman also enjoys full powers
relating to general administration and operations subject to the
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policy guidelines of the Government. It has however been observed
that too much general administrative responsibilities of a routine
nature are attached with the functional head of the organisation.
Instances of some of these responsibilities are given below:
a) Grant of leave (different kinds) for General Managers.
b) Installation of telephone for official use.
c) Counter-signing the TA/DA bills for DGM level and above.
d) Approval of promotional advertisements.
e) Permission to proceed on official tour 'within Pakistan'
above DGM level.
f) Permission for travel outside Pakistan.
g) Nominate officers and staff to attend training courses/
seminars outside Pakistan.
h) Powers to declare stocks as surplus and vehicles as
unserviceable.
i) Other miscellaneous matters not specified above which vary
in capacities and most of which are irrelevant for the
post of Chairman.
Other than these general administrative powers and tasks, the
following financial aspects of his responsibilities are also
'cumbersome' and create obstacles in the performance of his more
important functional tasks:
i) Local purchase of workshop tools, spare parts of mills
machinery.
ii) Engagement of lawyers or advocates other than those already
on RECP panel.
184
These tasks of routine nature leave less time for more strategic
issues related to the actual performance of RECP
7.7.5 Operational Shortcomings in the Organisation:
The major organisational shortcomings in RECP as reviewed by one
study [UCG, Vol-I, 1989, p.93] are described below:
7.7.5.1 Lack of Communication and Coordination.
A number of major instances of inadequate communication and
coordination, having adverse effects on operational efficiency in
the corporation were observed. The most common case of the lack of
communication and coordination in RECP prevails between the
exports cell and the top managerial level. This cut-off point in
the communication process at this critical level is likely to
produce adverse effects on marketing/export planning, strategy and
implementation plans.
The activities of the marketing department, in particular suffer
from these shortcomings. The views and recommendations of the
department do not reportedly receive due attention at the top level
mainly due to the inadequate communication and coordination among
the concerned executives. Marketing and exports are among the most
essential ingredients of RECP. The responsibility of managing the
marketing intelligence parameters are given to the Marketing
Manager by the decision making authorities of RECP.
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7.7.5.2 Performance Appraisal System.
The Corporation does not have any special performance appraisal
system linked with its operational activities. The system of
appraisal through the 'Annual Confidence Reports' (ACR), as in
vogue in other Government Departments also exists here [UCG 1989,
vol-II, pp 10-16]. Being a government organisation, RECP has to use
the ACR forms prescribed for Government officers, though they are
not directly relevant for evaluating performance standards in
respect of the specialist activities of RECP. So the ACR forms
should be carefully designed as to fully reflect the functional and
operational objectives of the performance evaluation and should be
related to the actual working environment of the Corporation.
7.7.5.3 Structural Duplications and Distortions.
The major instances of structural distortions and duplications as
confirmed by one study [UCG, 1989, vol-II, pp.17-24] appear to be
the following:
a) The existence of the post of Secretary, who looks after the
company's corporate, legal and personnel matters working under
Director Commercial.
b) Functional duplication of activities between 'Secretary' and
'General Manager Personnel and Administration' under the 'Director
Field and Operations'.
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c) Dilution of the responsibilities of Director Administration
among various levels.
Bearing in mind the above points, the responsibilities of each
sectional head should be clearly designed so as there should not be
distortions and duplications.
7.7.5.4 Internal Environment.
The organisational structure of RECP on paper looks nearly normal
in its objectivity, with a few minor debatable points. The
functional environment is more bureaucratic in nature than
professional or business like. It is also supported by the fact
that most of the 'deputed officers' , that is, the top level RECP
executives, belong to administrative services. Such a structure is
based on a so-called 'military model', that assumes complete
control of the organisation from the top. In pure form it is rigid
hierarchy, complete with objectives but without fixed, measurable
standards. Job descriptions are generally non-existent while the
prescribed administration and financial powers lead to conflicts
and contradictions within the system and structure.
7.7.5.5 Inadequate and Political Appointments.
One study [UCG, 1989, vol-1, p. 97] confirms that there are very few
managers who are working in positions in RECP that are relevant to
their academic background and experience. There are many instances
where people with inadequate and irrelevant experience are
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occupying positions of great responsibility. This creates
frustration among others, who are technically aore qualified to
perform the functions.
Reviewing the background of the existing nanagerial staff, it
appears that except for the Finance and Accounts Department, other
important operational areas of the organisation lack appropriate
technical personnel to perform their functions efficiently.
Obviously a person without the relevant and adequate background of
corporate law cannot perform relevant functions for that
department. Likewise, a person without a strong background of the
international marketing and business can not be a source of benefit
to export marketing which is the main objective of RECP. The rice
export market is so dynamic and volatile in nature, that the need
for people with adequate relevant academic qualifications and
experience is more than necessary.
Can a senior civil servant whose frame of reference is the
Government department be expected to make or implement a decision
in a 'business fashion'? Or can a senior military officer whose
experience has been in leading military units be expected to manage
any state enterprise along commercial lines? These are the
fundamental questions that are beyond the scope of this study.
Generally, a common criticism of the SOEs in Pakistan is that the
managers are often chosen for their political connections rather
than their professional competence. Selection of the Chief
executive officer of any SOEs can significantly effect ultimate
performance of the enterprise.
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One study [Jones, 1982, p. 7] estimated that in Pakistan, a 5%
increase of public enterprises efficiency would be equivalent to
about 1% of the GDP, 53% of the direct taxes or enough to increase
government expenditures on education by 50%. Clearly, managerial
issues related to SOEs merit serious attention in research.
7.7.5.6 Neglect of Market Intelligence function.
The importance of exports for a developing country like Pakistan
needs no emphasis. The country is facing stiff competition.
Pakistani rice has declined both in terms of its share in
Pakistan's total exports as well as in terms of its share in the
total world rice trade. Countries like Thailand and USA have
increased their share of the world market. These countries have
developed adequate systems for regular collection and systematic
evaluation of data relating to future world rice market [UCG, vol-
1, 1989].
RECP has always been lacking a functionally viable system and
procedures to collect, plan, analyse, and manage the information
needed to perform the desired operations of market intelligence.
The marketing section of the RECP comprises one 'Market Manager'
and, without any professional and logistic support. His activities
are confined to data collection through telephones, teleprinters,
some journals on agriculture, and reports from U.S Embassy — a
rival. The 'Marketing Manager' submits these reports to the higher
authorities without any attempt to analyse and evaluate.
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Further, the Marketing Manager is reporting only to the 'General
Manager-Export-1', who is responsible for the sale of Irri rice.
Thus the other important part, that is, the sale/export of Basmati
rice, is totally neglected, and therefore, the 'General Manager-
Export-II', who does not have the services of the marketing
manager, does not have the cooperation and information of this very
important area. Hence, product development according to the
changing needs environment has been ignored. RECP has thus been
continuing to produce a set specification of Irri and Basmatii rice
so that the buyer may take it without ascertaining the consumers
preferences.
In order to compete in the world market and to expand exports,
research and market studies are essential to penetrate new markets
with products that the consumers want.
7.7.5.7 Promotion System of the Employees.
The internal promotion policies of the RECP affects the morale of
the staff members. The critical factor in this case is that the
permanent employees of RECP cannot be promoted beyond the level of
General Manager in any department. However, even at the 'General
Manager', level, most of the posts are filled by 'secondment'. The
people who come from outside on 'secondment', are given key senior
positions, thus depriving the seasoned qualified people of their
due rights. This policy is imposed by the 'Government Sector'. It
is strongly felt that the Corporation, , which is supposed to
function as a full-fledged 'commercial house', functions almost in
opposite direction with respect to its objectives.
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7.7.5.8 Control Functions Exercised by the Ministry of Co—erce
and others.
The control of appointing and transferring the Chairman and
Directors has created great obstacles in the functional and
operational working flow of the Corporation.
The 'secondment' system of appointment by the Government has
deprived the Corporation of an appropriate organisational structure
with the specialised skills and tools necessary to cope with the
dynamic environment of the product line and to meet its objectives
successfully. Secondly, the lack of full authority of Chairman and
the Board (of RECP) in deciding major commercial issues instantly
have also contributed to the weaknesses in strategic decision
making.
The present operational structure of RECP has moulded itself into a
rigid system which is unable to adjust itself, both internally and
externally, with the dynamics of its total environment. Up to the
present time, the operations and survival of the corporation has
been based on the 'structural factor' of the comparative advantage
that Pakistan Basmati rice has enjoyed in certain markets.
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CONCLUSION.
This chapter started by looking at the policies of Paddy/Rice
adopted by the Government of Pakistan and the functions and
organisational structure of RECP.
It was found that in Pakistan there are two main rice varieties —
fine variety — Basmatii produced in Punjab and course varieties —
Irri — mainly produced in Sindh province. No medium variety is yet
introduced actively. The domestic market for paddy/rice is partly
liberalised. The distribution is free but the domestic price is
influenced by government floor price.
Private rice mills are mostly outdated, hence inefficient in
processing the quality rice. As a result, the milled rice procured
is re-milled by RECP (public sector) itself at Karachi. It has also
been found that the mills in the public sector (RECP) which are
believed to be modern, are also outdated. The result is that the
broken ratio of rice processed is high and sold at cheaper rates.
The Private sector is reluctant to invest in the modern milling
because it is not encouraged to produce quality rice by RECP
procurement officials. They accept the low quality rice through
bribery as alleged. On the other hand, they are not allowed to
export freely, hence they do not have any outlet and incentive to
process the quality rice or invest in modern milling.
As far as the rice milling by-product is concerned, it is mostly
misused mainly by using it as a fuel and animal feed.
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The procurement prices of Irri and Basmatii paddy/rice are
production cost oriented not export price oriented. Comparing the
procurement prices with the export prices, the Irri procurement
price is close to the export price because of low export prices due
to low quality rice, world competition, and the developed
countries' agricultural policies. Whereas the Basmatii procurement
price is underpriced in comparison to the export price, and this is
not justified.
However, it is just coincidence that the creation of Bangladesh in
1971 resulted in the diversion of the rice previously shipped to
East Pakistan to the international market, and the increase in oil
prices in 1973 led to rapid growth in the demand for Basmatii rice
in the Middle East. This period also coincided with the world wide
commodity boom and the export price for rice more than doubled in
1973-74 compared to 1972-73 and large profits were made by rice
traders. The Government at that time saw an opportunity for
generating revenue, therefore rice trade was declared a State
monopoly and the Rice Export Corporation (RECP) was established to
handle it. RECP was originally established with the aim to trade
with the socialist countries. Since then, in setting the
procurement price of rice, particularly the Basmatii variety,
revenue considerations have been dominant. The Government has
changed many times since then, but every Government is reluctant to
withdraw it because on the one hand Government needs money and on
the other hand it is very difficult to redeploy the people in other
jobs or even make them jobless due to the favouritism. But now the
farmers are going to organise in Pakistan and the Americans are
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trying for liberalisation of world agricultural trade.
As far as the Irri rice price is concerned, it cannot be set below
the current level, because it is already paid on the basis of the
cost of production. At the noment, if the price is paid below the
cost of production, millions of people will suffer whose staple
food it is and millions of people will be unemployed and a
significant portion of land will be unutilised. However, it could
be switched over to other crops which has more potential benefits
but it needs further study.
It seems that the support price is more important for Irri rice,
but it needs improvement. If only the inspection and procurement
system could have been controlled, much inefficiency and wastage
would disappear.
Looking at the organisational structure of RECP and in particular
the number of activities performed in the corporation, the
managerial level in terms of quantity seems more than sufficient.
The management of some technical departments in RECP, for example
export operations, require a number of professional and operational
skills for achieving a reasonable, degree of success. But the
current/existing system of nomination of the top executives does
not always ensure the availability and the development of the
required skills.
The next chapter will deal with the rice procurement policies and




According to sow of the Botanists and the Agronomists, Japonica is not the species
of rice but it is a trade mark name.
2
One consequence of this has been the development of international competition (for
example, Thai Basmati or U.S.A with Texamati) which is eroding the monopoly position
of Pakistan in the world Basmati market.
3
The support price is the minimum level of a commodity's price below which the
Government would not allow it to fall. At times, the procurement prices may also
tend to function as support prices, that is, after bumper harvests when open market
prices are declining. On the other hand, during periods of bad harvest, procurement
price may resist sharp price increases.
4
In case there is an excess stock, or if private traders are not in a position to
procure, and/or if they do not offer the prices to the producers, fixed by the
Government (support prices), in this case the PASSCO, which mostly procure the
wheat, is asked to procure rice on behalf of Government (RECP) and sell it to RECP
after processing by hiring Hills.
5
These are part of rice mills, which process rice into flour.
®The top executives who belong to civil services are transferred on
secondment/deputation, from one organisation to other, no matter what qualifications
or experiences they have. For example; a person with the background of civilian




RICE PROCUREMENT POLICIES A THE ROLE OF RECP IN HANDLING RICE.
The objective of this chapter is to describe the procurement and
pricing policies of rice in Pakistan and to analyse the role of
RECP in handling the rice at its godowns.
This chapter is organised as follows: The rice procurement policy
and procedure is described in section one. Sections 2 and 3 deal
briefly with the rice transportation and the quality inspection of
rice by RECP at godowns respectively. The paddy/rice marketing
channels are summarised in section 4. Finally, the role of RECP in
handling the rice is the subject of the rest of the discussion.
8.1. Rice Procurement Policy.
Rice was procured by the RECP under the 'Monopoly/compulsory
procurement scheme' from its inception (1974). The scheme was
issued annually and included the detailed instructions and legal
clauses covering the entire procurement process.
It was felt that the compulsory procurement at support prices was
detrimental to the interests of growers and was acting as a
disincentive for increasing rice production. This was due to the
fact that under monopoly procurement, the support price, which was
intended to be the minimum guaranteed price, became in practice the
maximum price that a farmer could get for his produce. The monopoly
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scheme thus involved indirect taxation on the farmers, especially
in the case of Basmatii rice, enjoying higher export prices compared
to the FOB prices calculated on the basis of the prescribed support
prices.
The voluntary scheme was expected to eliminate a number of
malpractices involved in the monopoly scheme because of the
restrictions on free domestic rice sale, that is, mismanagement
mainly corruption, and the lower prices offered to the producers.
One study [U.C.G, vol-1, 1989, p.117] concludes that the major
malpractices noticed were:
a) Rapid increase in the cultivation of unapproved rice
varieties, yielding better returns than Basmatii.
b) Increasing the mixture of unapproved varieties with
Basmatii, creating serious export problems.
c) Smuggling.
In 1986-87, the Government made certain reforms in the procurement
system. Compulsory procurement was abandoned altogether.
Procurement centres still exist but delivery and sales to these are
voluntary. Partly free market is allowed to operate for domestic
sales. Export by the private sector was allowed under certain
limitations. Exports of Basmatii rice in packages of 20 Kgs or less
by the private sector was allowed but the bulk exports remained
197
the monopoly of R.E.C. However, an extremely high export tax has
prevented any significant exports by the private sector so far. The
consequences are that the domestic price of Basmati rice has
fallen.
Nowadays, the dealers can now sell as much as they like in the
local market. The producer price offered by the Government has
increased, to induce traders to sell to the R.E.C, but it is still
well below the international price because of high export duties
and the Government monopoly on bulk exports. Many rice traders feel
that the Government's objective of improving the quality of the
voluntarily procured rice is unlikely to be met since the source of
the problem lies with export monopoly and lack of public
accountability to evaluate its performance.
8.1.1 Rice Procurement Procedure.
In the early years, the Food Department in Punjab and Sindh acted
as an agent of RECP/Government to procure and dispatch the rice to
RECP's storage in Karachi. The Food Department purchased rice at
their procurement centres (205 in Punjab and 85 in Sindh). Nowadays
RECP procures rice by itself at notified centres of the specified
varieties on the basis of procurement targets fixed by the
Government. The Food Department is not involved anymore.
The quality of the rice is tested visually on the basis of a
prescribed sampling procedure. Basic specifications tested include
ratio of head rice, brokens, unmilled, damaged, paddy, foreign
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aatter, the mixture of other varieties. The lot is accepted if the
percentage is within the tolerance limits, or with deduction, if it
falls in that category. It is rejected if any of the refraction's
percentage is more than the specified limit. It is widely believed
that the RECP officials accept the lower quality rice with bribes
or by political influence.
RECP, procures Basmatii and Irri rice. The quantity of rice procured
annually by RECP since 1975-76, classified by major varieties, are
shown in table-8.1. The procurement levels have generally remained
above the one million level and have shown a gradually rising
trend, especially during the 1980s. The year 1987-88 was the
exception when procurement levels were significantly lower.
TABLE - 8.1.
VARIETY WISE RICE PROCUREMENT BY RECP.
YEARS PEOCUEENENT (00 TONS) PEECENTAGE SHAEE OF TOTAL PEOCUREKENT.
BASNATI IEEI-6. TOTAL BASNATI IEEI-6
PUNJAB PUNJAB SINDH SUB-TOTAL PUNJAB PUNJAB SINDH SUB-TOTAL TOTAL.
1975-76 313 80 328 408 721 43 11 45 57 100
1976-77 198 134 312 446 644 31 21 48 69 -
1977-78 197 256 467 723 920 21 28 51 79 -
1978-79 399 318 527 845 1244 32 26 42 68 -
1979-80 328 168 593 761 1089 30 15 54 70 -
1980-81 320 65 639 704 1024 31 6 62 69 -
1981-82 388 112 594 706 1094 35 10 54 65 -
1982-83 337 145 744 889 1226 27 12 61 73 -
1983-84 264 154 728 882 1146 23 13 64 77 -
1984-85 267 205 753 958 1225 22 17 61 78 -
1985-86 230 240 745 985 1215 19 20 61 81 -
1986-87 237 137 931 1068 1305 18 10 71 82 -
1987-88 222 - 607 607 829 27 - 73 73 -
Source: United Consulting Group (UCG) [1989], p.121, table 5-3.
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The classification of procurements by varieties shows that the
ratio of Irri in the total has varied between 57 to 80% during
different years. Irri rice is procured from both Punjab and Sindh
provinces except for 1987-88 when it was obtained only from Sindh.
The relative share of Basmati in the total has been declining over
the years, from 43% in 1975-76 to 18% in 1986-87. The share of Irri
rice procured from Punjab has also shown a declining trend.
Consequently, the share of the Punjab province in the total
procurement operations has also been declining consistently. The
reason for the decline of Basmatii procurement seems to be either
smuggling or an increase in the domestic consumption due to the low
domestic price of Basmatii in comparison to export prices. The
domestic prices of Basmatii rice is low because there is no free
external outlet. There is RECP monopoly to export.
The relationship between annual production and procurement levels
for Basmatii, Irri Punjab, and Irri Sindh, and for total rice is
shown in table-8.2. It appears that the production and
procurement levels have varied within narrow limits during recent
years. The procurement levels which have ranged between 1.0 to 1.3
million tonnes, have constituted about one-third to two-fifths of
the annual output. The annual ratios of procurement to total output
have been the highest in the case of Irri from Sindh where more
than 50% of the crop had been procured during most of the years.
The ratio rose to more than two-thirds of the total output during
1985-86 and 1986-87. The procurement of Irri in the Punjab has been
in lesser quantities compared to Sindh. This is because,
comparatively the Irri rice is produced less in the Punjab.
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However, the percentage of the total provincial output has ranged
between 36 to 48% in the early 1980s. With the introduction of
voluntary procurement in 1986-87, only about one-fifth of the
provincial output was procured while no quantities were procured in
the subsequent two years.
TABLE - 8.2.
Production and Procurement of Rice Classified by Varieties.
(qiaititj ii tkoasaid toss)
YEARS TOTAL RICE. BASRATI IRRI-6 PUIJAB. IRRI-6 SIIDE
PRODUCT PRCRIIT1 PRCRKIT PRODUCT PRCEHT PRCRIIT PRODUCT PRCRIIT PRCRIIT PRODUCT PRCRIIT PR0CRIT.
AS I OF AS I OF AS X OF AS X OF
PRODUCT PRODUCT PRODUCT PRODUCT
1975-T6 1891 721 38 642 313 49 221 80 36 1028 328 32
1976-77 1935 644 33 660 198 38 260 134 52 1016 312 31
19TT-T8 2446 920 38 552 197 36 579 256 44 1315 467 36
19T8-T9 2835 1244 44 863 399 46 676 318 47 1296 527 41
1979-80 2899 1089 38 874 328 38 526 168 32 1499 593 40
1980-81 2847 1024 36 965 320 33 332 65 20 1550 639 41
1981-82 2930 1094 37 1035 388 37 311 112 36 1584 594 38
1982-83 2904 1226 42 987 337 34 357 145 41 1560 744 48
1983-81 2833 1146 40 926 264 29 408 154 38 1500 728 49
1984-85 2768 1225 44 855 267 31 568 205 36 1345 753 56
1985-88 3550 1215 52 785 230 29 493 240 49 1072 745 70
1985-87 3045 1305 43 790 237 30 691 137 20 1564 931 60
1987-88 2869 829 29 903 222 25 420 - - 1546 607 40
Soiree: Diited Comltiig Groip (OCG) [1989], p. 125, table-5.4.
late: *frocire«eit.
Under the monopoly procurement scheme, the suppliers of Basmatii
rice were allowed to sell in the open market a free sale bonus
quota equivalent to 25% of the rice tendered to RECP. With the
deregulation of the monopoly procurement scheme, private rice
suppliers and dealers were allowed to sell their rice in the open
market at best prevailing prices.
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The Federal Government fixes separate procurement targets each year
for Basmatii and Irri rice varieties. The procurement targets are
adjusted from time to time , keeping in view the estimated export
requirements, expected production, and carry over stocks and
experiences of the preceding years.
A comparison of the levels of targeted and actual procurements each
year is given in table-8.3. This shows that, on the whole the
actual procurements have ranged between 94 and 104% of the targets
during recent years. A comparative study of the position in respect
of different varieties shows that compared to Basmatii, procurements
have been nearer or in excess of the targets for Irri varieties.
TABLE - 8.3.
TARGET VERSUS ACTUAL PROCUREMENT OF RICE CLASSIFIED BY VARIETIES.
(Quantity in thousand tons).
Tears RICK TOTAL. BAS1ATI. IREI SUM. IREI POIJAB.









1975-76 675 721 107 225 313 139 350 328 94 100 80 80
1976-77 750 644 86 250 198 79 400 312 78 100 134 134
1977-78 900 920 102 '300 197 66 450 467 104 150 256 178
19T8-T9 1000 1244 124 300 399 193 500 527 105 200 328 159
19T9-80 1250 1089 87 350 328 94 550 593 108 350 168 48
1980-81 1000 1024 102 300 320 107 600 639 107 100 65 65
1981-82 1155 1024 95 400 388 97 650 594 91 105 112 107
1982-83 1150 1226 107 300 337 112 700 744 106 150 145 97
1983-84 1100 1146 104 200 264 132 750 728 97 150 154 103
1984-85 1250 1225 98 300 267 98 750 753 100 200 205 103
1985-86 1250 1215 97 350 230 67 750 745 99 150 240 160
1985-87 1250 1305 104 350 237 68 750 931 124 150 137 91
1987-88 1350 889 66 250 222 98 935 667 65 165 - -




Rice is mostly transported from the procurement centres to the RECP
godowns at Karachi, both by road and rail, where it is stocked for
re-milling and shipment. The great advantage of road is the
physical possibility of being able to provide a door to door
facility, both at the origin and the destination point. The
transportation modes for moving rice to Karachi are:
a) Pakistan Railway.
b) National Logistic Cell (NLC).
c) Private Trucks.
The characteristics of each of the above means are given below:
8.2.1.1 Pakistan Railway
Railway arrangements are based on the registration of rice
consignments at the loading stations. While registration and
arrangements for railway wagons are being made, rice is stored
temporarily in open space on the railway platforms. The duration of
this storage is 24 to 36 hours. Pakistan Railway's capacity for
rice transportation is reported to be 300 railway wagons a day, the
capacity of one wagon being 32.1 tonnes. On this basis the total
rice carrying capacity of Pakistan Railway, comes to 9630 tonnes.
RECP could not utilise this low cost means of transport to the
extent of 100% of its requirement because:
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a) Storage facilities at railway stations are inadequate and,
further, are not well protected from inclement weather.
b) Many of the rice suppliers are not located near the Rail Heads
so the rice supplies of these localities are reluctant to bring
their stocks to Rail Heads because of the extra costs which has to
be born by then.
c) As the bulk quantity of rice is procured during a limited period
of about three months, December to February, the daily availability
of railway wagons does not match the requirements.
8.2.1.2 National Logistic Cell (NLC).
NLC is a public sector organisation which is engaged in nationwide
transportation of commodities. NLC Trucks are assigned by its
headquarters at Gujranwala in Punjab and Khairpur in Sindh. The
capacity of these trucks is given below:








This mode of transport is mostly used for:
i) Mills located more than 10 k.m from a railway station or
ii) Rice which Pakistan Railway cannot transport.
8.2.1.3 Private Trucks.
Private trucks with the capacity of about 10 tonnes each are used
for transporting rice from Sindh only. These trucks transport rice
to Karachi after unloading the previous cargo from Karachi. The
cost of carriage varies with the distance covered, capacity of each
vehicle and the demand and supply situation. For instance, in times
of greater import activity at Karachi, more goods are transported
from Karachi to Sindh and Punjab areas and for returning quickly to
Karachi even lower rates can be accepted. Millers mostly in Sindh
prefer and use the private trucks and NLC services, because they
provide door to door facilities. Whereas the railway does not offer
easy access for the traders because supplying rice from the mills
to the railway station, and the booking of the railway is time
consuming and problematic. In Punjab, due to very long distances,
it is preferred to utilise the railway services.
The quantity of rice transported by different means each year and
their relative share through the different transportation modes are
shown in tables-8.4 and 8.5.
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TABLE - 8.4.
Transportation of Mice classified by Mode of Transport. To Karachi froai Punjab.
(Quantity in tonnes)
Tears Railway Wagon. National Logistic Cell (NLC) Total.
Quantity Percentage Quantity Percentage Quantity. Percentage.
1980-81 315394 82 69836 18 385230 100
1981-82 398331 80 101110 20 499941 -
1982-83 372757 77 110194 23 482951 -
1983-84 326984 78 91895 22 418879 -
1984-85 382204 80 90345 20 472549 -
1985-86 404221 86 65253 14 469474 -
1986-87 320808 86 53981 14 374789 -
1987-88 187275 85 33973 15 221248 -
Source: Rice Export Operation Study in Pakistan, 1989, United Consulting Group
(UCG), Lahore.
TABLE - 8.5.
Transportation of lice classified by lode of Transport to laracbi froa Siadh.
(Quantity in tonnes)
Tears Bailvay lagon. Rational Logistic Cell (NLC) Private Trucks. Total.
Quantity Percent Quantity Percentage Quantity Percent Quantity. Percent
1980-81 52808 8 38782 6 547876 86 639466 100
1981-82 61998 10 82219 14 450375 76 594592 -
1982-83 75076 10 112903 15 556128 75 744107 -
1983-84 113146 16 103787 14 512012 70 728945 -
1984-85 148060 20
, 152325 20 452955 60 753340 -
1985-86 182106 24 112391 16 451199 60 745696 -
1986-87 432288 46 120789 14 378053 40 931130 -
1987-88 344898 56 102063 18 159738 26 606697 -
Source: lice Export Operation Study in Pakistan, [1989, p.187] United Consulting Croup
(OCG),lahore.
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8.2.2 Transport Operation and Cost.
In the Punjab province of Pakistan, nore than four-fifths of the
rice procured by RECP is transported to Karachi by Railway Wagons.
The Railway has been transporting between 315,000 to 404,000 tonnes
annually, except for 1987-88 when only 187,000 tonnes were
transported. Even in 1987-88 when the total quantity transported
from the Punjab was 221,000 tonnes, railway's share was about 85%.
It thus seeas that apart from the availability of wagons, other
factors accounted for the transportation of the remaining quality
by NLC Trucks.
In the Sindh province of Pakistan, private trucks have been
transporting the major share, varying from GO to 86% of the total
until 1985-86.
There has however been a significant change over the last two years
when the railways have become the most important mode at the cost
of the private trucks while the NLC has almost maintained its
share. The increased share of railways was due to the complaint
received from the Railway authorities with regard to the non-
utilisation of the available Railway Wagons in Sindh.
The capacity of the railways for lifting rice from interior of
Sindh was reported to be 400,000 tonnes. The cost of
transportation by different modes from different areas is shown in
table-8.6. This indicates that, the railway is the cheapest mode of
rice transport.
The fig:-8.A shows that the railway route in Pakistan is not
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Thar# la an agraad «na of control (No«arnear 1072) betaaa
ttw Indian and Paklatan Forcaa In the atala or Jamnu and
Kaahmlr indicated by ♦ ♦♦♦.
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widespread and there is a small railway infrastructure in the
country which is not very suitable for transporting rice throughout
the country from every part of the milling/processing points.
TABLE-8.6
COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF PER UNIT TRANSPORT COSTS BY DIFFERENT MODES FROM MAJOR




Railway. NLC. PRIVATE TRUCKS RAILWAY COST AS
* OF NIC COST.
Shekhupura, 280.93 373.44 - 75
Cujranwala, 277.65 400.32 - 70
Sialkot, 280.93 403.84 - 70
Jecobabad, 157.92 170.00 179.00 93
Larkana, 137.27 170.00 179.00 81
Sukkur. 143.17 170.00 179.00 84
Source: UCG [1989] Rice Export Operation Study in Pakistan, (p.193) ,lahore.
8.3 Paddy/Rice grading and Inspection.
If the lots of rice are sent directly to the RECP mills and godowns
at Karachi, the loaded trucks will be weighed, the consignments
will be unloaded at the respective enclosures for inspection and
sampling. Trucks are weighed for fare and allowed to go out.
Appeals are possible only for consignments tendered under protest
and analysis is carried out by the Super Inspection Team of Central
Laboratory and covers all items of refraction. This is done after
payment of the usual inspection fee. But it is widely believed that
there is a very poor system of grading by RECP. Very few private
exporters have proper grading facilities, but it is alleged that
they are discouraged because while selling to RECP, they do not get
the quality certificate without bribes.
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Payment to the seller is made through the designated Commercial
Banks as the lot is initially accepted after deduction on the basis
of quality. According to the millers, the price they receive by
RECP (fixed by the Government) for the sale of rice is not an
incentive, so, the millers sell high quality rice in domestic
market at higher prices and sell low quality rice to the RECP.
8.4. Paddy/Rice Marketing Channels and Cost,
Paddy procurement is mostly made by the private sector through the
village shopkeepers, traders, commission agents, and millers. One
study [Schermerhorn, 1990, p.30] confirmed that the producers of
paddy often prefer to sell their product through dealers which
fetches them a better price rather than selling directly to the
mills. The millers mostly purchase their paddy requirement through
the local markets, instead of direct purchases from producers. They
sell their rice after milling in the domestic market freely, and to
the RECP at fixed prices. The marketing channels of paddy rice for
Irri and Basmatii are shown in fig:-8.B, C, and D. In these figures
it seems that, in Sindh province, paddy producers sell their paddy
to various buyers and one producer sells paddy to an unspecified
number of purchasers which means that the flow of merchandise does
not concentrate on one specific route. In Punjab province,
however, most paddy is distributed through a specific route:




SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM SHOWING MARKET INC CHANNELS OF RASMATI PADDY/RICE IN PUNJAB.
PRODUCERS OF PAPPY/RICE.
Source: tJCG [1990, p.195] 'Marketing Margins of Selected Crops in the Context of
Faraing Systeas and Ecological Zones', Lahore, Government of Pakistan, Islaaabod.
Note:The private sector was allowed to export rice in a saall packages, which was
very saall quantity. For export they purchased froa RECP.
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Figure - 8.C
SCHFMATIC DIAGRAM SHOWING MARKETING CHANNELS OF IRRI PADDY/RICE IN
PUNJAB.
PRODUCERS OF PADDY/RICE.
Source: UCG (1990, p.195)) 'Marketing Margins of Selected Crops in
the Context of Farming Systems and Ecological Zones', Lahore.




SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM SHOWING MARKETING CHANNELS OF IRRI PADDY/RICE IN
SINDH.
PRODUCERS OF PADDY/RICE.
Source: UCG (1990, p.195) 'Marketing Margins of Selected Crops in
the Context of Farming Systems and Ecological Zones', Lahore.
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The procurement price of Basmati paddy/rice and gross profit on
them for millers is shown in table-8.7. It seems that the gross
profit for Basmatii rice millers is higher in comparison to the
gross profit for Irri rice millers. This is mainly because of high
processing costs.
TABLE - 8.7.
GE05S UKII/ROnr II KiSUTI ID IUI KICK (F0£ TUBEES FHM PMDBCEE TO IILLES).
(price ii lb: per 40 kg).
YEARS BASIATI TAEIETT. IEEI VARIETY.
PADD7 PEOCOEE- EICE PE0CUE- GE0SS IAEGII FOE EICE PADDY PE0C0E- EICE PEOCOEE- GEOSS RAEGIIS FOE
KEIT PEICE. EKEIT PEICE. KILLEES 11 Es PEE 40 ERERT PEICE. RERT PEICE. IEEI RICE RILLEES (11
KGs OF BASIATI PADDY* ES. PEE 40 AGs OF PADDY*
1982-83 88 154 (154x.65-88) = 12.10 53 89 (89i.65-53) = 4.85
1983-84 90 160 (160i.65-90) = 14.00 55 92 (92x.65-55) = 4.80
1984-85 90 160 = = = = 14.00 55 92 (92x.65-55) = 4.80
1985-86 83 175 (lT5x.65-83] = 30.75 57 95 (95x.65-57) = 4.75
1986-87 102 206 (206x.65-102)= 31.90 57 98 (98i.65-57) = 6.70
1987-88 130 250 (250x.65-130)= 32.50 59 99 (99x.65-59) = 5.35
1988-89 135 268 (268x.65-135)= 39.20 65 111 (lllx.65-65)= 7.15
ioirce: OCG, vol-1, [1989] 'Eice Export Operatioi SUdy', Lakore, Goierueit of Pakistu, Islamabad.
Rote: - Accordiag to tke FAO staidard, oae uit of paddy gives .09 uit of milled rice.
- Gross (argii/profit for miller is calculated as aider:
For exuple, a miller baps oae aait (40 kgs) of paddy say ia lis: 88.00, and ke trill get .65 aait of
milled rice froa it. Tke price of oae aait (40 kgs) of rice for exuple is Es: 154, it aeans that
ke till get (154i.(5) Es:100.1 for .65 aait of coaaerted rice froa oie uit paddy. Tkerefore, tke
gross aargii of profit for kia/iiller till be (Es 100.1 as a price for coiverted rice - Es 88 as a
procareaett price for oie aait of paddy, tkick till be equifaleit to Es 12.10 as a gross profit
aargii.
The rice marketing cost at different marketing sectors is given in
table-8.8. It shows that the net margins or profits for various
dealers, starting from farm-gate to retailers with in domestic
market (excluding the RECP), absorb about 70% of the gross margins.
Processing cost is the next important item accounting for 15.98% of
the total margin for Basmatii rice and 10.34% for Irri rice.
Transport is the third most important cost for both the varieties.
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TABLE - 8.8
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE SHARES OF MARKETING SERVICES IN GROSS MARGINS.







CREDIT COST 0.06 0.17
PROCESSING COST 15.98 10.34
NET MARGINS (PR0FITS)a 70.40 69.86
MISCELLANEOUS 3.63 4.31
TOTAL 100.00 100.00
aIt includes the profits of all dealers, starting from farm-gate to the Retailers.
Source: UCG (Pvt, Ltd; Lahore) [1990] p.202-3, table-4.30-31. 'Marketing Margins of
Selected Crops in the Context of Farming Systems and Ecological Zones' , Vol-1,
Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Islamabad.
One study [J. Lynton Evans, 1987, p.30] concluded that the total
Marketing costs for Basmatii rice down to wholesale level in
Karachi, within the private sector are estimated to be Rs: 39-40
per 40 kg and for Irri froM Larkana (Sindh) Rs: 19-20 per 40 kg.
Whereas the Marketing cost including the re-milling cost incurred
by RECP is estiMated to be Rs: 57 per 40 kg for BasMatii and Rs: 38
for 40 kgs of Sindh Irri. Here it seeas that the difference in
costs is sufficiently large. It seeas that RECP is working
ineffectively because of the high marketing cost.
Out of net Margins/profits, the Major portion goes to the
retailers, wholesalers, and processors in case of Basmatii rice.
Whereas in the case of Irri rice in Punjab and Sindh, the major
portion of the net Margins/profits goes to the retailers,
wholesalers, and processors, because of storage costs and keeping
the stock for the whole year (table-8.9).
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TABLE - 8.9.
NET MARGINS/PROFITS FOR VARIOUS RICE DEALERS OF IRRI k RASMATI IN
SINDH k PUNJAB.
(Rs: Per 40 kg.)
PADDY/RICE DEALERS. BASMATI PUNJAB IRRI PUNJAB. IRRI SINDH
VILLAGE BEOPARIS 3.70 4.14
*
KATCHA ARHATI 7.18 2.36 8.83
PACCA ARHATI 2.50 2.50 2.66
PROCESSORS 16.46 5.39 4.99
WHOLE SELLERS 27.00 13.00 13.94
RETAILERS 32.00 18.00 21.76
Source: UCG (PVT, LTD;) [1990] 'Marketing Margins of selected crops
in the context of farming System and Ecological Zones', Vol-II,
p.A-64-69. Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Food and
Agriculture, Islamabad.
*The author disagrees, because according to the author's personal
experience there is the existence of village Beoparies/Shopkeepers
in Sindh, but the original source shows their non existence.
8.5 Bole of RECP in Handling Rice.
8.5.1 Rice Handling by the RECP at its godowns.
Handling of rice by RECP actually begins when stock arrives at its
godowns. From the time of its arrival at the godowns up to
unloading at the port alongside ship, all handling of rice and its
transportation is carried out by 'handling agents' appointed on
contract by RECP. All handling is done manually by labour provided
by the 'handling agent'. For this purpose contracts are entered
into with the agents on the basis of the lower quotation obtained
through the public tenders from amongst the prequalified handling
contractors.
All handling is by manual methods. The workers use a dog-hook
(pointed toggle) to puncture the bag and pull it, immediately
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taking hold of it with the other hand. This is not only costly but
very harmful, because the use of hooks for carrying or moving rice
sacks results in substantial waste. The reasons usually given for
using the old manual 'hooking' system is to employ more labour and
help curb unemployment, though it is not included in the objectives
of RECP.
Secondly, it is argued by the authorities concerned that to change
the entire system would be very costly, although no estimate of the
cost of such a system is given by the RECP and no such proposal has
even been under consideration. The usual reason generally reported
is corruption as the manual system and hiring of labour on contract
for the job gives more opportunities to show inflated contract cost
(which is never audited) to make money for the people in-charge of
the handling of rice [UCG, volume-1, 1989].
This sort of rice handling system using hooks creates higher
losses. For safety purposes, a double bagging system is being used
which is still not safe and very expensive. It is understood that
the RECP procured a complete mechanical handling plant for the
movement and stacking of rice bags about 15 years ago, but later
was stacked away in the stores for the reasons best known to the
RECP management. All other countries, including USA, Thailand and
even Egypt use a mechanised approach [UCG, Vol-1, 1989].
On the other hand, the author was reliably informed about the past
frauds and corruptions occurring in RECP by the 'handling agents'.
It was also informed that the same agents involved in frauds are
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appointed again for handling rice.
8.5.2 Rice Handling Cost.
It has been observed in many studies that the handling costs of
rice at the RECP godowns are higher. The annual handling costs and
their proportion of the total sales are given in table-8.10.
TABLE - 8.10.
ANNUAL HANDLING COSTS OF KICK AND THE IK SHAKE IN TOTAL SALES.
(kb: 000)
Years. Handling Cost. Sales. Handling Cost as Z
to sales.
1982-83 62,108 3,720,500 1.67
1983-84 95,754 5,762,860 1.66
1984-85 106,895 4,645,867 2.30
1985-86 158,866 5,809,333 2.73
1986-87 111,081 4,807,129 2.31
Source: UCG, vol-1 [1989] 'Rice Export Operation Study', p.222.
The handling cost per tonne based on total sales (export and local
sales) is given in table-8.11.
TABLE-8.11.









1982-83 62,108 925,011 67.14 100
1983-84 95,754 1,294,417 73.97 110
1984-85 106,895 1,050,959 101.71 151
1985-86 158,866 1,343,688 118.28 176
1986-87 111,081 1,287,039 86.30 129
Source:UCG, vol-1 [1989] "Rice Export Operation Study*, p.224.
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The handling costs have increased at a higher pace than any other
cost component. The reason for the increase in yearly handling
costs is the rapid increase in the accepted tendered rates over the
scheduled rates and poor control over the operations of handling
agents. On the other hand, the reasons for the lower costs for
1986-87 were reportedly to be mainly because of the stopping of
higher rates for over-time work [UCG, vol-1, 1989].
The same study [Ibid, P.225] confirms that many handling operations
can be eliminated by systematic planning. Another study
[Shermerhorn, 1990, p.45] also confirms that the handling costs can
be reduced by at least 50X through proper management of the
handling activities and effective control.
8.5.3 Rice Storage at KECP godowns (KARACHI).
Presently RECP has a total built up capacity of 848,000 metric
tonnes in Karachi. Out of this capacity some godowns are utilised
for storage bags, empty cartons and packets, insecticide and other
necessary material for the preparation of stock for export. A few
godowns have also been converted into cleaning and packing plants.
Consequently, only 80 to 85X of total built up capacity, that is,
700,000 metric tonnes is available for use as rice storage. The
arrival position of procured rice at different godowns during 1986-
87 and 1987-88 is shown in table-8.12.
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TABLE-8.12.
The arrival position of procured rice at RKCP godowns in Karachi.
Godowns. 1986-87 1987-88




Source: UCG, (pvt, ltd) [1989] "Rice export operation study*, vol-1, p.196,
Islamabad.
Besides the RECP's own godowns, private godowns had to be hired.
The capacity utilised from the hired godowns and the rent paid
during the last two years is shown in table-8.13.
TABLE - 8.13.
CAPACITY OF THE HIKED GODOWNS AND THE RENT PAID.




Source: UCG, (pvt, ltd) [1989] 'Rice export operation study', vol-1, p.197,
Isianabad.
Since there was not sufficient storage space available in the RECP
and hired godowns, the following quantities had to be stored in the
open under the cover of tarpaulins [table-8.14].
TABLE - 8.14
RICE STORED IH THE OPEN.





Source: UCG, vol-1 [1989] 'Rice export Operation Study, p-196, Islamabad.
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In the absence of adequate storage facilities, both owned and
hired, storage requirements are managed through:
a) Stacking of large quantities in open space, exposed to natural
hazards including rain, frost, wind and the attacks of birds, etc.
b) Stacking of rice bags in godowns in a congested manner, not
allowing the required space between stacks and the walls, and
stacking up to ceilings. These practices create problems for easy
counting and for fumigation.
A statement about the levels of opening,closing and average stock
for each year since 1977-78 is given in the table-8.15. It appears
that RECP has been carrying forward huge stocks each year, varying
from 508,000 to 967,000 tonnes. The annual average closing stock
was 609,000 tonnes for the five year period ending 1981-82 against
an annual average of 852,000 tonnes for the subsequent five year
period. It thus shows that on average, the quantities of incoming
stock have been greater than the outgoing stocks in most of the
years.
TABLE - 8.15.
AVERAGE STOCK OF RICE HELD BY RECP OVER LAST TEN YEARS.
(quantity in 000 tonnes).
YKAES. OPENING STOCK. CLOSING STOCK. AVERAGE STOCK.
BASNATI OTHERS TOTAL BASNATI OTHERS TOTAL BASNATI OTHERS TOTAL.
1977-78 138 215 353 126 382 508 132 299 431
1978-79 128 382 508 342 417 759 234 400 634
1979-80 342 417 759 400 374 774 3T1 396 767
1980-81 400 374 774 276 253 529 338 314 652
1981-82 276 253 529 323 276 599 300 265 564
1982-83 323 276 599 433 502 935 378 389 767
1983-84 433 502 935 280 511 791 357 507 863
1984-85 280 511 791 267 700 967 274 606 879
1985-88 276 700 967 211 628 839 239 664 903
1986-87 211 628 839 298 565 863 255 597 851
Soiree: 0CG,vol-l, 1989, p. 198, 'Eice Eiport Operatioi Stidj', Eoierueit of Pakistu, Islamabad.
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The levels of carryover stocks do not materially influence the
procurement targets fixed each year. A comparison of the annual
procurement levels with the closing stocks is indicated in table-
8.16, fig:8.16-A and B. It shows that the ratio of closing stocks
to the annual procurements has ranged between a minimum of 53% in
1977-78 to a maximum of 79% in 1984-85. Obviously, pure
commercial considerations would never justify the level of stocks
maintained by RECP. It has also been alleged that some stock kept
with RECP in open space or for a longer time improperly, suffers
deterioration, hence not exported. The same stock plus the quality
rice is auctioned sometimes in the name of deteriorated stock at
low prices on paper only.
TABLE - 8.16.
RELATIONSHIP OF CLOSING STOCK TO RICE PROCUREMENT.
(quantity in 000 tonnes).
YEARS. RICE PROCURED. CLOSING STOCK.
1
|X OF CLOSING STOCK TO PROCUREMENT









1977-78 211 755 966 126
1
382 | 508 | 59.72 | 50.60 | 52.59
1978-79 406 868 1274 342 417 | 759 | 84.24 | 48.04 | 59.58
1979-80 397 756 1153 400 374 | 774 | 100.76 | 49.47 | 67.13
1980-81 321 715
'
1036 276 253 | 529 ) 85.98 | 35.38 | 51.06
1981-82 398 715 1113 323 276 | 599 | 81.16 | 38.60 | 53.82
1982-83 356 904 1260 433 502 I 935 I 121.63 I 55.53 [ 74.21
1983-81 264 890 1154 280 511 | 791 ! 106.06 | 57.42 | 68.54
1984-85 269 962 1231 267 700 ! 967 j 99.26 | 72.77 | 78.55
1985-86 231 987 1218 211 628 | 839 1 91-34 i 63.63 | 68.88
1986-87 237 1076 1313 298 565 |
1










Source: United Consulting Group (PVT Ltd.) [1989, p.200] 'Rice Export Operation Study',
Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.
pig : — 8.16. A
RELATIONSHIP OF BASMATI RICE CLOSING! STOCK TO PROCUREMENT.
(quantity h 000 tonnaa) *
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Fig;- 8.16.B
RELATIONSHIP OF CLOSING STOCK TO PROCUREMENT OF OTHER1 RICE.
(quinttty h 000 torn—)
It includes irri and other traditional rice varieties, but the share of other
traditional varieties is negligible.
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8.5.4 Inventory Management and Control.
Inventory management and control is not adequate. In this regard,
one study [UCG, 1989, P.211] confirmed that the physical
verification of stocks has not been carried out by the RECP for the
past number of years. This has been attributed to the inadequacy
of the storage space. The closing stock worth Rs:3479 million
carried in books over a period of 1982-87, constitute only book
entries which have continued to remain unconfirmed by any physical
verification of stocks on the ground. The perpetual inventory
system of RECP is very weak. Although a register in this regard
showing receipt, issue and balance of rice and other items is
maintained, it is not posted on a daily basis and transactions of
many previous months are not registered.
8.5.5 RECP's Godown Security.
For the security of rice stocks at RECP godowns, the corporation
employs more than three hundred security staff at its godowns who
report to 'Manager.Security'. The 'Manager Security* is under the
line authority of the respective 'Area Officer' of the godowns.
Looking at the responsibilities of the 'Manager Security* and the
amounts involved in the stocks of RECP's godowns, this arrangement
does not seem to serve the purpose.
Security is a staff rather than a line function. So independence is
essential to the effectiveness of the security procedures and
programmes. The organisational status of the Chief Security Officer
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and the support accorded to him by management are major
determinants of the range and value of the services which
management will obtain from the security officer. Under the present
organisational set up, where the Security Officer is under the
direct control of 'Area Officer', there exists every possibility of
malpractice. Hence, the status of Security Officer should be
upgraded to the level of General Manager Security, and he should be
made directly responsible to the Chairman [UCG, vol-1, 1989].
8.5.6 Issuance of Bice to Mills.
Rice is being issued from RECP godowns to mills or mills to
godowns on the basis of a goods movement note. This document is
not prepared carefully, for example, it is issued after the
completion of the movement of rice and is not signed by the
competent authority [UCG, 1989, VOL-1, P.213].
8.5.7 Re-Milling of Rice by RECP.
Sheller type units supply to RECP about 902 of the rice sold in
market. This output contains many impurities besides variations in
quality characteristics which do not meet international standards.
On the other hand all the grades of the particular variety are
mixed at godowns and sold on the basis of the buyers requirements.
RECP thus has to undertake in its own plants located at Karachi,
re-milling and polishing of the procured rice. This involves an
additional cost in handling, milling and storing operations.
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RECP inherited a Billing capacity of 317,000 tonnes per annum.
After its inception, the Corporation imported six new modern
automatic plants from Germany and Japan. In addition, two locally
manufactured plants were installed. The capacity was expanded by
500,000 tons, thus increasing the total available cleaning and
processing capacity to 817,000 tonnes per annum [table-8.17].
TABLE—8.17.
MILLING CAPACITY AND THKIK UTILISATION.
(quantity in tonnes).
Year. Hilling Capacity. Quantity Processed, Capacity Utilisation in X.
1983-84 871,000 587,606 71.9
1984-85 817,000 363,635 45.1
1985-86 817,000 759,995 93.0
1986-87 817,000 816,919 99.0
Source: UCG, vol-1 [1989] 'Rice export Operation Study, P-234, Islamabad.
Initially only Basmatii rice was processed by the RECP at Karachi
and these plants were set up for this purpose only. Keeping in view
the foreign requirements, RECP has to process other varieties also
for which the available capacity is not adequate.
On the other hand, the RECP's cleaning and grading facilities are
located within their Qasim and Landhi godowns. These consist of 14
cleaning and grading plants. All these plants are more than 15
years old with some units having been installed as much as 30 years
ago. This author was reliably informed that a foreign team of
engineers who recently visited RECP with regard to repairing the
existing plants, were told that the existing plants are outdated.
This is confirmed by one study [Schermerhorn, 1990, p.45] that all
the RECP's 14 cleaning and grading plants show inefficient
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operations due to old machinery, non availability of spare parts
and absence of maintenance schedules. Because of improper
processing, polishing and packaging of rice by RECP, it is often
re-milled a third time by the importers, mainly in Europe, which
will be discussed later on in chapter 11.
8.5.8 Packing Plants for one Kg Packets.
An automatic packing plant for filling rice in one kilo packs,
imported from Italy, is in commission to meet the demand of the
buyers for packet rice. This plant is insufficient to meet the
requirements of packeted rice due to its limited installed capacity
of ten million packets per annum. Besides this, RECP has to meet
the requirements being received for the export of rice in
cellophane and cloth bags [UCG, 1989, P.237].
CONCLUSION.
This chapter starred by looking at the procurement policies of rice
applied by the Government of Pakistan and analysed the role of RECP
in handling the rice. It was found that the domestic market for
rice is partly liberalised and the export market has remained under
the monopoly of public sector (RECP).
RECP which procures rice solely for export, carries over huge
stocks every year. The quantity of incoming stock is mostly greater
than the out going stock. The ratio of closing stock to the annual
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procurements has ranged between a minimum of 53% to a maximum 80%.
Pure commercial considerations would never justify the levels of
stocks maintained by RECP.
Generally in RECP, a number of shortcomings in the control and
management of handling operations have been observed. These include
inadequate control over operations to bridge the gap between sales,
purchases and milling operations; inadequate control and
accountability of handling cost; inadequate stock control over
exportable rice and the absence of checks on the quality of rice
issued against work orders. These inadequacies tend to have
harmful effects on the functional, managerial and operational
structure of the RECP organisation.
The above problems are not uncommon in Government (public sector)
corporations. There are many and varied reasons why many public
agencies perform in such a manner. Among these reasons are:
automatic coverage of losses by the public treasury; multiple
objectives; inability of the agency or corporation to gain
additional funding to upgrade equipment and facilities due to a
tight financial conditions of the government in general; lack of
performance incentives; and appointment of managerial personnel
without consideration of expertise required for the position, that
is, appointment may occur for political reasons.
The next chapter deals with the nature and characteristics of
Pakistan's rice exports and export policies.
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CHAPTER - 9
PAKISTAN RICE EXPORT POLICIES AMD ITS EXPORT.
The nain objective of this chapter is to review the rice export
policies in Pakistan and to examine Pakistan's rice export.
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 9.1 contains the rice
export policies in Pakistan and section 9.2 deals with Pakistan's
rice export. Finally, section 9.3 consists of the rice export price
determination in Pakistan.
9.1 Rice Export Ptolicies in Pakistan.
The overall trade policy in Pakistan is controlled by the Ministry
of Commerce. As far as rice is concerned, the Rice Board
coordinates all the different issues and sets the general rice
policy. The Board meets twice a year and its agenda covers all
matters relating to rice.
The Rice Board copsists of the following:
- Minister of Commerce - Federal, Chairman.
- Minister/ Secretary of Agriculture - Federal, Member.
- Secretary Finance - Federal, =
- Provincial Agricultural Secretaries, =
- Chairman Agricultural Price Commission, =
- Chairman Rice Export Corporation, =
- Rice Commissioner, =
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- Rice Technologists, =
- Growers, Nominated By the Government, =
- Directors of the Rice Research Institute, =
Government policies in Pakistan relating to rice export are divided
into two distinct periods — before 1987-88 when Government had a
complete monopoly on rice exports and after 1987-88 when private
sector entered the rice export trade.
9.1.1 Pakistan Rice Export Policies Prior to 1987-88.
Since Pakistan's early period, Rice has become more liberal
gradually, in four phases. When Pakistan started to export rice on
a very small scale since 1958, the rice export arrangements were
made by the Pakistan Rice Board, the secretariat of which was
located in the Export Promotion Bureau under the Ministry of
Commerce. The internal arrangements for procurements, cleaning,
storage, and shipping were under the control of 'Director General
of Food*, Under the 'Ministry of Food and Agriculture'. Thus, a
dual public sector system of control for export existed. This dual
system resulted in problems of coordination and inefficiencies
[Schermerhorn, 1990].
In 1974 the Rice Export Corporation (RECP) was set up to undertake
the entire process of rice exporting. Rice was procured by the
RECP until 1985-86 under a 'Monopoly Procurement Scheme' whereby
compulsory procurement of rice at support prices was required.
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In 1985-86 the policy was revised such that rice was 'voluntarily'
procured under the support price. Because of this policy, the
domestic market of rice was partly liberalised and influenced by
the government's domestic floor price. Under the 'voluntary'
procurement policy, the procurement centres and the support price
still existed, but sales to these centres were voluntary. Rice
received by the RECP was strictly for export. Supplying the
domestic market was undertaken by the private sector under certain
restrictions imposed by the Government, to ensure that RECP was
able to secure adequate quantities of rice to meet the export
requirements. In practice, the Food Department still acted as an
agent of the RECP to procure and dispatch paddy to the RECP's
storage facilities in Karachi after milling. The procurement was
also accomplished by the rice millers/rice dealers appointed by the
Food Department, or in some cases by the Pakistan Storage and
Services Corporation limited (PASSCO).
A major change has been initiated during the past 15 years (since
the mid 1970s) in- this procurement procedure, where the RECP no
longer uses the services of Food Department to procure paddy. Now
the RECP procures milled rice on its own from the private millers,
and on a very small scale by its subsidiaries. As RECP operates as
an agent of the Government, hence it receives a commission on
handling the rice and it is not responsible for any loss or profit
on rice export. The costs incurred on the procurement and
preparation of rice for export are directly charged to the
Government, and the profit/loss on the export of rice goes to the
Government treasury.
9.1.2 Pakistan Rice Export Policies after 1987-88.
Beginning in 1987-88 the private sector was allowed conditionally
to export Basnati rice only. The initial special procedures
applying to the private sector export of rice were as follows:
Export of Basmatii rice by the private sector was allowed subject to
the conditions that:
(i) Basnati rice is exported in packets of 1-20 kgs with brand
names;
(ii) The exporters are registered with the Superior Rice (Basmatii)
Dealers Association, Punjab;
(iii) The brand nanes will be registered with the Registrar, Trade
Marks, Government of Pakistan;
(iv) The exporters may obtain rice either from the Rice Export
Corporation of Pakistan (RECP) at the rate the Corporation
is exporting in bulk, or they may use their own stocks after
depositing the difference in price between the bulk export
of rice by RECP and the Government fixed procurement price;
and such exporters shall be subject to RECP's inspection and
quality control procedures.
In addition, a Rs: 5000/per metric tonne export tax was imposed on
the export of Basmatii rice. For example in 1987-88 the average
export price of Basmatii rice was Rs: 12000 per mt and the export
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tax was Rs: 5000, it means that the export tax was 42% of the
export value. The initial regulation essentially qualifies as non-
tariff barriers to the private sector in the export of rice. These
barriers, plus the export tax were soon recognised as effective in
almost totally restricting private sector rice exports. The result
was that only 1243 tonnes or 0.6% of total rice export were
exported by the private sector during 1987-88. Consequently, the
following improvements have occurred in the initial regulations:
(i) The export tax of Rs. 5000/mt was reduced to Rs. 4000 in
1988/89.
(ii) Private rice exporters are no longer required to deposit with
RECP, the differential in price between the bulk export of rice by
RECP and the Government procurement price. They are required to
sell as a minimum price, the RECP export bulk price plus an
additional U.S $50 per mt for 1-2 kg packages, and an additional US
$25 per mt for 3-25 kg packages. The bulk price is the price
negotiated by RECP with the Gulf Cooperative Council. Because the
major market for Basmatii rice is in the Gulf, the Government does
not want to bother with the fixing of prices for each individual
country separately.
(iii) Private exporters must have a license to export which is
obtained by registering with the 'Chief Controller of Exports and
Imports'. The cost is minimal. However, there is restriction or
complications for the issue of license, because very few people are
interested due to the heavy export taxes).
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(iv) Rice Exporters are no longer required to register with the
Superior Rice Dealers Association, Punjab.
(v) Private sector Basmati rice exports continue to be subjected to
RECP's inspection and quality control procedures.
9.1.3 Rice Export Policy for Private Sector in 1990.
According to the circular/letter S.R.O. No: 400-(I)90, dated May 7
1990, Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Commerce, export of
Basmatii rice by the private sector is allowed in packets with brand
names or in bulk subject to the conditions that:
(i) The exporters are registered with the respective Chamber of
Commerce and Industry.
(ii) The brand names will be registered with the Registrar, Trade
Marks, Government of Pakistan.
(iii) The exporters may obtain rice either from RECP or may use
their own stock.
(iv) The buyers shall appoint internationally reputed Inspectors or
RECP for inspections and.
(v) The contracts (for rice export) shall be subject to the
approval and registration by the Export Promotion Bureau.
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Recently, (in 1992), following amendments have made by the Ministry
of Commerce:
(a) the export of Basmatii rice was allowed by the private sector
in bulk as well as in the small packet form.
(b) From August 1990, all the varieties of rice (Basmatii and Irri)
were allowed to be exported by the private sector.
(c) The export duty on all rice varieties was abolished on 10th
October 1990.
(d) It was also decided to exempt the import of rice milling
machinery and equipment from 'Custom Duty' and 'Iqra Tax'.
(e) The Government has also granted to the private sector liberal
credit facilities, industrial loans, working capital and loans for
building warehouses and storage facilities. The existing rate of 1%
retention of rice sales receipts in foreign exchange has been
raised to 5X to cover sales promotion and market development.
As a result of these incentives, the private sector has achieved
good results in the short span of a year, 1991, as shown in table-
9.1. However it is too early to comment on the implementation of
the recent liberalised policy and the future role of the private
sector. During field work interviews in Pakistan, the private
sector was confident that when the liberalisation takes place, they
would sell to the West and Middle East.
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TABLE - 9.1
Bra*ititi and Other Kice Export by the Private sector.
THIS. BASKATI KXF01T. OTBKE KICK EIFOIT.
TOTAL KIPOET PEIIATK PEIVATE EIPOET TOTAL KIPOET PIIVATE PEIVATK KIPOET
(000) TOIIKS. KXPOIT. X OF TOTAL. (000) TOIIKS. KIPOET. X OF TOTAL.
1987-88 188,000 1243 0.66 988.4 zero -
1988-89 221,000 5000 2.26 626.3 zero -
1989-90 228,000 30611 13.42 - zero -
1.7.90 to
30.6.91 - 166579* - - 27730* -
Source: EECP's Export Section in Karachi, (during field work).
*Figures are taken frou the Ministry of Couuerce notification, 1991.
- Figures not available.
9.2 PAKISTAN'S RICK EXPORT.
Rice is a Major item of Pakistan's exports, accounting for about
10% of the total world exports in recent years. A statement showing
rice exports from Pakistan, classified by varieties and share of
rice exports in total exports over the last ten years is given in
table-9.2. Indices of value, quantity and unit value of exports of
Basmatii and Irri varieties of rice are also included in the table.
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TABLE - 9.2
PAKISTAN RICE EXPORT BY VALUE, AND INDICES BY VALUE AND VOLUME.
(lalie ii D.S. lillioi $)
Tears. Total Iidex. Rice Export (ulae Skare of Rice Export to Iidices of Exports.
Eiports ii D.S aillioi $). Total Eiports (perceitage)
Basiati. Irri.
Basiati Irri Total. Basiati. Irri Total. Valie. Qiaitity. false Quantity
19T7-T8 1311.2 100 109.1 134.1 243.2 8.32 10.23 18.55 100.1 100.0 100.0 100.0
1978-79 1709.6 130 135.4 206.0 341.4 7.92 12.05 19.97 124.1 74.8 153.6 143.5
1979-80 2364.7 180 225.5 196.7 422.2 9.54 8.32 17.85 206.7 130.2 146.7 132.9
1980-81 2957.5 226 290.3 275.5 565.8 9.82 9.32 19.13 266.1 169.4 205.4 143.5
1981-82 2464.3 188 183.5 203.7 387.2 7.45 8.27 15.71 168.2 108.3 151.9 118.6
1982-83 2695.0 206 174.4 140.8 315.2 6.47 5.22 11.69 135.1 98.3 105.0 114.8
1983-81 2768.0 211 244.3 178.2 422.5 8.82 6.44 15.26 223.9 167.8 132.9 147.8
1984-85 2491.2 190 109.6 112.5 222.1 4.40 4.52 8.92 100.5 71.9 83.9 93.8
1985-86 3069.8 234 173.4 168.9 342.3 5.65 5.50 11.15 158.9 107.9 125.9 181.6
1986-87 3681.4 281 133.7 161.0 294.7 3.63 4.37 8.00 122.5 77.7 120.1 181.2
1987-88 4410.0 336 98.0 125.8 223.8 2.22 2.85 5.07 133.9 82.6 144.0 172.1
Soiree: BCD [1989], 'Rice Export Operatioa Stidj', Tol-1, table-3.9, p.(8,
This table shows that the share of rice in the total value of
exports has been persistently declining over the period. From an
average of about 17% for the five year period ending 1982-83, it
declined to an average of about 10% in the subsequent five year
period ending 1987-88.
The total value of all exports from Pakistan in terms of US dollars
rose by 336% from the year 1977-78 to 1987-88, with 1977-78 as
base year. The increase in the value of Basmatii and Irri rice
export was only 34 and 44% respectively for the same period.
With regard to the export of the Basmatii rice , the author was
reliably informed that there is no coordination between the
'Ministry* of Commerce' and the 'Ministry of Agriculture'. Because,
the new high yielding varieties of Basmatii rice introduced by the
'Pakistan Agriculture Research Council' are not very popular unlike
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the old ones, in the international narket. But, the RECP under the
instructions of the Ministry of Comerce procures Basmatii rice
without any distinction. Hence the new unpopular Basmatii rice
producers are encouraged to produce.
However, the overall exports of Basmatii rice by the RECP have
always yielded a net return to the RECP. The ratio of net return
to FOB cost varied between 43 to 99% during the three years ending
1986-87, as shown in table-9.3.
TABUS - 9.3
AVERAGE RETURN ON RICK EXPORT.
(Rs: per aetric tonne).
1986--87 1985 -86 1984-85
Basmati Others Basmati Others Basmati Others
Average Export
price. 12479 2723 11130 2567 9634 3027
F.O.B cost. 6240 3450 5990 3590 6740 3650
Profit/loss 6189 (727) 5140 (1023) 2894 (623)
profit loss as
% of FOB cost. 99 (21) 57 (29) 43 (21)
Source: UCG, 1989, Vol-1, table 11.12, p.304.
In the case of Irri rice, net losses have been suffered in recent
years to the extent of about one-fifth to one-fourth of the FOB
cost. The losses are passed on to the national exchequer in the
form of reduced profits of RECP on overall performance. Table-9.4
indicates the position of the profit and loss of the RECP through
the exporting of Basmatii and Irri rice varieties.
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TABLE - 9.4
PROFIT AMD LOSS FROM PUBLIC (RECP) EXPORT OF RICK.
(in Billion Rupees).
Years BASMATI RICE. IRRI RICE.











Source: Scheraerhom, Richard [1990, p.38],'Rice Export Marketing Study*, EAN/USAID
Project, Islamabad.
9.2.1 Share of Rice Export in total output.
Table-9.5 shows the rice export as a percentage of annual output by
varieties. Indices have also been computed with 1975-76 as base.
It seems that the annual variations in exports do not appear to be
correlated with the output [fig:-9.5.A and B]. The percentage share
of exports to total output has thus varied haphazardly, with a
slight .downward trend in the case of Basmatii rice and a marked
upward trend for Irri rice.
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1975-7ff6-77 77-?e 78-89 79-80 80-8181-82 82-83 83-84 64-85 85-86 86-87 87-88
EXPO
OTHER RICE PRODUCTION AND EXPORT.
(000 TONNES).
1875-Tff6-77 77-78 78-79 79-80 80-8181-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86 86-87 87-88
YEARS.
1
It includes irri and other traditional rice varieties, but the share of other
traditional varieties is negligible.
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TABLE - 9.5
SHARE OF RICE EXPORTS IN TOTAL PRODUCTION OF RICE BY VARIETIES IN
PAKISTAN.
(000 Toues).
BASKATI. OTEER VARIETIES1. TOTAL RICE.
PRODOCTIOI. EXPORTS. I of PRODOCTIOi. EIPORTS. 1 of PRODUCTION EXPORTS. I of Eiports
Eiport Exports to Product.
Qtj. Iudei. Qtf. Iidex to Prod; Qty. Iidex. Qty. Iudei to Prod. Qty. Itdex Qty. Isdex.
1975-76 662 100 237 100 37 1975 100 527 100 27 2617 100 764 100 29
1976-77 660 103 402 170 61 2078 105 481 91 23 2738 105 883 116 32
1977-78 560 87 247 104 44 2390 121 557 106 23 2950 113 804 105 27
1978-79 878 137 181 76 21 2394 121 829 157 35 3272 125 010 132 31
1979-80 887 138 315 133 36 2329 118 772 146 33 3216 123 1087 142 34
1980-81 980 153 410 173 42 2143 109 835 158 39 3123 119 1245 163 40
1981-82 1055 164 262 111 25 2375 120 689 131 29 3430 131 951 124 28
1982-83 1010 157 229 97 23 2434 123 670 127 28 3445 132 905 118 26
1983-84 965 150 406 171 42 2374 120 854 162 36 3340 126 1260 165 38
1984-85 958 149 174 73 18 2357 119 545 103 23 3315 127 719 94 22
1985-86 883 137 261 110 30 2036 103 1056 200 52 2919 112 1317 172 45
1986-87 917 143 188 79 21 2569 130 1083 206 42 3486 133 1271 166 36
1987-88 943 147 221 93 23 2298 116 989 188 43 3241 124 1210 158 37
aIt leais Irri rice plus a ?ery tiiy portioa of otker traditioaal uarieties.
Soirees: OCG [1389], 'Rice Export Operatioa Study', Vol-l, table-3.il, p.71; Agriciltaral Statistics of Pakistan,
Goieraieit of Pakistan.
In the case of Irri rice, the share of exports in the total output
has varied between 42 to 52% in recent years. The export levels
show a significant increase since 1985-86. Thus the annual average
share of exports in the total increased from 33% for the five year
period ending 1982-83 to 40% in the subsequent five year period.
The exports in 1987-88 were 88% higher as compared to the base year
as against an increase of only 16% in the total output.
The export of Basmatii rice has shown a sluggish performance. Taking
the ent-ire period since 1975-76, exports exceeded 400,000 tonnes
during only two years — 1980-81 and 1983-84, the export level in
other years being mostly about one half of these quantities. The
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export of 188,000 tonnes during 1986-87 was among the lowest levels
attained during any of the years. The actual exports during 1986-87
and 1987-88 were in fact lower by 21 and 7% respectively from the
base year 1975-76. The annual average share of Basmatii exports in
the total output declined from 29% in the five year period ending
1982-83 to 27% in the subsequent five year period. The exports in
1987-88 were lower by 7% compared to the base year as against an
increase of 47% in total output.
The export of rice as whole, significantly increased mainly because
of the upward trend noticed for Irri rice. The annual average
exports in the total output for all rice thus increased from 32%
for the five year period ending 1982-83 to 36% for the subsequent
five year period. The exports in 1987-88 represented an increase of
58% over the base year as against an appreciation of 24% in total
output.
9.2.2 Marketing Channels of Bice Export.
9.2.2.1 Basmati Rice Export.
The Rice Export Corporation of Pakistan (Government Export Agent)
which had a monopoly, exported virtually all the Basmatii rice under
Government to Government contracts mostly to the Middle East
countries. Only a tiny portion of Basmatii exports have been made
by the private sector since 1987-88. The sale of Basmatii rice to
Gulf countries is on the basis of the agreement with the Council of
Gulf Countries, in respect of price and import quantities.
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9.2.2.2 Irri Rice Varieties.
For the sale of Irri rice, the following strategies were adopted:
i) large quantities were sold through tenders floated regularly at
intervals of 4 to 6 weeks. Highest bids were generally accepted .
ii) sales were struck to parties desiring the purchase of any
specific quantity outside the tender. Such sales were usually
concluded at prices at least US $10 per tonne above the price
obtained in the last tender.
iii) direct negotiation with prospective buyers during periods of
large accumulated stocks.
iv) sales on a Government to Government basis by negotiation with
importing countries.
The relative shares of various marketing channels in the total
export of Irri rice are shown in fig:-9.6.A (table-9.6). It shows
that the sales through Government to Government negotiation are the
most important channels accounting for almost one-half of the total
sales. Sales through inviting tenders are the second most important
channel, its share in the total, varying from about one-third to
two-fifths in different years sine 1984-85.
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Fig:- 9•6•A
AV: (1984-88) SHARE OF OFF: CHANNELS K THE EXPORT OF Irri RICE,
(quantity In X)
B TtflOUQH TBCffll
0 fEGOTIAHONS WTffl PRIVATE TRADERS,
[] AT FKH) PUCE WITH FWVATE PARTES.
B GOVT: TO GOVT: THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.
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9.2.3 Directions of Rice Trade.
9.2.3.1 Basmati Rice.
Pakistan exported Basmatii rice to as many as 31 countries during
1987-88 in quantities ranging from only 2 tonnes each to South
Korea, and France to 91,624 tonnes to S. Arabia. Since 1975-76, a
total of 58 countries have imported Basmatii rice during different
years. A number of other countries have also been obtaining
Pakistani Basmatii rice indirectly through third countries or
through smuggling [U.C.G, 1989, Vol-1, p.74],
Taking the recent six year period, very few countries have been
regularly importing Basmatii rice from Pakistan since 1983-84. The
actual exports to these countries and the relative share of these
'regular buyers' in the total annual exports are shown in table-
9.7.
It appears that the relative share in annual exports to the regular
buyers in the Middle East has ranged between a minimum of 92% of
total export in 1988-89 to a maximum of 98% in 1983-84. It seems
that Pakistan's market for Basmatii rice lies primarily in the
Middle East. This percentage has been largely consistent over the
past few years. Saudi Arabia has been the largest importer of
Pakistan Basmati rice over the past few years.
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TABLE - 9.7
BASMATI RICE EXPORTS TO MIDDLE EAST.
(Qsastity ii letric tosses aid false is 000 Es.)
IDOETIK 1313-04 1914-15 1915-00 1910-17 1917-01 1900-09
amnios.
Qtj; false. Qtj; Talae. Qtj; Talae. Qtj; Talae. Qtj; Talae. Qtj; Talte.
lbs Ihabi 17120 130752 4147 44114 32078 301229 200 3185 21500 279053 11854 175903
lakrais 15100 122972 10102 107400 10208 123584 10973 142234 10023 200418 188 2401
Bibai 23040 202904 31004 293800 22275 207410 15738 212250 19221 255470 08009 915459
Iras 159090 1287259 — — — - — — — — 42540 590279
Imil 48420 288031 19400 107210 29441 319750 23057 275223 44540 507221 22407 303274
Qatar 15271 124779 200 2083 9420 110004 7880 99480 8394 108919 19192 253130
S. Arabia 87322 098448 54083 514073 110908 1120033 97839 1149253 87339 1097004 40238 532874
S.af Oats 33234 207772 49020 407821 38733 407970 22011 279074 13000 170124 5498 73587
0tiers 0040 57404 4772 51305 7442 91145 9350 125004 11208 150113 17910 180949





Total. 90.4 91.3 9T.3 90.9 T9.1 90.T 95.1 94.0 94.9 94.T 92.1 94.0
Sources: Foreign Trade Statistics of Pakistan, Exports April-June,
1985, 1987 and 1989; Richard Schernerhorn, 1990, 'Rice Export
Marketing Study', p.22, table-13.
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This situation changed drastically in 1988-89 when Saudi Arabia's
share fell to 18%. This was partially due to Iran coning in to
market for the first tine since 1983-84 and a significant increase
in purchases by Dubai. The absolute volume of imports of Basmatii
rice by Saudi Arabia fell by one-half of the volume of the previous
year. The share of Saudi Arabia in the total Basmatii exports during
the last five years was 36%. The next important buyers are:
Sultanate of Oman, Kuwait, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Bahrain [table-
9.8].
TABLE - 9.8
REGULAR BUYERS OF BASMATI RICE FOR THE LAST FIVE YEARS.
(quantity in aetric tonnes).
COUliTKIKS. 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 TOTAL X OF TOTAL
EXPORTS.
A rail in 87222 5644 115360 101134 91624 451784 36.16
lunit 48466 19406 29515 20242 41517 159146 12.7
Iran 159696 - - - - 159696 12.7
S.of Oaan 33234 49026 38733 22611 13600 157204 12.6
Dubai 23559 31468 19845 10409 16111 101392 8.1
Aba Dhabi 16540 4075 32060 3046 22769 78490 6.3
RnHra in 15148 10162 10155 10656 16040 62161 5.0
Qatar 15271 76 8537 8171 8394 40449 3.2
Singapore 1345 566 1810 1917 1179 6817 0.5
U.E 981 166 1937 1780 1920 6784 0.5
Malaysia 1000 700 500 1000 2000 5200 0.4
Mauritius 843 638 772 1410 1233 4896 0.4
Djibouti 529 700 635 843 903 3610 0.3
Australia 379 577 595 575 591 2717 0.2
U.S.A 234 38 119 60 170 621 0.05
Canada 5 24 161 38 89 317 0.03
France 57 55 84 81 2 279 0.02
Sudan 94 20 39 19 96 268 0.02
Derark 23 18 36 30 40 147 0.01
Germany 1 5 29 37 11 83 0.006
Italy 7 8 11 12 13 51 0.004
OangimlpiA 3 5 4 3 5 20 0.002
Total: 404637 174177 260937 184074 218307 1242134 —
Total Exports. 405927 174177 260937 187829 220395 1249094 100
X of total
Exports. 96.60 100.oo 100.00 98.00 99.00 99.44
Soiree: - OCG, vol-l, 1989,table 3.13;
lote: 1. Ii tie original soiree, tke export of Basuati rice to tke Sultauate of Oiaa aid Irai kas been igaored.
2. Tke total Exports of Basmatii rice leitioied ii tkis table, sligktly differs froi otker soirees, because
tke data covers differeit dates of the year, for exaiple, June to July, January to Deceiber etc.
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Taking the recent five year period ending 1987-88, as much as 60%
of Pakistan's Basraatii rice exports were accounted for by these six
countries. Such a high degree of concentration of export outlets
does not auger well for the future as prospects of Basmatii exports
are intimately tied up to demand conditions in these local markets
only. There are already signs of penetration by other competitors
in these markets which may pose serious problems for Pakistan's
Basmatii exports. RECP, the former monopoly exporter of Basmatii rice
from Pakistan has thus completely failed to tap other regional
markets.
One study [UCG, 1989, p. 77] concludes that Iran and Iraq have been
important buyers of Basmatii rice in the past. The consumer
preference there is still reported to be in favour of Pakistani
Basmatii. These two countries can thus be considered as potential
markets for Pakistan.
There is also a demand of Basmatii rice in EEC, but one study
[Choudhary, 1978] concludes that the following factors largely
explain Pakistan's poor performance in the EEC market:
i. The EEC market is an extremely quality conscious market and no
sub-standard products are likely to find room there. Although
Pakistan exports high quality Basmatii rice, the EEC prefers, clean
white packed rice of the scented varieties. Moreover, the quality
of Pakistani rice leaves much to be desired.
ii. Pakistan faced a stiff competition from the main EEC suppliers
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of long grain rice such as USA, Thailand, India, China, Argentina
and Surinam. The hardest competition comes from USA and India.
iii. National Tariffs on rice imports from the 'third countries'.
iv. The EC12 provides preferential — most favoured nations —
treatment (MFN) because of the association status with EEC, to rice
imports from African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries through
higher relative import quotas, lower import levies, and grants for
the improvement of the rice industry in ACP countries. This is
confirmed by one study [Warren, et, al., 1990] that about 90% of
the EC rice imports under this (MFN) arrangement comes from Surinam
only.
9.2.3.2 Irri Rice Varieties.
The Pakistan Irri rice varieties are exported all over the world.
The main competitors of Pakistan being: Thailand, USA, and China. A
total of 107 countries have imported Irri rice from Pakistan during
different years since 1975-76, and in 1987-88 it was exported to
only 42 countries. Only 10 of the 107 countries have imported rice
t
from Pakistan regularly, for at least 10 years out of the 13 year
period since 1975-76. The international market in this respect has
been highly volatile due to changes in the requirements of the
importing countries each year, influenced by fluctuations in local
outputs, self sufficiency schemes, local agriculture policies,
export policies by the developed countries, imports from other
countries against credit and aid, and foreign exchange availability
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[UCG, vol-1,1989, p.78].
As shown in table-9.9, the annual exports to the main and 'regular
buyers' of Irri rice has ranged between 186,166 tonnes in 1984-85
to 871,940 tonnes in 1986-87. Compared with the total annual
exports, the relative share of the regular buyers has ranged
between a minimum of 34% in 1984-85 to a maximum of 80% in 1986-87.
Taking the five year period as a whole, about 64% of the total
exports of Irri rice were accounted for by only nine regular
buyers.
TABLE - 9.9
EXPOKT TO REGULAR BUYERS DURING LAST FIVE YEARS OF OTHER RICE VARIETIES.
(Quantity in netric tonnes).
cooiteiks. 1913-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 TOTAL. x OF TOTAL EIPOETS.
Sri Laika. 1200 100 96681 73319 136542 307842 6.8
Tnrkey. 30000 30500 334 14363 28869 104066 2.3
Bangladesh. 4912 2272 11659 145842 254458 419143 9.3
Senegal. 25097 20000 33356 127699 57165 263317 5.8
Ivory Coast. 178041 7134 115267 151428 30135 482005 10.6
Cane ran. 136867 86282 140926 86844 43038 493957 10.9
Iran. 96034 15000 162987 244377 48595 566993 12.5
Dubai. 3533 950 7240 10467 7629 29189 0.7
Togo. 38265 23928 115042 17601 16550 211386 4.7
Total Kiports 513949 186168 683492 871940 622981 2878528 —
to legnlar buyers.
Total Exports of
last 05 Tears. 853809 544627 1056062 1082699 988566 4525763 —
X of total Export
(Irri rice].
60.2 34.2 64.7 80.5 63.0 63.6 —
Source:- DCG, vol-1, [1989] 'Eice Export Operation Study', p.80.
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On the whole, the market for Pakistan's Irri rice varieties is much
more diverse. The regional classification of direction of trade,
given in table-9.10; fig:-9.10-A shows that the exports of Irri
rice are more widely distributed among various regions. The African
countries have accounted for 52X of exports on average between
1975-76 to 1978-88 and the Asian countries have been absorbing
about one-fourth of Irri rice exports from Pakistan for the same
period.
TABLE - 9.10
STATEUEIT SHOIIIG REGIOI-USE EXPORT OF PAIISTAI'S IEEI 1ICK.
(Percentage of rice quantity exported.)
TEARS. ASIA. I.EAST. EUROPE. S.AKERICA. AFRICA. PRIVATE PARTIES TOTAL.
1975-78 43 5 19 1 33 0 100
1978-77 48 1 5 0 46 0 -
1977-78 39 4 9 2 45 0 -
1978-79 20 12 2 2 63 0 -
1979-80 23 8 3 19 46 0 -
1980-81 12 2 7 15 64 0 -
1981-82 26 8 2 10 55 0 -
1982-83 8 7 2 15 88 0 -
1983-84 14 12 11 5 58 0 -
1984-85 5 4 8 0 83 0 -
1985-86 13 17 0 20 50 0 -
1986-87 20 25 1 9 42 3 -
1987-88 43 6 10 0 33 8 -
13 TEARS
AVERAGE. 23 10 S 8 52 .85
^ource: UCG, VOL-1, [1989] 'Rice Export Operation Study', p.145.
Private sector were not allowed to eiport directly fron Pakistan, but it works as an agent of
foreign fins.
Keeping in mind the yearly exports to Asia and Africa, it seems
that there are widespread fluctuations in the quantities exported.
This is mainly because of two factors — weather conditions, and
the concessional export or food aid by the developed countries.
According to the RECP officials, as quoted in UCG [vol-1, 1989,
p.81] "Brazil and Mexico in Latin America may also be considered as
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principal Markets for Irri rice but we have not been able to
breakthrough in Mexico because of our high prices. Prosperous
regions in Asia, Africa, and Latin America like Iran, Algeria,
Libya, Syria, Turkey, Malaysia offer good prospectus for Irri
varieties of higher grades with 5-10% broken only".
Under Barter arrangements Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Poland
are also important buyers of high grades of Irri rice*. But it can
be seen in the above table that these countries are not regular
and main buyers of Pakistani Irri rice. It means that RECP is not
benefiting from these markets to a great extent.
To know the import and distribution system of Pakistani rice in the
U.K, the author distributed the questionnaires [shown in appendix
9-A, and 9-B] to 47 grain importing and distributing companies and
only 15 companies replied. It was found that only two companies
import Basmatii rice directly from RECP/Pakistan through private
parties, who contact the RECP on behalf of them. Further, it was
found that the rice imported from Pakistan was not as good as
Indian rice in terms of processing quality, hence they were milled
again in U.K.
9.3 Export Price Determination for Pakistani Rice.
9.3.1 Irri rice.
There is no international rice exchange in the world where rice can
be traded in, as with other commodities. The prices for various
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grades of Thai rice which are listed by the Thai Board of Trade,
are generally taken as (the benchmark) reference price. According
to RECP authorities, these are only indicative in so far as the
actual deals made by Thai authorities are at lower than the
notified prices. They claim to allow discounts from 3 to 5% over
notified prices in Government to Government sales. However, private
Thai exporters are generally reported to be selling rice at much
below the notified prices, even at 15-20% below notified prices
[UCG, 1989, Vol-1].
According to the RECP authorities, Thai rice enjoys an edge over
rice of comparable grades in various consuming countries. This is
because of the processed quality and the private sector's
competitive edge in finding new markets. If Thai rice which is 35%
broken is sold at a particular price, the buyer would offer US $5
to 7 less for Pakistan rice of the same grade. In simple words,
prices of Irri rice are roughly determined, keeping in view the
prices of similar grades of rice of Thai origin .
9.3.2 Basmati Rice.
The export price of Basmatii rice is fixed each year in consultation
with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries who are the main
importers of Basmatii rice. Pakistani Basmatii rice is sold to other
regions, also at the same price [UCG, 1989, vol-II, p.331], There
is no particular formula or criteria for fixing the export prices.
But the same study [Ibid, p.250] further confirms that the prices
are roughly determined depending in part on the competition from
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other countries like India, and Thailand, demand for Basmatii rice
and the prices of oil in Gulf countries.
Pakistan's Basmatii rice price for 1988-89 was fixed at US $675 to
700 per tonne, whereas India was presently reported to be offering
Basmatii of comparable grade to 'Pak-10' variety at prices ranging
between US $650 - 680 per tonne. Indian traders were also offering
sales on credit and undertaking other aggressive promotional
campaigns [UCG, 1989, vol-1, 303],
The price of Basmatii rice was higher in 1978-79 mainly due to the
increase in oil prices. In 1982, the price was fixed at US $700 per
metric tonne (p/mt) which was reduced to US $600 pmt in 1983-84, in
view of the falling international rice prices. The price was raised
to US $665 pmt in 1985, to US $700 pmt in 1986 and to US $750 pmt
during 1987. In the late years, however, a discount of up to 3.35%
was allowed to the buyers of 20000 tonnes or more.
The price for 1987-88 crop was fixed at US $700. The price for
1988-89 crop was fixed on February 19, 1989, at a meeting in
Riyadh, between RECP representatives and the Rice Purchase
Committee of GCC Secretariat at the following level:
a) US $675 pmt for sales of 1000 tonnes or above.
b) US $700 pmt for sales of less than 1000 tonnes.
The fluctuations and the main unfavourable factors for Basmatii
rice prices were reported to be the following [UCG, vol-1, 1989]:
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a) The population pattern in the Middle East has undergone
remarkable changes due to the repatriation of a large number of
Pakistanis and increasing employment of citizens of countries like
the Philippines, Bangladesh, and North Korea, who are ready to work
on low wages. These people have a greater preference for other
varieties of rice imported from Thailand and USA.
b) The fall in oil prices has adversely affected the demand for
Basmatii rice and the Gulf countries are now reluctant to pay high
prices.
c) Thailand has developed fragrant rice resembling Pakistani
Basmatii and is trying to market the same under the garb of Basmatii.
d) Indian traders are reported to be offering sales on credit and
undertaking aggressive publicity campaigns for promotion of sales
of Indian Basmatii rice.
9.3.3 Unit Price of Rice Export.
The average unit prices in terms of US dollars for Basmatii and Irri
rice, since 1975-76 are given in fig:-9.11.A (table-9.11). It
appears that the proportional increase in the unit prices of
Basmatii rice has been higher than that of Irri rice. The trend
analysis shows that average prices in 1987-88 were higher by 39%
for Basmatii and by 10% for Irri rice as compared to the base year
1975-76. Prices of Basmatii increased because of the monopoly of
production by just two countries — India and Pakistan. Whereas,
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AVERAGE OIL AND RICE (BASMATi ftlRRI) PRICES (FOB).
(Rice price* h USfTorre ind Crude 01 Prices ti USI/bbQ.
BASMATI u-liBl OL (EUR)
«76-7« #77-76 #?8-M «6W2
#76-77 #76-79 #60-61 #62-63
(Ay: udt nlue, CF)
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the slow increase in price of Irri rice is mainly because of low
quality rice and world competition and protectionism which will be
discussed in chapter 10.
Conclusion.
This chapter started by looking at the nature and characteristics
of Pakistan's rice exports and export policies. It was found that
in Pakistan rice was exported under the monopoly of the RECP, and
the private sector has been allowed since 1986-87 to export Basmatii
rice under certain conditions.
Restricting private exporters to dealing with Basmatii rice only,
limits their ability to offer "package" deals to potential buyers
and creates an inflexible pricing situation that results in less
opportunities to develop new customers. Restricting private
exporters from exporting small packs of rice, limits their ability
to supply bulk orders to buyers. Requiring private sector sales of
Basmatii rice to be priced at not less than the negotiated GCC bulk
price, places some limitations on the private exporters ability to
compete effectively with the increasingly stiff competition from
private traders in India and Thailand. Subjecting private sector
rice exports to inspection and quality control by the RECP, places
limitations on the private sector because it is against the normal
practice of the international trade system to have one exporter
(RECP) responsible for the quality control of other exporters.
In this study, we conclude that the RECP, on the whole is
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relatively inefficient which results in high cost operations that,
in turn, places rice exports in a continuously cost increasing
situation'. This situation obviously nakes it more difficult to
compete on the world market. This situation is especially critical
for Pakistani rice as it faces new suppliers of rice, both Basmatii
from India and Thailand and Irri type rice from Thailand, U.S.A,
China, and more recently from Vietnam. Improved marketing
efficiency is a must if it is to continue to function in the rice
export market.
The next chapter will deal with the agricultural policies and rice
trade of the developed countries and the prospects for agriculture




WORLD RICE TRADE AND AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN GENERAL.
The main object of this chapter is to briefly describe in general
the world rice trade and agricultural policies by the developed
countries and also to examine the prospects for agriculture trade
liberalisation.
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 10.1 deals with the
world rice trade; and the agriculture trade distortion policies are
summarised in section 10.2. In section 10.3 prospects for
agricultural trade liberalisation have been summarised.
10.1 World Rice Varieties and their Price Differences.
Rice is a highly differentiated product and its market is segmented
and imperfect. Partly as a result of the wide differentiation in
product and a lack of market integration, there are significant
differences among the exporters in average value and quality
traded. There is no average price of rice as there is for wheat.
However, the international prices generally quoted are for
Thailand, the largest exporter, and the USA.
Rather than a single price being evident in the world market, the
observation is that there are a number of specific prices according
to rice types, qualities and the country of origin (table-10.1)
[Timmer and Falcon, 1975].
262
TABLE - 10.1
AVERAGE EXPORT PRICES OF SELECTED TYPES AND QUALITIES OF RICE.
(OS $ per ton)
19T5 1976 19T7 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Thailand long grain
1001 white (FOB) 380 268 286 382 354 449 489 299 290 262 227
Thailand broken Al-
super (FOB) 244 176 183 224 198 252 250 198 194 212 172
Thailand brokens 30-
35X (fob). n.a n.a 233 339 297 387 408 242 240 233 197
Thailand parboiled
(fob). 279 230 272 367 312 391 431 269 270 258 221
USA long grain (fas) 420 318 309 416 409 435 503 385 391 403 361
USA parboiled (fas) 459 311 342 441 477 510 573 470 471 489 496
USA aediua grain
(fas). 385 242 274 297 291 348 448 364 209 333 328
USA short grain
(fas). 376 257 273 324 345 468 581 517 562 543 429
Pakistani Basaati,
(FAQ).
524 354 451 743 715 713 721 639 604 628 678
Pakistani Irri,(FAQ). 187 180 232 247 255 326 298 212 210 207 160
Sources: UCG, 1989, vol-1, p.73, table-3.12; Board of Trade
Bulletin, Thailand and USA.
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In terms of demand for the various types of rice, there are large
regional varieties; for example, most of Africa's rice imports in
the last decade were low quality — with more brokens — long
grain. In contrast, imports to the Middle East are predominantly
long grain and high quality; and in the Far East, long grain has
been the dominant type imported for most years. There is a much
smaller market for short grain, 'Japonica' varieties, grown widely
in East Asia like Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and China.
Low quality, par-boiled rice is produced and consumed largely in
South Asia. High quality, par-boiled rice is produced by major
exporters, such as Thailand, United States, and shipped to Africa
and Middle East. Par-boiled rice accounts for about 10% of trade.
Glutinous rice is consumed as a staple food in the territory
stretching from the Shan areas of northern Burma to the north and
north eastern Thailand, Laos, and the mountainous areas of Vietnam.
It is also consumed in small quantities in sweets, snacks, and
desert dishes, usually on festive occasions, in many countries in
East and Southeast Asia. Only a very small portion of glutinous
rice enters world trade.
Basmati rice — long-grain, scented or aromatic varieties — are
grown largely in Pakistan and in India only, and the volume traded
is limited to about 300,000 to 400,000 metric tonnes annually.
10.1.2 World Rice Production.
The annual world rice production in recent years is estimated to
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have been in excess of 450 million tonnes — approximately 300
million tonnes of milled rice. A high proportion of this production
is concentrated in Asia, which in 1985 accounted for about 92% of a
world total of 460 million tonnes (Fig:-10.2.A and table-10.2).
In table-10.2 [see appendix - tables], it is mentioned that among
the group of Asian rice producing countries, China alone produced
about 37% of the world total in 1985. Rice production, in contrast
to other food grains such as wheat, is primarily located in Third
World countries. Taken together these countries accounted for
around 94% of global rice output between 1981 and 1985 compared to
6% produced by the industrial countries like U.S.A, Japan, EEC,
and Australia [Nick Amin, 1987], Developments in world rice
production during the 1970s are centrally related to the spread of
high yielding varieties (HYVs), first introduced in many Asian
countries in the 1960s.
10.1.3 World Rice Trade.
The developing countries including China, who are the major
producers of rice are mainly consuming rice within the country and
a small portion of it is exported. On a global basis, the share of
trade as a proportion of world rice output is estimated at around
4% only (fig:-10.3-A and table-10.3). Although the volume of world
rice trade increased from 6.47 to 11.4 million tonnes during 1965-
88, it never exceeded more than 4.2% of the total. It seems that
the international rice market is very thin in terms of the small
volume of trade relative to the production. Thus, the effect of
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AVERAGE WORLD RICE PRODUCTION AND EXPORT.
(Million metric tonnes).
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year-to-year fluctuations in production is likely to be reflected
in substantial price volatility.
10.1.3.1 Trends of World Rice Trade.
Asian rice producing countries have continued to play a dominant
role in the world rice trade since early times. Within Asia, the
pattern of trade has changed markedly: Vietnam and Burma lost their
position as major exporters, and China and Japan shifted from an
import to an export position. Thailand succeeded in maintaining a
dominant role not only in Asia but in the world. Its share of rice
exports in world never fell below 20%. Although Burmese exports
exceeded those of Thailand for more than a decade after World War
II, but Burmese domestic policies, particularly the maintenance of
domestic rice prices well below world market level, led to a
gradual collapse of rice exports in the late 1960s and early 1970s
[Nick Amin, 1987].
In the post war period, three other countries have emerged as
leading exporters of rice - the United States, China, and Pakistan.
The five major exporting countries as a group, that is, Burma,
China, Pakistan, Thailand, and the USA have, on average accounted
for about 70% of the world exports since World War II [Randolph,
Barker, et,al., 1985].
Thailand, till 1987 has contributed about one third of the total
rice trade. USA, China, and Pakistan were the next major exporters,
accounting for 19, 10, and 10% of the total exports respectively
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during 1985-87. Thailand's position in maintaining itself as the
world's largest exporter of rice has been primarily due to the
cumulative effects of a number of policy initiatives that have been
taken since 1981 to encourage and expand export sales. The more
recent measures have been aimed at reducing in Government control
and intervention in rice production and trade. With increased
liberalisation, domestic prices of rice, both at farmer and
consumer levels, now move in line with international rice price
movements. The most important developments in production policies
have been: the expansion of measures to assist farmers in
withholding market supplies during the harvest season so as to
provide greater stability of prices and thus avoiding sharp
declines, and the increased involvement of local private traders in
these farm programmes [UCG, vol-1, 1989].
Major developments in trade policies include: complete elimination
of export tax, progressive reduction in direct Government
procurement and export, the extension of low interest rate loans in
support of private rice exports, and the overall continuation of
broad moves towards liberalising trade, with the policy changes,
the volume of rice exports has expanded. Thailand's export share of
the world market has risen progressively from under 25% at the
beginning of the 1980's, before the process of liberalisation
started, to over 40% in 1988 [table-10.4]. After an initial sharp
increase in export volume between 1980-84, export volumes have been
maintained at relatively high levels. As a consequence, rice has
continued to generate a significant proportion of Thailand's total
agricultural export earnings [Ibid],
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TABLE - 10.4.
BICE TRADE OF KICE EXPORTING COUNTRIES A THEIR SHARE OF WORLD MARKET.
IKIM/COHTtT. Average Aiiaal let Exports, (1000 it.) Perceit of VorU Exports.
1SS1-53 1968-71 1976-71 1978-10 1983-85 1961-63 1969-71 1976-78 1978-80 1)83-05
Asia: 4177 4790 4601 5977 7370 46.0 61.6 48.5 57.3 69.9
Baria, 1682 694 474 546 682 25.8 8.9 5.0 5.2 6.5
Ckiaa, 551 1415 1260 1151 1047 8.5 18.2 13.3 11.0 9.9
Japaa, -179 593 -5 395 83 -2.7 7.6 -0.0 3.8 0.8
laipackea, 249 90 13 -127 -140 3.8 1.2 0.1 -1.2 -1.3
Eorea D. Repiblic, 7 82 257 310 215 0.1 1.1 2.7 3.0 2.0
lepal, 173 245 113 65 22 2.7 3.2 1.2 0.6 0.2
Pakistai, 217 426 808 1012 1106 3.3 5.5 8.5 9.7 10.5
Taisaa, 52 24 124 302 264 0.8 0.3 1.3 2.9 2.5
Tbailaad. 1(22 1221 1558 2323 4091 21.8 15.7 16.4 22.3 38.8
Ceitral A Soitk-
kerica: 229 380 716 130 76 3.5 4.9 7.5 1.2 0.8
Argeatiaa A Orageaj, 41 ISO 243 233 293 0.6 1.9 2.6 2.2 2.8
Bolivia, Costa Eica,
licaragia 1 Paaaia. -19 9 43 47 -11 -1.0 0.1 0.4 0.5 -0.1
Braxil, 65 105 207 -299 -289 -1.0 1.3 2.2 -2.9 -2.7
Colubia, -12 7 52 25 39 -0.2 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.4
Ecaador 1 Veiexiela, 17 25 7 -16 -13 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 -0.1
Gijaaa 1 Saritaa, 106 91 144 174 164 1.6 1.1 1.5 1.5 1.5
Mexico, 31 -7 20 -34 -107 0.5 -0.1 0.2 -0.3 -1.0
Eiropeai Exporters: 212 495 298 385 382 3.2 6.4 3.1 3.7 3.6
Italy, 155 444 251 323 362 2.4 5.7 2.6 3.2 3.4
Spaii, 57 51 47 53 20 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.2
Otker Exporters:
Aastralia, 52 132 271 352 328 0.8 1.7 2.9 3.4 3.1
Kgypt, 242 647 157 139 35 3.7 8.3 1.7 1.3 0.3
Baited States. 1022 1634 2185 2500 2084 15.7 21.0 23.0 24.0 19.8
lorld Gross Exports. 6769 7880 9704 11237 11597 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Soiree: lick kia, [1987], 'Characteristics of Iiteraatioial Eice Market*, tabIe-6, p.36.
Sote: Pakistai exclides East Pakistai or Bangladesh.
Evidence [table 10.4] on export levels of individual countries over
the 25 years clearly show the wide periodic fluctuations coupled
with the changing market shares for a number of important
exporters. In this context Egypt presents an interesting case, its
average exports in 1969-71 were 8.3% the fifth largest share of the
world export market, by the eighties its market share was less than
half a percent (0.3%).
Areas outside Asia, like U.S.A, EEC and Australia are gaining an
increasing Market share. Although the share of rice output of the
developed countries such as U.S.A., EEC, Japan, and Australia, in
the world total output is relatively small — approximately 6%,
their role in world trade is highly significant [Nick Amin, 1987].
The penetration of the international rice export market by the
industrialised countries except Australia has been largely achieved
through export subsidisation. The subsidy has the effect of
increasing competition in the global rice market. The developed
countries thus have been able to increase their share of world
trade as they can export at prices having no relation with the
local cost of production. Hence, the lower price of their rice has
made it more attractive for several countries in South America,
Africa, and the Middle East. The result is that the market share
of third world countries in world exports has steadily declined
from 90% prior to World War II to 60% in recent years [table
-10.5].
TABLE - 10.5
RICE EXPORTS FROM SELECTED COUNTRIES.
(000 it KILLED RICE].
Coutrj. 1934-36 1954-56 1959-61 1964-66 1969-71 1974-76 1978-10 Z anial groitl
1959-61 to 78-4
Baria 3118 1E5E 1668 1281 664 345 535 -5.6
Ckiia 13 671 1049 892 930 2648 1483 3.8
Pakistas - 141 87 157 324 619 959 11.6
Thailaid 15S8 1256 1290 1763 1221 1289 2383 2.9
ASIA 8892 4087 3778 4981 4445 5456 6826 2.0
O.S.A 41 662 791 1410 1712 1990 2546 5.0
Others4 EOT 834 869 1140 1610 1542 2046 4.7
KORLO. 9540 5583 5439 7531 7767 8988 11418 4.0
Asia as Z of world. 93 73 69 66 57 61 60 -
S leadiig Eiporters 50 79 68 73 62 77 70 -
as I of lorld.
Soiree: Raadolpk Barker, [1985] 'Rice Econoiy of Asia', table-13.14, p.189.
aAll otker rice export, excladiig Asia aid the O.S.A.
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Looking at the trend in rice import, there has been a marked shift
in the import pattern over the last 25 years, which in the main
signify a movement away from Asia's dominance in the market [table-
10.6; Fig:-10.6.A)] Against this, demand for imported rice
increased in both Africa and the Middle East and in each case, the
share of imports tripled between the sixties and the eighties.
Among most of the Asian importing countries, rising levels of
domestic production have been responsible for declining imports.
High yielding varieties, coupled with policies promoting self
sufficiency have contributed to this process [Nick Amin, 1987].
10.4 Agriculture and Trade Distortion Policies by Developed
Countries in General.
With few exceptions, almost all countries intervene in their
agricultural markets creating growing imbalances in world supply
and demand, shifting world trade patterns, and distorting world
agricultural prices.
Protectionist policy depresses the world market prices and reduces
the volume of international trade. The main loser are the low-cost
exporting countries, which find their foreign exchange earnings and
their overall welfare reduced. However, the high cost countries
which protect their agriculture lose too, since such policies lead
to an inefficient use of their resources [Knudsen and Nash, 1990].
"Protectionism is a grave threat to world economic growth"
[Commonwealth Heads of Governments, 1975].
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Finger and Olechowaki [1987, p.37] asserts that 'trade restrictions
are disproportionately imposed against the exports of developing
countries and are disproportionately imposed by the developing
countries. They suffer on both the accounts - probably more on the
latter than on the former'. Further they [Ibid, p.58] says that,
'an open international trading system is in the interest of each
nation and the major part of the costs of any nation's trade
restrictions are borne by that nation itself'. He makes an analogy
of 'world and a country' with a 'team and a member of the team'.
In this regard he says that, 'if a member of a team shoots himself
in the foot, the effectiveness of the whole team is reduced
considerably. 'Today's players shoot themselves a lot, and those
less skilled even more so than others, because Governments
intervene in trade to protect the economic interests of particular
group. The cost of trade restrictions are almost always greater
than their benefits, and that these costs are borne primarily by
the citizens of the country which imposes the restrictions'.
One of the few propositions on which almost all economists seem to
be in agreement, concerns the undesirability of the trade
restrictions which are applied by the EEC and other industrial
countries to imports from the developing world. Restrictions impose
economic costs on the industrial countries themselves, and they
limit the opportunities of developing countries to prosper through
greater participation in international trade.
One study [Cable Vincent, 1987, p.309] found that if all barriers
were removed in the industrial countries, LDC's manufactured
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exports would be 30% higher by 1985 than the trend figure.
Voldes Zietz [1980] as quoted in the sane study [Ibid, p.310],
shows that agricultural exports from developing countries could
increase at least by 11% if agricultural trade barriers were cut by
only 50%, but the net gains to LDCs as a whole — US $400 million
— is considerably less than the gains to exporters ($1 billion).
Anderson and Tyres [1983] in their study, as quoted in Vincent
Cable [1987, p.314], show that the community's [EEC] grain and meat
policies depress the world prices by around 15%, increase world
price instability by 30 to 100% and reduce welfare substantially
both in the community and the producing countries.
Looking at the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) as a whole,
Burniaux and Wealbroeck [1985] as quoted in the same study [Ibid]],
calculated that real incomes in developing countries as a whole
would be almost 3% higher in 1995, if the CAP evolved along its
present path. From the trade point of view, it is interesting to
see that the terms of trade are improving under the EC trade
liberalisation for almost all LDC's.
What would happen if the USA removed all its programmes
[liberalise] unilaterally? According to Tyres and Anderson [1986]
as quoted in Sanderson [1989], the trade effects would be much less
than in the case of EC liberalisation. This, of course, is due to
the fact that the reduction of price incentives to producers would
be approximately offset by the elimination of acreage restraints.
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Only in dairy products would there be a significant (5%)
improvement in world prices. Wheat and rice exports would decline;
exports of pork and poultry would increase slightly. USA producer
prices would drop by half in the dairy sector, by 28% in sugar, by
23% in rice, and by 14% in wheat.
Another study [UNCTAD, 1986] calculates the gains to 20 developing
countries from the complete liberalisation of all Tariff and
selected 'Non-Tariff Barriers' (NTBs) in the EEC, Japan, and the
USA. It showed that there is an estimated gain to LDCs in export
earnings from liberalisation on an MFN basis of US $29.5 billion —
an increase of 12%. It seems that their removal would contribute a
significant gain to developing countries export.
10.4.1 World Rice Trade Distortions.
Few commodities are so heavily influenced by Government policies,
as the international market for rice. This is because the key
players in the rice markets are governments rather than producers
and consumers. The widespread use of concessional sales, Government
to Government contracts, State trading agencies, and import and
export barriers means that, world prices have little direct
relevance for production and consumption decisions in most
countries [Walter P.Falcon and Eric A.Monke, 1979-80].
In the case of rice, as quoted in the same study [Ibid] the FAO,
Intergovernmental Group on rice, at its annual session in March
1987, expressed concern over the depressed world rice market
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situation. It was noted that the increased use of export aids in
some countries had rendered small exporting countries uncompetitive
on world markets, even when they had comparative advantages in
growing rice. Rice exports were at their lowest levels in many
years. It was further concluded that low world prices had caused
many exporting countries to cut back on production. The group was
also concerned with the adverse effects that low world prices had
in importing countries.
While recognising that low prices were welcomed by those countries
which were not trying to increase their rate of self sufficiency,
many other importing countries found that cheap imports had acted
as a disincentive to their domestic production programme.
The same study [Ibid] has also looked into the effects on the
volatility of world market prices and found that protectionist
policies significantly increase world market price instability, by
as much as 100X or more. This is because protection of domestic
agricultural markets in developed countries reduces the size of
the market volume which could buffer fluctuations on world
agricultural commodity markets due to present policies, and are
particularly harmful for developing countries.
The policies impinging on world rice markets can be categorised as
either trade restrictions or trade incentives. Both types of trade
policies tend to distort world rice trade and price levels away
from what they would be under free trade. The major obstacle in
expansion and growth of world rice trade is the tariff^ and non-
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2tariff barriers imposed by developed and developing countries.
There are hardly any countries which do not impose any
restrictions, whatsoever, on their exports or imports of rice.
One study [FAO, 1983] concludes that barriers to rice trade, have a
number of undesirable consequences. Inside the country, tariff and
non-tariff barriers to imports tend to raise domestic prices and
unless subsidies are given, which most developing countries can ill
afford, the price to the consumer is raised and consumption is
reduced. In countries where rice is staple food, the effect on the
consumer price is of particular concern. Barriers to imports can
also misallocate the domestic resources by encouraging the
production of a product in which the country is relatively
inefficient. The widespread adoption of such barriers also has
negative effects on world trade. The volume of trade is reduced
and, in certain circumstances some exporters are forced to reduce
production. Competition for the remaining market is intensified,
with increased resort to export subsidies and other export aids
which very few developing countries can afford. In such a situation
developing exporting countries suffer the most from the reduction
in their export revenues as they rely heavily on rice as a source
of foreign exchange.
The same study [Ibid] regarding 86 rice trading countries and the
EEC examining rice trade barriers, showed the trade control
measures to be widely prevalent. On import measures, it was found
that in all 16 net exporting countries some form of control was in
operation to limit imports. For the remaining 70 countries and the
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EEC, 30 had no tariffs on rice while 40 applied them; though most
had relatively low levels - less than 15%. However, the majority of
countries with low tariff levels had non-tariff barriers to control
import levels. In total, there were 50 countries in which States
restricted imports either by issuing licences to private traders,
by setting annual quotas, or through direct engagement in trade.
Thus, of the 50 countries with non-tariff barriers in place, 30
used import licences, 5 set quotas and 25 had state monopoly
trading to limit trade.
With regard to export measures, the same study [Ibid] found
considerable evidence of State regulation which in some countries
acted as a restraint on exports. The purpose of export control
measures was either to raise revenues through taxes or to
stabilise domestic markets through quantity controls. In other
developed countries, however, the State subsidised rice exports in
order to encourage exports, particularly in times of low
international prices.
Another FAO study [FAO, 1988] of about 98 countries including EEC,
also showed that the trade control measures are widely prevalent.
One recent study [Cramer, et,al., 1990] as quoted in Warren
R.Grant, et, al., [1990, p.iii] concludes that world rice trade is
48% lower as a result of rice policy distortions, than would be the
case under free trade. The study estimates that policy
interventions have reduced world exports of high quality 'Indica'
rice by 15%, low quality 'Indica' by 39% and 'Japonica' by 83%. The
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study also concludes that the respective prices of high quality and
low quality 'Indica' and of 'Japonica' rice are 25%, 5% and 61%,
lower than would occur under free trade.
10.5. Prospects for Agricultural Trade Liberalisation.
10.5.1 Recent Developments and Prospects for Liberalisation.
Several proposals in the past have been considered by the GATT,
advocating reduced support to agriculture and the liberalisation of
agricultural trade, but no fruitful results have been achieved.
Nowadays there is a greater recognition of the high and rising
costs of protective barriers and domestic policies affecting
agricultural trade products. Recently, liberalising world trade in
agricultural products has been receiving greater attention in the
multilateral trade negotiations (MTNs) under the auspices of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) than was the case of
previous rounds.
Recently, the European Community Ministers surprised the world on
May 21, 1992 and clinched an unprecedented agreement to begin
reforming the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP). This promised deal
matters not just for the EC's consumers and taxpayers, who have to
pay the cost of the CAP's distorted prices and subsidies, but for
people everywhere [The Economist, May 23 1992]. After three days of
almost continuous negotiation, the ministers agreed to move away
from spending £23 billion a year on fixing the community's food
prices, paying instead for more direct financial assistance for
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farmers.
The benchmarks set at the GATT talks for the reform of European
farming was the plan suggested by Arthur Dunkel, the agency's
(GATT) director-general, last year. For cereals, where Europe and
America have been furthest apart, the Dunkel plan called for cuts
of 20% in the value of the CAP's production subsidies, of 36% in
the value of its export subsidies, and of 24% in the volume of its
subsidised exports. The new plan easily does the first two, but
fails to do the third. The reason for that failure is simple.
Europe aims to replace some subsidies to producers with direct
payments. The effect of this switch on the EC's output of cereals
will depend on precisely how the payments work. The new regime
would still distort the trade, but less than the present one. And
it would make the costs of the CAP more visible, which prepares the
way for further reforms later ['The Economist', May 23-29, 1992].
Nevertheless, as a result of the deal, grain prices will be cut by
29% and farmers will be obliged to take 15% of land used for cereal
production out of use. Farmers will be paid 45 ecu (£31.50) per
tonne of grain as long as they adhere to the 15% rule. There will
also be production ceilings for the land still farmed. Beef prices
will be cut by 15% and butter by 5%.
As reported by Maxwell Fordyce [The Scotsman, Daily, May 22, 1992]
the net effects of the new reformed CAP will be to bring EC cereal
prices much closer to the theoretical world price and, possibly,
persuade the U.S to settle the world trade talks, the General
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which have lumbered on almost five-
and-a-half years, stuck on rows over subsidies.
As far as the case of rice is concerned, according to Cramer, et,
al., [1990], the complete and immediate elimination of non-tariff
barriers is not likely to result from current negotiations in GATT,
the next trade liberalisation process of world rice markets would
involve as a first step the transformation of all non-tariff
barriers into their equivalents, that is, 'tariffication'. The next
step would be a gradual reduction in tariff levels over time. The
advantage of tariff ication is that not only a greater world trade
volume can be achieved but also volatility in world markets can be
substantially reduced.
10.5.2. Pakistan*?; Position Towards the Uruguay Round.
Pakistan is an important player in several world commodity markets,
such as cotton, rice and wheat. It has substantially increased the
quantity and quality of its cotton output in the past 5 years, so
it will most likely remain a major exporter. In Pakistan, rice
exports are state regulated. Exports of coarse rice, while
generating foreign exchange, often incur losses for the RECP,
although these are offset by profits on Basmatii rice. Pakistan is
marginally self-sufficient in wheat, its staple food, periodically
importing substantial amounts.
At present, Pakistan's reported posture towards the negotiations in
the current GATT round is based largely on its traditional exports
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of textiles and cotton [Ender, Gary, 1990]. This is not surprising,
because the textile industry has long formed the core of the
manufacturing sector and is a major employer. Moreover, cotton and
cotton products account for about one-third of all Pakistan's
exports.
The same study [Ibid, p.12] concludes that there may be three
different possible scenarios for GATT negotiation achievements and
Pakistan will reap the benefit under whatever path the agricultural
trade liberalisation might take. The three different possible
scenarios for GATT negotiation achievements are described as
follows:
i. reduction in support only when aggregate support to agricultural
producers is positive.
ii. reduction in positive support for each commodity or policy
where it occurs.
iii. complete liberalisation, involving elimination of all
instances of positive and negative support.
CONCLUSION.
This chapter began by looking at the agricultural policies of the
developed countries and the world rice trade in general . It was
found that the developed countries', mainly USA., EEC and Japan's
agricultural policy has negative effects on world trade. The result
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is that the volume of trade is reduced, price is decreased, in
certain circumstances some exporters are forced to reduce
production, and competition for the remaining market is
intensified, with increased resort to export subsidies and other
export aids. In such a market, the developing countries who are
dependent on rice as a source of foreign exchange, suffer the most.
Nowadays, there is a greater recognition of the high and rising
costs of protective barriers and domestic policies of the developed
countries. With the initiatives of the U.S Government, the EEC has
moved towards liberalisation and has liberalised the agricultural
markets partially. But it is too early to comment, on the path of
agricultural trade liberalisation. Nevertheless, whatever path the
agricultural trade liberalisation will take, Pakistan will reap the
benefit of it.
In next chapter the author will turn to a general conclusion of the
study and major recommendations.
Foot Motes.
'
11 is a tax or duty imposed on the import or exports.
2
It includes the following:
a) State trading, (Direct Government control).
b) Quantitative restrictions (quotas and embargoes).
c) Licensing.
d) Health and sanitary regulations.






In this chapter, the whole study is summarised. The preferred
policies for Pakistan's rice marketing and the suggested methods
for their implementation are specified, with the aim of improving
the marketing of rice in Pakistan, which is the main focus of this
thesis.
The principal objectives of this dissertation were: to identify the
weaknesses of Pakistan's rice marketing; to identify the specific
rice export impediments; to explore ways of improving the existing
rice marketing in Pakistan; and to generate lessons for LDCs'
agricultural marketing efforts.
This thesis has examined paddy and rice marketing in Pakistan with
special reference to whether or not it should be liberalised. In
the first section of this chapter, there is summary of main
findings. The conclusions and recommendations of the study are
summarised in section two. Lessons for LDCs' from Pakistan's rice
marketing experience are presented in section three. Finally,
suggestions and recommendations, and areas for further research,




Summary of the Main Findings.
Agricultural Policies in Developing Countries in General.
As highlighted in chapter II of this study, the predominance of the
agricultural sector in many developing countries' economies, is
often one of the main characteristics. This is because agriculture
is not only one of the largest contributors to the national income
but also the major source of employment and foreign exchange
earnings. It is also the provider of grain for food especially for
the growing urban population and for the generation of surplus
profits to finance the development effort.
Governments have distorted agricultural prices and historically
intervened in the agricultural price determination and marketing
through state agencies. Usually prices are set to meet political
objectives. Typically producers are heavily taxed and the consumers
- industries and the urban people - subsidised [World Bank Report
1986, and Knudsen and Nash 1990].
Protecting industry at the cost of agriculture has resulted in
substantial discrimination against agriculture - a point that
Barrington Moore emphasises when he says: "just what does
modernisation/industrialisation mean to peasants beyond the simple
and brutal fact that sooner or later they are its victim?" [see
Moore, quoted in Bates 1981, p.7], "As part of the modernisation
process, the peasantry is compelled to surrender its resources to
the upper class, to the states, and to the industrial sector"
286
[Bates 1981, p.7].
In agriculture, farm prices are often suppressed to provide
subsidised food or raw Material to the consumers. To compensate the
producers, for their suppressed prices, they are offered input
subsidies. The conflict of policies involved in pursuing both
suppressed crop prices and subsidised fan inputs has resulted in a
large waste of resources, instead of helping the producers and poor
consumers [Knudsen and Nash 1990; World Bank Report 1986].
As far state marketing agencies, one study [Maddock, 1987, p.296]
points out that these have been net consumers of resources rather
than income generators.
Perhaps more important, because of their inflexibly, state owned
organisations find it hard to handle the sheer complexity of the
markets. They can not adapt readily to changing market conditions.
State organisations simply do not respond flexibly, because it is
usually politically difficult for them to quickly shed labour and
take other cost cutting measures in a timely manner [Knudsen and
Nash, 1990, p.59, and World Bank Report, 1986, p.86].
Knudsen and Nash [Ibid, p.58] argue that as far as corruption is
concerned, estimates are hard to come by. But to give some idea of
its seriousness, reports from Senegal indicate that the government
has admitted fraudulent losses of the major state marketing agency
ONCAD of an amount equivalent to 44X of the public sector
investment budget. In addition to the direct siphoning-off of
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funds, [Bryceson, 1985; Ni« Caswell, 1985] leakage of supplies
purchased by the state Marketing agencies into the higher priced
parallel Market are coMMon [Hopecraft, 1987]. But even disregarding
the wide scale fraud, parastatals often fulfil their Mission
inefficiently [Idachaba, 1985].
11.1.2. Agricultural Policies in Pakistan.
Like other developing countries, successive Pakistani Governments
have intervened in the agriculture sector and iupleuented a very
conplex set of pricing, subsidy and tax policies. The pattern of
Governuent intervention takes Many different forms: through direct
price intervention, direct subsidies and taxes. By indirect
intervention through: control over exchange rates - overvalued
currencies, indirect taxes and subsidies. The Most iMportant types
of direct intervention include: the governMent's Monopoly on
international trade and the regulation of doMestic sales of
agricultural products like wheat, Basaati rice, flour and sugar to
the urban people at cheaper rates through the network of ration
shops in cities only [see chapter-vi].
One study [Hanid, et, al., 1990, pp.104-106] found that in the
rationing systeM, the costs to the Pakistan governnent for
operating this systeM were Much greater than the benefits to the
consuners. Further they say that considerable corruption and waste
in the systeM had been widely accepted for a long tiMe.
HaMid,et,al., [1990, p!28] in their study conclude that governnent
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has attempted to balance three Major considerations in its
agricultural price intervention; (i) Maximising foreign exchange
earnings to support balance of payments, (ii) the political
consideration of keeping food prices low for urban consumers and
(iii) the government's own revenue needs. However, given that the
three are inter-related, pursuing one soon led to problems with
another, so that it has been a difficult balancing act. This
management task is all the more complex given that there are four
major crop prices - cotton, rice, wheat and sugar-cane - to be
administered, each with its own set of conflicts. This is best
exemplified in the case of cotton where growers, traders and
ginners bring to bear conflicting interests in influencing the
policy, particularly on domestically elected governments. Lobbying
is in the open. Given the opportunities for corruption that
intervention presents in an increasingly complex crop management
system, the trend to reduce differences between domestic and border
prices must be a healthy one and should be encouraged.
It is estimated that in Pakistan's agriculture sector, producers
were taxed and prices distorted, resulting in a net transfer of
resources out of agriculture [Qureshi, 1987, p.168; Commission
Report, 1988, p.529].
Because of distortions in agricultural prices in which farm-gate
and domestic prices were set below international prices, smuggling
was encouraged. For example, Hamidj et, al. [1990, p.106] confirm
that smuggling of wheat from Pakistan was widespread. Although no
hard evidence is available beyond newspaper reports, interviews
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with government officials indicate that smuggling of rice and sugar
has also been on a wide scale to Afghanistan, Iran and India.
Thus distortions in producer prices resulted in significant costs
to the economy in terms of foregone output, export losses, and
foreign exchange losses because of lower exports [Hamid, et, al.,
1990, p.60].
11.1.3 Rice Marketing in General.
There is a wide difference in the varieties of rice sold in the
world market. There is no 'central' or spot marketing for rice,
compared to, say, the London daily prices or the New York world
market price for sugar, wheat and maize. For rice, the weekly
Bangkok FOB prices are notified as the reference price [Siamwalla
and Haykin, 1983, p.34].
One study [Barker, et, al., 1985, p.191] confirms that the world
rice market is highly unstable. Instability in the world rice
market is reflected in short-run price fluctuations and more
broadly in the uncertainty that traders face in negotiating
contracts. Weather is a major cause of fluctuations in supply, and
technological change appears to have contributed to variability in
production in the long run. The thinness of the market - in the
sense that only 4-5X of the total world rice production is traded -
is another contributing factor to instability. Government policies
have also been destabilising.
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11.1.3.1 Pakistan Rice Marketing Developments.
Two aain rice varieties are produced in Pakistan - Basaati - a high
quality rice and - Irri - a low quality rice.
Since 1972, there has been an increase in the exportable surplus of
Pakistani rice, because of two reasons. First, as a result of the
loss of a significant portion of the Bangladesh Market when it was
separated froa Pakistan to becoae an independent state. Second, the
increase in production because of the introduction of high yielding
Irri rice varieties.
Irri rice is a low quality rice, priaarily grown for doaestic
consuaption. About 60* of the total produced is consuaed locally.
The surplus is exported at low prices on which RECP incurs losses.
The increase in oil prices in 1973 led to rapid growth in the
deaand for Basaatii rice in the Middle East. This period also
coincided with the world wide coaaodity boon, and the export price
of rice wore than doubled in 1973-74 coapared to 1972-73.
The Governaent of Pakistan saw an opportunity for generating
revenue, therefore rice trade was declared a state Monopoly and
the RECP was established for the job. Since then, in setting the
procureaent price of rice, particularly of the Basaati, revenue
considerations have been doainant in governaent thinking [see
table-9.4]. Thus, between 1977-78 and 1986-87, the annual average
surplus froa Basaati rice exporting accounted for 0.94* of the
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total budget and 1.55% of national revenue, [table-11.1].
With special reference to rice Marketing in Pakistan which is our
focus here, the following bottlenecks were identified as affecting
the efficiency of rice Marketing:
11.1.3.2 Rice Processing and Milling.
Processing and Milling of paddy in Pakistan is controlled by the
private sector, yet rice Mills are Mostly outdated and particularly
inefficient in processing exportable quality rice. Our respondents
confirned that the private sector is reluctant to invest in Modern
Milling equipnent in the absence of an adequate price incentive for
processing quality rice.
Quality control is poor. It is widely believed that RECP officials
are persuaded to accept low quality rice through bribes [Hanid, et,
al., 1990, p.115] and/or political influence. The private sector is
not allowed to export freely, so there is no exterior outlet for
then. Thus they have no direct incentive to invest in Modern Mills
and process quality rice. The net result is that the broken ratio
of rice processed is high^ [JICA, P.II1-17, 1986] and there is a
net loss of revenue to the nation as a consequence. The Milled rice
procured by RKCP even needs to be re-Milled by the RECP in
Karachi before shipaent for export.
The RECP Mills are Modern by Pakistan standards, but are outdated
9
by international standards , [JICA, 1986; and Field Work interviews
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by the author in Pakistan]. Because of improper processing,
polishing and packing of rice by RECP, it is often re-milled a
third time by importers, mainly in Europe, [U.K interviews]. There
is inevitably considerable wastage because of milling again and
again.
11.1.3.3 Rice Milling By-products.
As far as rice milling by-products - husk, bran, and broken - are
concerned, it was found that Pakistan is not getting the potential
benefits from by-products of rice milling [UCG, volume 1, p.173,
1989] . The husk is used as fuel for brick making; bran is used as
animal feed; and the broken rice is sold in the domestic as well as
in the international market at low prices.
The manufacture of husk board and activated carbon are two
potential uses of husk; and the manufacture of edible oils is a
potential use of bran but is still in the experimental stage in
Pakistan. This edible oil could be produced as an import
9
substitute for soyabean oil and palm oil [UCG, volume-1, 1989].
Better use of rice by-products could, if feasible, create new
employment opportunities in rural areas, and in the case of edible
oil reduce the need for foreign exchange. This is a topic for
further research.
11.1.3.4 Rice Transportation and storage.
Rice is mostly transported by road - through private trucks and
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NLC^ - and rail to Karachi, where it is stocked for re-milling
before export. The advantage of road transportation especially from
Sindh, is the possibility of being able to provide a door to door
facility, at the start and the destination points.
There has been a significant change since 1985-86, as railways have
become the most important mode of transport. The increased share of
rail-freight is because of complaints received from railway
authorities about the non-utilisation of the available railway
wagons in Sindh.
However, the RECP cannot use railways to meet all of its freight
requirements for three reasons. First, storage facilities at
railway stations are inadequate and are not well protected from the
inclement weather. Second, many of the rice suppliers are not
located near the line of rail, so in these localities they hesitate
to bring their stocks because of the extra cost which has to be
born by them. Finally, the daily availability of railway wagons
does not match requirements.
There are no proper storage facilities at RECP godowns, either
owned by the RECP or hired. Storage management of stacked rice bags
in godowns is poor often resulting in congestion. This results in
inadequate space between stacks, walls and ceilings. This creates
problems for stock taking and for fumigation [UCG, volume 1, p.197,
1989].
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11.1.3.5 Rice Export Policies
In Pakistan, rice is exported under the monopoly of RECP. The
private sector has been allowed to export Basmatii rice under
certain conditions. These are: exporting only Basmatii rice in small
packs, requiring private exporters not to sell less than the
negotiated Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) price, and subjecting
private sector rice exports to inspection and quality control by
RECP.
Restricting private exporters to dealing with only Basmatii rice
limits their ability to offer 'package' deals to potential buyers
and also limits their ability to supply bulk orders to buyers.
Requiring private sector sales of Basmatii rice to be priced at not
less than the negotiated Gulf Cooperation Council bulk price places
some limitations on the private exporters' ability to compete
effectively with the increasingly stiff competition from India and
Thailand.
Subjecting private sector rice exports to inspection and quality
control by the RECP, places limitations on the private sector
because of cumbersome bureaucratic attitudes and the petty jealousy
of RECP officials. It is not, of course, normal practice in
international trade system to have one exporter - RECP -
responsible for the quality control of other exporters.
The RECP exports virtually all Basmati rice by government to
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government contracts under the supervision of Ministry of Commerce.
Most of the rice goes to the Middle-East because of high demand
due to the popularity of Basmati rice there. The sale of Basmatii
rice by the RECP to Gulf states is on the basis of an agreement
with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), in respect of price and
import quantities. Only a tiny portion of Basmati rice exports are
accounted for by the private sector in spite of liberalisation
because of the near monopoly of the RECP.
The situation today is critical for Pakistani exports as it
competes with new suppliers of rice, — Basmati from India and
Thailand, and Irri-type rice from Thailand, USA, China, and more
recently from Vietnam. On the other hand, the importing countries'
self-sufficiency rate is improving. Improved rice marketing is a
must if Pakistan is to maintain its market share in the rice export
market.
Recently (since 1991), government has decided to liberalise rice
exports [Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Commerce, 1991].
Clearly it is too early to make an assessment about the impact on
the volume of exports or the direction of trade by the private
sector. However, during fieldwork interviews in Pakistan,
respondents were very confident that when liberalisation took place
they would successfully sell to the West and Middle East.
11.1.3.5.1 Export Channels for Irri Rice.
Irri rice is exported through government to government sales
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negotiation with importing countries, through tenders floated
regularly at intervals of four to six weeks, and direct negotiation
with prospective buyers during periods of large accumulated stocks.
Sometimes sales are also struck by parties outside the tender
system. Such sales were usually concluded at prices at least U.S
$10 per tonne above the price obtained in the most recent tender.
Sales through government to government negotiations were the most
important channel accounting for 39% of the total sales on average
between 1984 to 1988. Sales through tenders were the second most
important channel accounting for 35%. The remaining 26% was sold
through direct negotiations with prospective buyers [UCG, volume-1,
1989].
As the major portion of rice is exported under government to
government contract, the Ministry of Commerce could play a leading
role in facilitating the private sector's takeover of exporting.
For example, the Ministry of Commerce is permitted to export rice
through private channels by special arrangement. For instance
export orders coming through the Ministry could be channelled
through private outlets for execution. This of course still raises
the question of how to ensure competition for export orders amongst
would be private exporters.
The regional classification of direction of trade, shows that
exports of Irri rice are more widely dispersed among various
regions. African countries have accounted for 52% of exports on
average between 1975-76 and 1987-88 and Asian countries about a
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quarter of exports of Irri [UCG, volume-1, p.78, 1989].
11.1.3.6 Problems in the RECP.
Rice Marketing is partly liberalised at the domestic level.
Internal distribution is liberal but the domestic price is
influenced by government floor prices. The export Market has been
an RECP monopoly between 1974 to 1986 but is currently in the
process of being liberalised. Various problems have been identified
in the RECP's organisation and operations. From tine to tine,
steps have been taken to try and eliminate these problems. The
United Consulting Group [UCG, volume 1, 1989] drew the following
conclusions from its assessments of the RECP:
a. Paddy rice was procured by the RECP under the 'monopoly and
compulsory procurement scheme' from its inception in 1974 until
1986.
The voluntary scheme, introduced in 1986-87, was expected to
eliminate a number of malpractice involved in the monopoly scheme.
The malpractices were: mismanagement, corruption, smuggling, and
the low prices offered to the producers [UCG, volume 1, 1989].
Today, government procurement centres still exist but delivery to
and sales are voluntary, and a free market operates for domestic
sales.
The quality of the rice procured by the RECP is tested visually on
the basis of the prescribed sampling procedure. Basic
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specifications tested include ratio of head rice, brokens,
unbilled, damaged, paddy, foreign matter and the mixture of other
varieties. It is alleged that corruption is still widespread in
procurement and RECP officials accept lower quality rice when
bribed or political influence is exerted.
It was confirmed by one study [Hamid, et, al., 1990, p.115] that an
important source of corruption in the rice procurement system
indeed arises at the quality control stage. The authors were told
that if there was competition in exporting, the RECP would be
caught out for its rice would be seen to fetch a lower price. It
would then be forced to take action to improve quality control.
b. Although the RECP procures annually for export, its inventory
control is inefficient. It carries over huge stocks each year. The
ratio of closing stock to annual procurement has ranged from a
minimum of 53X in 1977-78 to a maximum of 79Z in 1984-85 [Ibid,
p.197]. Rice procured is also sometimes stored in open spaces and
exposed to natural hazards including: rain, frost, wind and attacks
from birds, because of insufficient storage facilities.
Obviously pure commercial considerations could never justify the
level of stocks maintained by RECP. Some of the stock kept with the
RECP in the open or for long periods deteriorates, and is not
acceptable for export. This same stock is auctioned in the domestic
market as 'deteriorated material', at low prices. It is widely
believed that there is racketeering in the selection of
'deteriorated' stock whereby some good rice finds its way into the
auction.
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c. The handling of rice at RECP godowns is carried out by agents
appointed by the RECP on one year renewable contracts. All handling
is by manual methods. Workers use a dog-hook (pointed toggle) to
puncture the bag and pull it, taking hold of it with the other
hand. This is not only labour intensive but very harmful, because
the use of hooks for carrying or moving rice sacks results in
substantial spillage.
No other major rice exporting country uses this method [Ibid,
p.221]. All other rice exporters including the USA, Thailand and
India use mechanical methods and a 'no-hook system' to lift, store
and ship bags. The mechanical approach does not require costly
double jute bags used in Pakistan. It was reported that RECP
purchased a complete mechanical handling plant for the movement and
stacking of rice bags some 15 years ago, but it has never been used
for reasons best known to the RECP authorities [Ibid, p.218].
d. The perpetual inventory management system of the RECP is very
weak, in the sense that although a register is kept that shows
receipts, issue and balance of rice and other items, it is not
posted on a daily basis. Furthermore, transactions of previous
months have been found missing. For example, the UCG [Ibid]
concluded that closing stock of rice worth Rs: 3479 million carried
in the RECP's books for many years constituted only a book entry.
It had not been confirmed by physical verification. Rice movements
from RECP godowns to mills or mills to godowns was on the basis of
a goods movement note. However this document was not prepared
carefully. For example it was issued after the completion of the
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Movement of rice; and was not apparently signed by a competent
authority [Ibid, p.210].
e. Many instances were reported of where people with inadequate and
irrelevant experience being appointed to positions of authority in
the RECP management structure. Officials come from the Civil
Service on 'secondment'^ for a short tour of about two to three
years. They have insufficient time to learn about the complexity of
the rice market.
f. The RECP has always lacked a functionally viable management
information system with procedures to collect, plan, analyse and
manage the information needed to perform the operations of market
intelligence gathering. Market intelligence activities are limited
to receiving data from very few sources such as;. Weekly reports of
prices from U.S Embassy in Islamabod, Associated Press of
Pakistan's (APP) news reports about rice situation, and FAO market
reports.
Further, the marketing manager who collects the information reports
only to the General Manager Export-1, who is responsible for the
sale of Irri rice. The other important market, for Basmatii rice, is
totally neglected.
Overall the RECP was found to be ineffective, with widespread






Agricultural Trade Policies and their Reforms.
With few exceptions, almost all countries intervene in their
agricultural markets creating a growing imbalance in world supply
and demand, shifting world trade patterns, and distorting world
agricultural prices.
Protectionist policies as applied by the developed countries,
depress world Market prices and reduce the volume of international
trade. The main losers are the low-cost exporting countries, which
find their foreign exchange earnings and their overall welfare
reduced. However, the high cost countries which protect their
agriculture lose too, since such policies lead to an inefficient
use of their resources, [see chapter 10, section 10.4].
As far as world agricultural trade in the present economic climate
is concerned, it is unlikely that individual developed or
developing nation governments will have the fortitude to
unilaterally reform agriculture support and trade programmes
[Knudsen and Nash, 1990, p.91].
According to Finger and Olechowski [1987, p.58] 'trade restrictions
are disproportionately imposed against the exports of developing
countries and are disproportionately imposed by the developing
countries. They suffer on both accounts - probably more on the
latter than on the former'. Further he says that 'an open
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international trading system is in the interest of each nation and
the major part of the costs of any nation's trade restrictions are
borne by that nation itself'. Finger makes an analogy of 'world and
a country' with a team and a member of the team. In this regard he
says that 'if a member of a team shoots himself in the foot, the
effectiveness of the whole team is reduced. The effectiveness of
the player who shoots himself is reduced considerably more'.
11.2.2 Agricultural Policies in Pakistan.
Returning to Bates' arguments for liberalisation [see chapter III],
state intervention in Pakistan agriculture occurs through direct
intervention in the agriculture sector and implementation of a very
complex set of pricing, subsidy and tax policies. The pattern of
intervention took many different forms: through direct price
intervention, direct subsidies and taxes. The most important types
of direct intervention included: the government's monopoly of
international trade and regulation of domestic sales of
agricultural products. Political appointments and nepotism are also
thought to have had an adverse effect on efficiency. The suppressed
prices, monopoly procurement and rationing system in Pakistan
resulted in a widespread wastage, corruption and smuggling [Haaid,
et, al., 1990, p.115; and see chapter 6].
Overall, intervention in the agriculture sector has distorted
producer prices. The distortion in prices imposed significant
costs on the economy of the country in terms of foregone outputs,
export losses, and foreign exchange losses because of lower
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exports. One study [Hamid at, al., 1990, p.68] found that
'distortions in producer prices because of government intervention,
impose significant costs on the economy in terms of foregone
output. This ranged, on average, from between 5% for wheat and 23%
for Basmatii rice over a 24 year period (1961 to 1987). The
corresponding long term output loss because of intervention ranged
from 12% for wheat to 44% for cotton. Finally, foreign exchange
earning foregone because of lower exports or higher imports of all
crops taken together, are substantial, ranging from 17% for short
run direct to 148% for long run total earnings'.
According to Knudsen and Nash [1990, p.83], in developing countries
the immense funding that has gone to subsidise fertilisers, farm
credits and urban consumers, should have gone to developing
infrastructure and providing education, health and other services
for the poor. Instead it has been largely wasted and unfortunately
is irrecoverable. This need not continue.
It is the author's belief that what is needed in Pakistan, is a
reconsideration of the government's proper role in agriculture and
consequential institutional changes. A solution to the problem
requires withdrawal of the government from agricultural markets.
The only case for intervention in our view, is in activities for
which individuals do not absorb the full costs, that is where there
are significant externalities, for example, research, environmental
effects, food security, absence of a futures market. These issues
will be discussed later.
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11.2.3 Pakistan's Rice Marketing in General.
In chapter III of the study, we examined the arguments for the
liberalisation of agricultural markets as presented by Bates [1981,
1983, 1988] and arguments for government intervention, as put
forward by Smith [1990, 1991]. In our empirical study of Pakistan,
we attempted to examine to what extent their arguments hold up in
the particular case of rice marketing.
First, it should be noted, that rice is not a homogeneous
commodity. In Pakistan, there are two main rice varieties grown -
Irri and Basmatii - with very different qualities, different
markets, and different prices. The Government has partly recognised
this by adopting a dual price policy. However, the price paid to
Basmatii producers is low, about half of the average export price
and would seem to confirm Bates' [1981, 83, 88] arguments for
liberalisation. By contrast, Irri rice is procured by RECP at very
close to the export price, which is near the cost of production.
Since the producer price of Irri rice is close to the export
prices, some minimum government involvement seems to be necessary
to prevent price instability, protect food security and production
instability as argued by Smith [1990, 1991],
The marketing policies for these two different varieties of rice
are discussed in detail below:
(a) Basmati Rice.
Basmati rice is a top quality, high value product because of its
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cooking characteristics. It is exported at premium prices and is
consumed by relatively wealthy people. It is not a subsistence food
crop. For Basmatii rice, the margin between the government
controlled FOB price and the export price is between 50 to 100%,
which produces a handsome return to the RECP and consequently to
government revenues. With a world price which is 50 to 100% higher
than the producer prices, it seems that Pakistan has enormous
comparative advantage in Basmatii rice production. But, because of
government intervention producers and processors do not get their
full reward and therefore lack incentive to expand and improve
production efficiently. The net result is that Pakistan is not
capitalising on its foreign exchange earnings potential.
Though Pakistani Basmatii rice is a relatively expensive quality
product and the market is strong, it is not branded. By contrast,
its Indian competitor, 'Tilda', has gained a good reputation in the
international market because of its superior milling, packaging,
and branding .
Pakistani Basmatii rice could be developed as a branded product with
a special image comparable to those of 'Uncle Ben's' rice and
Indian 'Tilda' rice. However, at the present time, there is no
investment in market intelligence and export promotion measures.
Along with many RECP deficiencies summarised in the main findings,
RECP is not in a position to export all rice procured for export.
It sells on the basis of what is available. The RECP does no market
research to find out what the true demand is in the market place,
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so it has little idea of whether it satisfies consumers. By
contrast, the latest development of rice in the U.S.A and other
countries is driven by an assessment of consumer demand, for
example, for ready made foods and microwaveable products such as
par-boiled rice and rice mixed with vegetables.
Overall, the export of Pakistani Basmatii rice has shown sluggish
performance [UCG, vol-1, 1989]. However, the potential of Basmatii
rice is still considerable. Demand in buoyant in Middle Eastern
countries and, in the West where the demand for authentic rice
dishes such as Asian 'Pulao', 'Curry', 'Biryani', is increasing via
the influence of 'Indian' restaurants. More investment needs to be
made in promoting the export of Pakistani rice. In this regard
there is an urgent need to develop alternative market outlets.
Existing exporters of rice need to be informed of consumer demands
and requirements, of how to enter export markets, and the rules and
regulations they must follow in order to export from Pakistan. The
government needs to increase participation in international food
fairs and exhibitions as part of a systematic strategy designed to
extend the market and brand name of Pakistani Basmatii rice.
(b) Irri Rice.
Irri rice is a low quality rice sold and exported at low prices. It
is a staple food for the significant domestic population mainly in
the lower income group. It is exported to relatively poor
developing countries, principally in Africa. About 60 percent of
Irri rice is consumed domestically. Prices paid to producers are
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very close to export prices, which is near the cost of production.
The international market for Irri rice has become increasingly weak
n
and subsidies have been required in most years since 1982-83 . It
seeas that, given the poor prospects for Irri rice exports,
Pakistan can only retain its present share of rice exports if it
concentrates on exporting better rice varieties.
The Pakistan Government has introduced new and better rice
varieties such as 'KS-282' and 'DR-83', but has not actively
encouraged producers to cultivate them. This is mainly because of
lack of coordination between the Pakistan Agriculture Research
Council (Ministry of Food and Agriculture) and the Ministry of
o
Commerce .
The new varieties reportedly fetch a premium over Irri rice because
of their high protein content and higher yield than Irri; at 50
percent head rice, they possess better milling quality and a 50
percent higher protein content. Given existing land constraints,
they are also suited to saline - sodic soils [Commission Report,
1988, p.138].
The support price of Irri rice cannot be reduced below the current
level because the present price paid is so close to the real cost
of production. As Irri rice feeds a majority of low income groups
it is very difficult for the government to stop its production
suddenly by withdrawing the support price. Some form of support
price for Irri rice is necessary until new varieties can be
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introduced. To engineer this change requires government
intervention. Nevertheless, there is also plenty of room for
improvement in the existing rice marketing system, especially in
procurement, processing, inspection and export policies. In this
regard the government has a key role to play in controlling
existing irregularities and improving quality assurance.
In view of the very small profit margins available on Irri rice
production at world market prices, the right strategy for Irri rice
in our view is to concentrate resources on increasing yield which
is amongst the lowest in the developed world [FAO, Production Year
Books for different years; UCG, volume 1, 1989, p. 60] and to
actively promote the adoption of high quality rice varieties.
The question also arises as to why farmers should not switch from
Irri rice to other crops such as sugar-cane or cotton. This topic
is beyond the scope of this study, and is an area which requires
further research. Clearly alternatives need to be seriously
considered taking into account the suitability of soil, climate and
infrastructural development. It is by no means obvious that
Pakistan should continue to support the production of an exportable
surplus of Irri rice amounting to 40 percent of national
production.
11.2.3.1 The Rice Export Corporation of Pakistan (RECP).
From our review of the problems of the RECP, it seems resources are
being misused on a substantial scale. In this regard there is an
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urgent need to develop efficient Market outlets to procure,
process, and export rice. This obviously raises the question of
whether the RECP perfori a useful function. A complete divestment
or liquidation of the agency is not possible at this time because,
firstly, the agency acts as buyer of last resort at a pre-stated
minimum price. Secondly, the future role of the private sector is
uncertain. At best, the government of Pakistan needs to develop an
active competition policy with regard to trade in agriculture
produce otherwise there is a real risk of simply converting a
public monopoly into a private one.
In conjunction with this move, the operation of the RECP require
urgent improvement along the following lines:
i. Major malpractices occur in procurement, because there is no
reliable laboratory for carrying out quality inspection at
procurement centres. Quality is presently tested visually on the
basis of a prescribed sampling procedure. In this regard,
laboratories should be established to assess quality and avoid
malpractice in procurement.
ii. It is recommended that the RECP should procure only exportable
quality rice so that it will not be necessary to mill it again.
Furthermore, the procured rice should not be mixed with inferior
quality rice at godowns.
iii. Currently, handling of rice by the RECP is done manually, this
sort of handling means higher losses and wastage. It is recommended
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that mechanical handling be introduced. These already exist for the
movement and stacking of rice bags, but are not used.
iv. RECP is given Multiple and sometimes conflicting objectives by
the Ministry of Commerce — commercial and social — yet it is a
nominally independent administrator. The RECP was originally set up
to export rice from Pakistan. In practice, it also acts as the
government agency for implementing the official price support
scheme for rice crops.
The RECP is required to undertake rice procurement operations on
the basis of targets fixed by the Ministry of Commerce. These
targets are based on expected export requirements, expected
production and carry over stocks [UCG, volume 1, 1989].
In our view, the RECP should be given clearer objectives. The
Commercial functions of RECP should be separated from social policy
objectives such as support price administration and buyer of last
resort. It should also be given independent decision making
authority. Separate fund should be created for social objectives, a
point we will discuss in section 11.4.iv.
11.2.3.2. Activities in which government intervention is justified.
In the Pakistan rice production and marketing system, there are
some activities which may still require a government role. For
example, support prices for Irri rice and food security, monitoring
mechanisms on foreign exchange transactions, tax revenue
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collection, supply of credit to producers and millers, quality
assurance, and the collection and dissemination of market
information. This section briefly discusses these activities.
a). Implementation of a Support Price for Irri rice.
As far as the support price for Irri rice and food security are
concerned, there is already an agency in existence called the
'Pakistan Agriculture Storage Corporation' [PASSCO] which started
operating in 1974. This agency procures, if required, agricultural
commodities such as wheat, paddy, pulses and potatoes, on behalf of
the government in order to stabilise prices.
b). Monitoring Foreign Exchange.
Foreign exchange earning is a very important objective of every
developing country in order to meet balance of payments and loan
payment requirements. Therefore most countries monitor trade and
foreign exchange earnings with other countries so as to monitor
flow. In Pakistan there exist two main ways of foreign exchange
monitoring; firstly, every contract for rice export is registered
with the 'Export Promotion Bureau'; secondly, the 'State Bank of
Pakistan' receives a letter of credit from the importers. In this
way the government is able to determine whether there is a net
inflow of foreign exchange.
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c). Generating Revenue.
Since the revenue imperative will continue to be a legitimate
policy concern of government, other policy instruments in addition
to the existing direct land tax, could also be used to generate
revenues for financing development expenditure. This should exclude
measures that indirectly tax agriculture may include: direct
taxation on earned incomes and property taxes may be raised
substantially. The overall objective should be to ensure tax
neutrality between agriculture and other sectors of the Pakistan
economy.
d). Quality Assurance.
Quality assurance is important to strengthen the market for any
product. The Government should therefore ensure that quality
standards are adhered to by all exporters. The quality inspection
function could be entrusted to an independent agency. One such
agency might be the 'Department of Agriculture, Livestock,
Marketing and Grading', which already exists and works under the
'Ministry of Food Agriculture and Co-operatives'. This Department
already has responsibility for grading many agricultural exports.
e). Credit.
Among other problems facing rice production in Pakistan, are:
outdated mills, and instability in the world rice market. In order
to facilitate the upgrading of rice mills and to smooth price
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fluctuations, credit facilities should be provided to producers and
■illers at market rates against the pledge of produce.
f). Market information and Research.
The importance of exports for a developing country like Pakistan
needs no overemphasis. The country is facing stiff and increasing
competition. Pakistan's rice exports have declined both in terms of
their share of Pakistan's total exports as well as in terms of
their share in total world rice trade. At the same time, countries
such as Thailand and U.S.A have increased their share of the world
market.
In order to compete in the world market and to expand exports,
research and market studies are essential to identify consumers'
needs and preferences. This would help to identify the product
attributes that consumers like most - for example, packaging and
milling quality. Therefore, successful rice marketing in Pakistan
requires adequate, accurate and timely information about the
international rice trade, and the demand and supply situation. This
function could be shared between the existing 'Export Promotion
Bureau' and the private sector.
11.2.3.3 Concluding, the author believes that the trend towards
liberalisation and privatisation is relevant to the agriculture
production and marketing processes of countries such as Pakistan.
Our recommendation that Basmati rice marketing should be
liberalised notwithstanding, there is still a need for minimal
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state intervention in some activities.
The population expects the government to provide or ensure food
security for the mass of the population. Therefore, it is expedient
for the government to provide a support price for Irri rice - the
staple food for the masses. Of course, in general, the state needs
to collect taxes for running the administration and there is no
particular reason why agriculture should be exempt. Above all, in a
world still dogged by agricultural market instability and
protectionism, the facilitating role of the Pakistan Government
cannot be denied or avoided. Therefore, only partial support is
given to the need for liberalisation.
Liberalisation is needed for Basmatii rice marketing but some
minimum government involvement is needed for Irri rice. If the rice
market, especially for Basmatii rice, is liberalised, efficiency can
be improved to a great extent by getting rid of substantial
physical constraints and wasteful methods through improved
incentives and competition. Delivering political favours to friends
and relatives would also be removed.
There is fierce competition from India and Thailand, and day by
day, Pakistan's rice export market is being eroded. The greater
portion of Pakistani Basmatii rice is exported to the Middle East.
Such a high degree of concentration of export outlets does not
auger well for the future, because there are signs of penetration
by other competitors. In an increasingly competitive global market,
the RECP must search for new markets and monitor consumer needs.
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It Bust become proactive or withdraw and leave rice marketing to
private interests. Under correct conditions and the appropriate
policy environment a role for the private sector is now essential.
11.3 Lessons for LDCs from Pakistan's Rice Marketing experience.
Liberalisation tries to make the market and marketing process
respond to price signals. Encouragement and involvement of the
private sector is based on private players' profit motives and
incentives, which call for both effectiveness and efficiency of
operations, as well as responsibility and accountability for
actions taken.
The following are the general lessons for LDCs from Pakistan's rice
marketing experience.
It is not feasible to liberalise all activities in the agricultural
sector. The literature points to severe limitations on the
possibilities of liberalising agricultural markets. These
limitations are: food security, price instability, and production
instability — the latter two largely as a result of climate
variation, protectionism and distortions in the world agricultural
market by Japan, EC, and the USA.
In view of the above factors, it seems that there is a strict limit
to what the typical LDC national government can do in terms of
creating price signals which reflect market conditions because the
world market is distorted. In addition, it also has social welfare
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obligations to its less advantaged majority who may starve in times
of food crisis if food security is ignored.
However, it does not mean that the state has to control everything
in the agriculture sector. The state should only involve itself in
areas that are not amenable to market solution, like food security,
stock-piling for famine, infrastructural development and
environmental protection.
The evidence from Pakistan's rice marketing demonstrates the
devastating consequences of having an inefficient and corrupt
state-run bureaucracy. In particular, it leads to poor quality
assurance, corruption in procurement, large wastage, and lack of
commitment in promoting the product.
Our study demonstrates that in the case of Irri rice in Pakistan,
there are serious and real constraints on government attempts to
liberalise marketing because of the food security issue involved
and world market distortions produced by the actions of developed
countries. The state therefore needs to continue to play a role in
Irri rice marketing. This is because Irri rice is the staple food
for the majority of the population who earn very low incomes.
Prices offered to producers are close to the export prices, though
they are paid on the basis of the cost of production. In view of
the food security problem, government involvement in the shape of
offering a support price to producers is necessary.
In contrast to Irri rice, Basmatii is a top quality, high value-
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added export product, consumed by rich people and utilised as a
luxury food. For Basmatii rice, there is fortunately a high profit
margin, which produces a handsome return, and Pakistan has a
substantial comparative advantage in its production. However, this
is being eroded by competitor nations' efficiency improvements
through investment. As a result of government intervention and
other policies, Pakistan is not reaping the full benefits of its
Basmatii rice export potential. In our opinion, this situation and
the substantial wastage by state agencies, requires that marketing
of Basmatii rice could, and should be liberalised without further
delay.
11.4 Main Suggestions and Recommendations.
Addressing our original problem as contained in chapter one, we are
unable to fully support the argument for liberalisation. This is
because it has been found necessary to differentiate policies
according to type of rice and market. We recommend partial
intervention in Irri rice and for full liberalisation in Basmatii
rice. In order to improve rice marketing, further recommendations
include:
i. The first and most important question is that of political
patronage. Policy makers, notably the political elite, need to
address the negative aspects of political clientelism especially
corruption, as well as seek to influence public attitudes towards
government, the State and public office and resources. No
institutional reforms are likely to lead to a significant
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improvement without people's attitudes first changing towards the
public good. A change in the structure of incentives is most likely
to make the necessary shift.
ii. Appropriate prices and institutional policy reforms that
ultimately remove the tax burden on small farm holders and improve
allocative efficiencies are called for. The marketing of Basmati
rice should be free of restrictions. However, the provision of
support price policies and efficient procurement arrangements on a
voluntary basis is necessary for Irri rice because of food
security.
iii. At the moment Pakistan produces two main rice varieties,
Basmatii and Irri. The prospects for Irri rice exports are not very
promising because of its low quality. The international market for
Irri rice is very weak and subsidies have been required in recent
years. In this regard it is recommended to actively promote high
quality rice, keeping in view mainly the soil and climatic
conditions in Pakistan.
iv. To support the price of Irri rice, a price stabilisation fund
could be established, and all surpluses from support operations
could be credited to it, while deficits may be charged to it. The
fund should have an individual crop account so that, as far as
possible, surpluses derived from the crop may be used to support
its price when the international price declines. Thus a portion of
the amount realised from the profits of crop export should be
credited to the fund. This fund could be controlled by the Ministry
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of CoMerce.
v. The Government should withdraw all input subsidies and indirect
taxes and also ensure that there are efficient and effective
methods for the collection and utilisation of the direct taxes. To
avoid corruption while collecting taxes, the existing land tax
collection system by government officials - for example 'Tapedars^'
who collect the tax personally - should be replaced by a system
whereby payment is made directly into banks, and to the government
treasury.
vi. The present predominant role of RECP as the major market outlet
for rice should be minimised over time through effective
liberalisation and encouragement of rice marketing by the private
sector.
11.5 Areas for Further Research.
In the light of the problems and findings in the previous sections,
and the urgent need to improve upon and find answers to Pakistan's
complex agricultural and rice marketing problems, further research
is necessary in order to provide operationally relevant advice on
agriculture especially rice marketing policy.
(i) One recommendation from this thesis is a comprehensive study of
the rural political process in Pakistan, so that the rural people
may not be deprived of their economic rights. Political and
economic systems of any country especially of the developing
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countries run together. If the political system of a country is
democratic and transparent, there is a greater likelihood that its
economy could be sound. Hence, research needs to be undertaken on
how improved rural institutions can be organised in Pakistan in
order to improve the depth of democracy in the country.
(ii) Recently, the European Community Ministers announced
liberalisation steps in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The
Ministers agreed to move away from spending £23 billion a year on
fixing the community's food prices, paying instead for more direct
financial assistance for farmers. This promised deal matters not
just for the EC's consumers and taxpayers, who have to pay the cost
of the CAP's distorted prices and subsidies but for people every
where. A second recommendation for future research should concern
the effects on rice producers and consumers in Pakistan, of the
recent liberalisation steps taken by the EC12, with regard to
agricultural policies. Another useful line of enquiry would concern
the impact of global agricultural liberalisation on rice producers
and consumers, and on Pakistan agricultural producers in
particular.
(iii) Future research is recommended in order to discover, how the
Irri rice crop could be switched over to other high quality rice or
other crops, for the benefit of producers.
(iv) Several other important areas also need to be explored
concerning Pakistani rice production and trade. The first is that
although irrigation in Pakistan is the backbone of agriculture, it
321
is alleged and widely believed that the expenses incurred on it are
misused; that there is widespread corruption. In this regard it
needs further study on how the existing irrigation system in
Pakistan can be improved and expenditures controlled.
(v) Existing rice mills in Pakistan are mostly outdated resulting
in a damage to the quality of rice processed, and loss of export
value. In this regard, a further study to discover how the existing
milling capacity can be improved, or how the existing mills can be
replaced by modern ones would be well worth Pakistan's development
efforts.
(v) The other area to be researched is that of rice milling by¬
products especially husk and bran in Pakistan which are mostly
misused and very little attention paid to them. A study to explore
their potential use is needed.
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Footnotes.
^Japan International Cooperative Agency [JICA, 1986, p.III-17] concluded that there
are types of rice mills in Pakistan Hullers, Shellers, and Modern Mills. On average
52* of the total rice is processed by Hullers, 43* by Shellers, and only 05* by
modern mills. Though Shellers are old mills, Hullers (about 1500 in total number)
which process a significant portion of total rice are extremely inefficient, giving
total milling recovery of 60* only. The rice is milled unevenly and the percentage
of broken grain is about 35* of the total.
2
I was reliably informed during field work interviews in Pakistan that recently a
team of Italian Engineers came for the maintenance of RECP rice mills. The mills
purchased from Italy about 20 to 30 years ago are believed to be modern. But the
team members were of the opinion that the existing EECP mills are old and outdated,
[Interviews with the RECP officials of Pipri plants at Karachi].
3
At present, 80 to 90* of Pakistan's edible oil requirements are imported.
4
National Logistic Cell (NIC) is government owned road transport. It is one of the
main source of road transport, engaged in nation wide transportation of commodities.
The NLC trucks are assigned by its headquarters at Cujranwala in Punjab and Khairpur
in Sindh.
5
In Pakistan, persons from the Civil Service are frequently appointed on the
secondment basis in any department or organisation.
^This information was given by the rice dealers, while conducting some informal
interviews with them in Edinburgh.
7
RECP earned profits on Irri Rice export up to 1982-83 but has incurred losses on
its exports since 1982-83 mainly because of the low world prices; international
competition; and corruption in RECP.
g
Interview with an officials (Rice Coordinator) at Pakistan Agricultural Research
Council, Islamabod, during field work in Pakistani.
9
'Tapedars' are the lowest grade officers in the Revenue Department of Pakistan.
Their responsibility it is to collect Land Taxes personally from land owners at
cultivated land. They are authorised to declare any piece of land as uncultivated so
it is alleged that even if the land is cultivated, they declare some as uncultivated





Information required from Pakistan to attempt the evaluation of
Pakistan Rice Marketing.
Area of Study.
i. - Full account of Rice Marketing in Pakistan (from producer to
consumer/shipment.)
ii. - Determination of prices:
- Who fix the prices?
- How prices are fixed?
- Procurement/Open domestic prices,
- FOB prices,
- World prices,
- Subsidies for producer & consumers.
iii.— What is the direction of change?
- Is there any shifting of benefit from rural to urban
areas?
- Who is benefiting? producers, consumers, Government or
the private sector?
iv. - Is there proper participation of the private sector in Rice
Marketing? If no, then:
- to look at the reasons for the blockage of
privatisation.
v. - Is privatisation a solution in Rice Marketing?
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Offices visited in Pakistan with regard to Data Collection.
1. Ministry of Commerce and Trade.
2. Ministry of Food and Agriculture.
3. Ministry of Finance.
4. Export Promotion Bureau.
5. Rice Export Corporation of Pakistan.
6. Private Exporters (about 10) in Karachi and Lahore.
7. State Bank of Pakistan.
8. Agriculture Development Bank of Pakistan.
9. Other Scheduled Banks in Pakistan.
10. Rice Board.
11. PASSCO.
12. Department of .Food and Agriculture.
13. Millers and Agents (about 30).
14. Revenue Department.
15. Pakistan Agriculture Research Council.
16. Chief Controller of Export and Import.
17. Sindh Agriculture University Tando Jam.
18. S.A.Latif University, Khairpur, Sindh.
19. Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad.
20. Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.
21. Applied Economics Research Centre, Karachi.
22. Chamber of Commerce and Trade Lahore.
23. United Consulting Group (UCG) Private Ltd; Lahore.
24. Agriculture Price Commission (APCOM) Islamabod.
25. Rice Commissioner Islamabod.
26. Economic Analysis Network (EAN) Project Islamabod.
27. World Bank office in Islamabod.
28. FAO office in Islamabod.
29. USAID offices in Pakistan.
30. Asian Development Bank office in Pakistan.
-li-
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Semi-structured Questionnaire used for Data Collection.
1. The agricultural policies of Pakistan's Government in
connection with the production and export of rice, for example:
taxes and/or subsidies imposed on:
- Producers
- Consumers
2. How is the present Rice Marketing system working in Pakistan?
-Organisational Structure of rice marketing,
-Objectives of the present Rice Marketing system, for
example:
- to promote the rice production,
- to promote the rice milling,
- to facilitate the consumers (subsidies) etc
3. Who fixes the prices at producer and milling level and how?





5. What is the cash-flow in relation to rice flow?
How crop production is financed?
- subsidies and loans to the farmers,
- terms and conditions of loans,
- subsidies to millers in terms of loans,
- terms and conditions of loan.
- subsidies for the consumers if any
6. Rice Stock by varieties in Pakistan:
- Quantity to be stocked for local emergency ?
- Storage capacity ?
- Storage charges ?
- For how long the rice is stocked ?
—i i i—
326
7. Policy of stock turn over in local market:
- How is the rice stock distributed to the consumers?
- Are the stock expenses charged to the consumers?
8. Is there any control on the maintenance of rice quality in
country? If yes:
What is the Rice grading procedure for domestic use and
for export?
9. Number of Rice Exporting Agencies in public and private sector:
- Number of National agencies?
- Number of multinational agencies?
- Their organisational structure?
10. What are the objectives of public sector exports?
- to earn profits,
- to earn foreign exchange,
- to provide subsidies to producers and consumers,
- stabilisation of prices etc.
11. Are there equal opportunities for public and private traders in
terms of the following:
- money, (loan facilities etc;)
- machines (importing machines)
- import/export tax, licenses,
- information for Exporting,
- shipping cost/facilities etc,
12. What are the criteria for the export licenses for the private
exporters?
13. Can the private sector in Pakistan be more efficient than
the public sector, specially in the exporting of rice?




15. What are the contacts of exporting agencies in terms of rice
exporting ?
- Government to Government?
- Government to Private sector?
- Private to Private sector?
- Private to Government?
16. What are the methods of exporting rice from Pakistan? For
example tenders etc.
17. Where does the profit of RECP go to? In RECP's own account or
to the Government Treasury?
18. Do the earnings of private traders from rice exports come to
Pakistan?
19. Is there any incentive for RECP to promote exports?




- proper places etc.




22.What criteria ought to be used for measuring the performance of:
- RECP and Private Traders.
23. Is there any food security in the country at the time of food
shortages?
24. Is rice being smuggled from Pakistan? if yes, where from and




Exchange Rate Mechanism in Pakistan.a.
The official exchange rate as mentioned in the column 2 (EO) of
table 6-A, was constant (fixed by the government of Pakistan) until
1971-72 and then fell sharply as a result of the devaluation of
1972. It then remained unchanged until January 1982 when Pakistan
de-linked its currency from the U.S dollar and pegged it to a
basket of currencies of trading partners. This allowed the exchange
rate to fluctuate against the dollar. The result has been a gradual
devaluation of the rupee in terms of the U.S dollar.
Another exchange rate is the purchasing power parity exchange rate
(PPP) as mentioned in the column 2 of the same table. To calculate
it, is assumed that in 1972-73, when Pakistan had a small surplus
on the trade balance, the official exchange rate was correct. For
the all other years the PPP is obtained by adjusting the 1972-73
exchange for the difference in the rates of inflation in Pakistan
and its major trading partners. For the former (inflation), the
consumer price index in Pakistan and for the latter (trading
partners) the U.S.A whole sale price index has been used. According
to this exchange rate, the Rupee should have fallen against the
dollar gradually and consistently since 1961 and in 1987 it should
have been less than half of its value in 1961.
A comparison of the official exchange rate (EO) and the purchasing
power parity exchange rate (PPP) gives a measure of the over¬
valuation of the rupee during this period (column-4 of table-6.A).
It shows that in the FY 1961, rupee was overvalued by 46% and this
increased to 55% by FY 1972, when the over-valuation was eliminated
by the devaluation.
As the rupee was revalued the next year and inflation in Pakistan
was much higher than in the U.S.A, the over-valuation re-emerged
and it continued to increase till the de-linking of the rupee in FY
1982. Since then the rupee has been steadily devalued in real terms
and as a result the over-valuation has declined, it was less than
10% in the FY 1987.
A similar story can be told in terms of "equilibrium" exchange rate
(column 3) which is the exchange rate that would have prevailed in
the absence of government intervention, i.e, under a neutral trade
policy. Trade policy here includes all elements of the commercial
policy such as import controls, tariffs and quotas, export quotas,
export taxes or subsidies and price controls.




Years EO1 EPP2 E*3 (E0/PPP)-1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1960-61 4.7620 8 . 746 7 .45 - 0.4555
1961-62 4 . 7620 8 . 759 7 .55 - 0.4563
1962-63 4.7620 8 . 679 7 . 64 - 0.4513
1963-64 4.7620 9 .013 7 . 72 - 0.4716
1964-65 4.7620 9 . 414 7.82 - 0.4941
1965-66 4.7620 9. 507 7 . 78 - 0.4991
1966-67 4 . 7620 10.051 7 . 73 - 0.5262
1967-86 4.7620 10.135 7.67 - 0.5301
1968-69 4.7620 10.023 7 . 76 - 0.5249
1969-70 4 . 7620 10.161 7.87 - 0.5313
1970-71 4 . 7620 10.426 7 . 52 - 0.5434
1971-72 4 . 7620 10.508 8.65 - 0.5468
1972-73 10.5880 10.588 10.31 - 0.0000
1973-74 9.9000 11.851 12 . 80 - 0.1646
1974-75 9.9000 13.214 13.53 - 0.2508
1975-76 9.9000 13.811 13.98 - 0.2832
1976-77 9.9000 14 . 649 13.67 - 0.3242
1977-78 9.9000 14.757 13 . 77 - 0.3291
1978-79 9.9000 14.269 13.36 - 0.3062
1979-80 9.9000 13.940 13.17 - 0.2898
1980-81 9.9000 14.063 13.46 - 0.2960
1981-82 10.5500 14.680 14 .41 - 0.2813
1982-83 12.7500 15.091 16.02 - 0.1551
1983-84 13.4800 16.059 17 . 96 - 0.1606
1984-85 15.1600 17.092 19 . 20 - 0.1130
1985-86 16.1300 18.227 20 . 28 - 0.1150
1986-87 17.1700 18.965 20 .91 - 0.0947
Source: Hamid, et, al., [1990] 'Trade Exchange Rate, & Agricultural Pricing
Policies in Pakistan', World Bank.
Notes:
1. EO = Nominal actual exchange rate (official exchange rate).
2. PPP = Nominal Purchasing Power Parity exchange rate =
Where WPIF=Wholesale price index in the U.S.A
CPIp=consumer price index in Pakistan.




Main features of the Government's agricultural policy in Pakistan.
The main features of the government agriculture policies during the
period up to the mid 1960s and with some of them still in operation
today were as follows (Commission report, 1988):
(a). Government fixed retail consumer prices of food grains at low
levels which had the effect of depressing market prices.
(b). Heavy export duties were levied on different agricultural
products which had the effect of reducing domestic prices of cotton
for the benefit of local industry.
(c). Monopoly procurement of wheat and rice was restored at fixed
prices which were deliberately kept low in order to minimise
subsidies to consumers.
(d). Inter -district and inter-province restrictions of movement
were imposed with the result that producer prices were depressed in
the surplus producing areas.
(e). Prices of vegetable ghee (oil) were controlled at an
artificially low level which had a depressing effect on producer
prices of cotton and oil seeds like mustard.
(f). Proceeds from the agricultural exports were converted at an
overvalued fixed exchange rate. The implicit exchange tax on
agricultural exports from 1960 to 1971 averaged 98%. In contrast,
the industrial sector benefited from the overvalued exchange rate
which reduced the domestic cost of imported machinery and other
inputs. When it came to the industrial exports, the exchange losses
to them were offset by the bonuses and subsidies.
(g). For nearly a decade after independence no systematic attempt
for the development of agriculture was made. The first agricultural
development programme in the country was launched in 1955.
(h). Barter deals were a common feature of Pakistan's international
trade in which agricultural produce was exchanged for industrial
machinery and inputs to the disadvantage of the agricultural
producers.
(i). Government freely accepted the agricultural commodity imports
at concessional prices which, when converted at the overvalued
exchange rate, resulted in a depressing of the domestic prices. The
adverse effect of the imported commodities was further intensified
by budgeted subsidies given by the government on their local sale
prices.
As a consequence of the above policies, agriculture's terms of
trade vis-a-vis consumer goods and agricultural inputs constantly
deteriorated which resulted in a massive transfer of resources out
of agriculture to the industries and to the urban consumers.
The assumptions implicit in these policies were that farmers would
continue to produce at their best irrespective of prices received
by them; and the predominantly agricultural economy of Pakistan
could be transferred into an industrial economy, without first
-i-
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developing" agriculture, primarily with foreign assistance. The
process of industrialisation, with transfer of resources from
agriculture and with foreign assistance thus weakened the
agricultural base of the economy. The mounting shortage of food and
other products and the accompanying balance of payments problems
forced a reconsideration of the government policies in favour of
agriculture. The shift of policies coincided with the availability
of high yielding varieties of wheat and rice in the late 1960s.
Gradually it was recognised that agriculture had to be developed to
sustain the industrial development and for this purpose investment
in new technological improvements and current inputs were
essential.
The implementation of this new policy in favour of agriculture was,
of necessity, very gradual. Initially the Government sought to
achieve its objectives by subsidising inputs rather than by raising
output prices. Obviously the early beneficiaries of this policy
were the large producers who were the major users of the subsidised
inputs rather than the small and the medium producers who did not
take to the use of modern inputs partly due to the lack of
financial ability to purchase the inputs and also reluctance in the
absence of price incentives, to take the risks perceived to be
associated with new technology. The relative low output prices,
subsidised inputs notwithstanding, sent distorted signals to
agricultural producers as they had little incentive to produce
marketable surpluses. Full benefits of the subsidised inputs could
have been realised only if the output prices were also maintained
at a remunerative levels. A rudimentary system of support prices
was introduced for wheat in the late 1960s while rice was subject
to monopoly procurement.
In 1981, there was the establishment of Agricultural Price
Commission (APCOM), whose responsibility it is to research the cost
issues and propose the support prices to the cabinet for approval.
The following agencies are responsible for the implementation of
the support price programme for different crops;
Agency. Product.
- PASSCO and Provincial Food Department. - Wheat.
- Cotton Export Corporation (CEC). - Seed Cotton and Cotton lint,
- Rice Export Corporation of Pakistan. - Paddy and Cleaned Rice.
- Agricultural Marketing and Storage ltd; - Potatoes and Onions.
- Ghee Corporation of Pakistan. - Non-traditional oil seeds
(Sunflower & Soybeans
- PASSCO. - Gram.
- Sugar Mills. - Sugar-cane.
These agencies intervene in the markets on behalf of the government
by establishing a network of procurement centres during the
harvesting periods of the respective crops assigned to them. This
assigned task is to purchase any quality of the commodity concerned
offered for sale by producers. Normally, the support fixed by the
government is paid but in exceptional cases the Government may





A survey in connection with the distribution/milling system of rice
in U.K, especially importation and trading from Pakistan.
Note: Please fill in the following and mark ( ^ ) where
applicable.
1. Name of the Company.
2. Do you import rice? Yes No
3. If yes, which rice varieties? If no, go to question no-23.
i. ii. iii. iv. .
4. Do you import rice from Pakistan? Yes No .
If yes go to question no-5, if no, go to question no-17.
5. How much quantity on average per annum do you import?
tonne/s kgs lbs.
6. How long have you been involved in importing rice from
Pakistan?
7. How are the prices of the imported rice are determined?
a. By negotiation with the Government exporting agency? ( )
b. Negotiation with the private parties? ( )
c. By Government exporting agency tenders? ( )
d. By private tenders? ( )
e. Others, please specify.
8. Which of the following method, is applied in importing rice
from Pakistan?
a. Government contract .
b. RECP (Rice Export Corporation of Pakistan) contacts .
c. RECP tenders .
d. Private contacts .
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9. Which of the following problems do you face in importing rice?
a. Pakistan Government regulations/formalities?
Yes No .
If yes, please specify .
b. U.K Government regulations/formalities? Yes No •
If yes, please give example .
c. Quality problems? Yes No .
d. Package problems? Yes No .
If yes give example .
e. Others, please specify .
10. Do you pay levy/taxes in U.K, on importing Pakistani rice?
Yes No .
If yes go to question no-11, if no go to question no-12.
11. How much tax do you pay per tonne on the following:
£ per tonne on paddy.
£ per tonne on rice.
£ per tonne on broken rice.
12. Do you re-process the Pakistani imported rice?
Yes No .
13. Which of the following applies to you in terms of rice
packaging?
a. We sell rice in the original packages and brand as
imported .
b. We re-pack the rice using smaller packages with our own
brand name .
c. We supply in both ways .
14. Do you also export the Pakistani imported rice?
Yes No .
15. If yes, please specify country/s.
i. ii. iii. iv.
16. What quantity of the Pakistani imported rice on average
do you export annually?
-ii-
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17. We do not sell/supply Pakistani Basmati rice because:
a. there is no demand for such rice .
b. we do not have an access to supply .
c. it is expensive .
d. lack of small packages available .
e. quality problem .
f. others, please specify .
18. Do you import rice from other than Pakistan?
Yes No .
If yes, please specify country/s, i. ii. iii.
if no go to question no-23.
19. What quantity is imported?
a. (country) tonne/s kg's lbs.
b. (country) tonne/s kgs lbs.
c. (country) tonne/s kgs lbs.
d. (country) tonne/s kgs lbs.
e. (country) tonne/s kgs lbs.
20. Do you re-process this imported rice? Yes No
21. Which of the following applies to you in terms of rice
packaging?
a. we sell rice in original packages & brand names as
imported .
b. we re-pack the rice using smaller packages with our own
brand name .
c. we supply in both ways.
22. Do you pay tax on the imported rice? Yes No
If yes, how much per tonne on the following?
£ per tonne on paddy.
£ per tonne on rice.
£ per tonne on broken rice.
23. We do not import rice from any country directly but buy from
the local wholesalers, Yes No .
— i i i—
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24. From the following', who are your major buyers?
a. wholesalers .
b. retailers .
c. final consumers .
d. others, please specify .
25. From the following to whom do you mostly sell?
a. Asian dealers/grocers .
b. English dealers/grocers .
c. Chain stores .
d. All .
e. others, please specify .
26. Which of the following applies to you in terms of rice
packaging?
a. we sell rice in original packages and brand as purchased
b. we re-pack the rice using smaller packages with our own
brand name .
c. we supply in both ways .
d. we reprocess them .
Note: After filling this questionnaire, please send it back on the
following address:
Amanat A. Jalbani








A survey in connection with the distribution system of rice in U.K,
especially importation and trading from Pakistan.
Note: Please fill in the following and mark ( ) where
applicable.
1. Name of the Company or Departmental/Chain store .
2. Total number in U.K. .
3. Do you sell rice? Yes No .
4. If yes, mention rice varieties, if no, go to question no-23.
i. ii . iii. iv.
5. Do you sell Pakistani rice? Yes No .
If yes, go to question no-7, if no, go to question no-13.
6. Do you import directly from Pakistan? Yes No .
7. Which of the following problems do you face in importing rice?
a. Pakistan Government regulation/formalities? Yes No .
b. U.K Government regulations/formalities? Yes No .
c. quality problems? Yes No .
d. packaging problems? Yes No .
If yes, give examples .
e. other, please specify .
8. How the prices of imported rice are determined?




e. other method, please specify .
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9. Which of the following applies to you in terms of rice
packaging?
a. we sell Pakistani rice in original packages and brand in
which imported .
b. we re-pack the rice using smaller packages with our own
brand .
c. we supply in both ways .
10. Do you pay tax on the imported rice? Yes No .
If yes, how much per tonne on average on the following:
a. paddy £ per tonne,
b. rice £ per tonne,
c. broken £ per tonne.
11. On average what quantity of rice (Pakistani) do you sell
in a year?
a. Basmatii rice tonne/s lbs kgs.
b. Irri rice tonne/s lbs kgs.
c. broken rice tonne/s lbs kgs.
12. We do not sell/supply Pakistani Basmatii/other rice because:
a. there is no demand for such rice .
b. we do not have an access to supply .
c. it is expensive .
d. lack of small packages available .
e. quality problem .
f. others, please specify .
13. Do you import rice from other than Pakistan? Yes No
If yes please specify country/s, if no go to question no-19.
i. ii. iii. iv.
14. How much quantity of rice is imported from each country?
.i. tonnes from—
ii. tonnes from-iii. tonnes from-iv. tonnes from- (country).- (country).• (country).- (country).
15. Do you reprocess/re-mill the imported rice? Yes- No-
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16. How the prices of the imported rice are determined?
a. By negotiation with the Government exporting agency? ( )
b. Negotiation with the private parties? ( )
c. By Government exporting agency tenders? ( )
d. By private tenders? ( )
e. Others, please specify.
17. Which of the following applies to you in terms of rice
packaging?
a. We sell rice in the original packages and brand as
imported .
b. We re-pack the rice using smaller packages with our own
brand name .
c. We supply in both ways .
18. Do you pay tax on the imported rice? Yes No .
If yes, how much per tonne on the following?
£ per tonne on paddy.
£ per tonne on rice.
£ per tonne on broken rice.
19. We do not import rice from any country directly but buy from
the local wholesalers, Yes No .
20. Which of the following applies to you in terms of rice
packaging?
a. we sell rice in original packages and brand as purchased
b. we re-pack the rice using smaller packages with our own
brand name .
c. we supply in both ways .
d. we reprocess them .
21. From the following, who are your major buyers?
a. wholesalers .
b. retailers .
c. final consumers .
d. others, please specify .
— i i i—
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22. From the following to whom do you mostly sell?
a. Asian dealers/grocers .
b. English dealers/grocers .
c. Chain stores .
d. All .
e. others, please specify .
23. We do not sell/supply any kind of rice because:
a. there is no demand for rice .
b. we do not have an access to supply .
c. lack of small packages available
d. quality problem .
e. storage problem .
f. others, please specify .
Note: After filling this questionnaire, please send it back the
following address:
Amanat A. Jalbani








Gross Domestic Product of Pakistan (at constant factor cost of
1959-60)
(Million Rs:)
Years GDP Growth rate GNP Growth rate Population. Per Capita income
Mln Rs: (in GDP) (in GNP) (in million) in Pak: Rupees.
1972-73 35773 + 1.6 35954 +7.1 65.309 550
1973-74 38439 7.5 38623 7.4 66.878 577
1974-75 39930 3.9 40188 4.1 68.924 583
1975-76 41229 3.3 41940 4.4 71.032 590
1976-77 42401 2.8 43696 4.2 73.205 596
1977-78 45679 7.7 48354 10.7 75.444 640
1978-79 48204 5.5 51270 6.0 77.751 659
1979-80 51736 7.3 54888 7.1 80.129 684
1980-81 55048 6.4 57863 5.4 82.580 700
1981-82 59012 7.2 61851 6.9 84.253 734
1982-83 62975 6.7 67069 00 87.758 764
1983-84 65968 4.8 69892 4.2 90.480 772
1984-85 72014 9.2 75586 8.2 93.286 810
1985-86 77023 7.0 80903 7.0 96.179 841
1986-87 81427 5.7 84733 7.4 99.162 854
1987-88 86166 5.8 88887 4.9 102.238 869
Sources: Annual Report, State Bank of Pakistan, 1987-88; Statistical Year Book,
Government of Pakistan, Bureau of statistics, 1987-88.
TABLE - 5.9
Structure of Pakistan Economy (Breakdown of GUP at constant factor cost of 1959-60).
(sectorial share of GNP in percentage)
PERCENTAGE of GNP. GNP
Years,
Primary Sector, Secondary Sector Tertiary Sector Income from Abroad
1949-50 53.44 0.77 45.79 100
1955-56 47.75 11.54 40.71 ...
1960-61 44,11 12.92 42.97 ...
1965-66 37.68 15.21 47.11 ...
1970-71 37.79 16.90 45.31 ...
1975-76 32.98 15.70 49.63 1.69
1980-81 28.84 18.83 47,47 4.86
1981-82 27,96 17.91 49.54 4.59
1982-83 26.77 17,23 49.90 6.10
1983-84 24,17 18,30 51.92 5.61
1984-85 25.13 18.29 51.86 4.72
1985-86 25.05 18.38 51.78 4.49
1986-87 24.46 18.87 52,18 4.49
1987-88 24.38 19.35 53.23 3.04
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan [1989-90, p.26-27] (Statistical
section), Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.
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Table - 5.10
Breakdown of GDP (at constant factor cost of 1959-60).
(in percentage)
Years Total Agriculture. Manufacturing Mining & Others.
GDP. quarrying.
1949-50 100 53 .50 7 .78 0 .21 38 .53
1955-56 - 47,,35 11,,53 0,,33 40.,79
1960-61 - 43 .60 12 .90 0 .45 43 .03
1965-66 - 37.,08 15,, 18 0,,53 47,, 19
1970-71 - 37,.23 16 .86 0 .47 45 .52
1975-76 - 33.,12 15,,97 0,,42 50.,46
1980-81 - 29,,80 17,.69 0,.51 51,,99
1985-86 - 25. 69 11. 90 0, 62 54. 37
1986-87 - 24,,83 19,,63 0,.62 54,,89
1987-88 _ 24. 51 19. 96 0. 63 54. 88
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan [1989-90, pp.26-27], Statistical section),
Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.
Table - 5.11
Production of Important Crops.
(000 tonnes).
Years. Wheat. Rice. Cotton. Sugar-cane.
1949-50 3,924 805 220 7,849
1954-55 3,186 838 281 8,836
1960-61 3,814 1,030 301 11,641
1965-66 3,916 1,317 414 22,309
1970-71 6,476 2,200 542 23,167
1975-76 8,691 2,619 514 25,547
1980-81 11,475 3,123 715 32,359
1985-86 13,913 2,919 1,208 27,856
1986-87 12,016 3,486 1,309 29,926
1987-88 12,675 3,241 1,468 33,029
1988-89 14,419 3,200 1,426 36,916
1989-90 15,000 3,222 1,455 36,188
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan [1989-90, p.46], (Statistical
section), Government of Pakistan Islamabad.
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TABLE - 5.17.
Value Added Share in Percentage of Major Agricultural Crops.
(at constant factor cost - base 1980-81)
Year. Wheat. Rice. Cotton. Sugar -cane. Others.
1980-81 20.52 17.16 32.33 17.54 12.45
1981-82 20.55 17.84 31.07 18.98 11.56
1982-83 21.79 17.00 32.15 16.24 12.82
1983-84 17.74 18.62 32.44 19.30 14.90
1984-85 20.08 15.61 29.24 15.68 19.39
1985-86 29.07 13.67 32.09 12.57 12.60
1986-87 30.48 15.36 29.07 13.06 12.03
1987-88 33.25 14.12 28.94 14.14 09.55
1988-89 30.50 13.32 30.60 14.96 10.62
1989-90 30.61 13.14 31.26 14.49 10.50
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan [1989-90, p.48], (statistical
section), Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.
Table - 5.18.
Economic Classification of Pakistan's Total Export by Major Export
Crops.
Years. Total Export Percentage of Total Export (in value).
Rs. Mln.
Rice. Raw Cotton.
1969-70 1,609 5.80 13.05
1970-71 1,998 8.60 13.51
1971-72 3,311 8.27 28.84
1972-73 8,551 13.28 13.64
1973-74 10,161 20.64 3.61
1974-75 10,286 22.39 15.01
1975-76 11,253 22.02 8.71
1980-81 29,280 19.13 17.76
1985-86 49,992 11.05 16.58
1986-87 63,355 8.11 12.11
1987-88 78,445 8.16 13.71
1988-89 90,183 6.61 19.99
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan [1988-89,pp.154-157] ,
(statistical section), Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.
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TABLE-7.3.
BREAKDOWN OF AREA UNDER DIFFERENT RICE VARIETIES.
(000) HACTARES).
AREA UNDEf BASMATI RICE. AREA UNDER IRRI RICE AREA UNDER OTHER RICE TOTAL
p a nnv /orri?r A U La i / Kri v/D
YEARS. Area under 1 of Total Area under 51 of Total Area under % of Total AREA.
Basiaati Rice Rice Area Irri Rice. Rice Area. other Rice. Rice Area,
1977-78 515.0 27 852 .2 45 531.9 28 1899.1
1978-79 677.9 34 1015.4 50 332.3 16 2025,6
1979-80 779 .0 38 946.1 47 291.4 15 2034.5
1980-81 823.7 43 841.1 43 268.3 14 1932.1
1981-82 844.0 43 872 .8 44 259 .2 13 1973.4
1982-83 836.3 42 915.7 46 226.1 12 1978.1
1983-84 825 .2 41 941.3 47 232 .0 12 1998.5
1984-85 779 .1 39 974.1 49 245.3 12 1998.6
1985-86 759 .0 41 902,3 48 201.9 11 1853.2
1986-87 803 .7 39 1055.5 51 206.4 10 2065.0
AVERAGE AREA IN X
(1977-78 TO 1886-87). 38.7 47.0 14.3 100
Source: 'Statistical Year Book', [1988], Government of Pakistan,
Bureau of Statistics, Islamabad.
TABLE 7-4.
BREAKDOWN OF RICE PRODUCTION BY VARIETIES IN PAKISTAN.
(000 tonnes),
BASMATI RICE PRODUCTION. IRRI RICE PRODUCTION. OTHER RICE. TOTAL
PRODUCT.
YEARS. BASMATI RICE. 5! OP TOTAL
RICE PROD;
IRRI RICE. % OF TOTAL
RICE PROD;
OTHER RICE, % OP TOTAL
RICE PROD;
1975-76 642.3 25 1290.1 49 685.1 26 2617.5
1976-77 659 .8 24 1315.7 48 761.9 28 2737.4
1977-78 560.1 19 1671.2 57 718.3 24 2949.6
1978-79 877,7 27 1948.8 60 445 .5 13 3272.0
1979-80 886.6 28 1958,0 61 371.2 11 3215.8
1980-81 980.0 31 1796.6 58 346 .6 11 3123.2
1981-82 1054,9 31 2020.8 59 354.0 10 3429.7
1982-83 1010.4 29 2123,6 62 310.7 09 3444.7
1983-84 965 .2 29 2069.9 62 304,4 09 3339.5
1984-85 958.3 29 2038.7 62 318.2 09 3315.2
1985-86 883,1 30 1786,6 61 251.2 09 2918.9
1986-87 916.9 26 2309,9 66 259.5 08 3486.3
1987-88 943,2 29 2069.8 64 227.9 07 3240.9
Source: Agricultural Statistics of Pakistan, [1988-89], Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Pood
and Agriculture and Co-operatives, Islamabad.
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TABLE - 7.9
AVERAGE PER HACTARE YIELD OF RICE FOR DIFFERENT VARIETIES IN
PAKISTAN.
(in Kgs).
YEARS. BASMATI. IRRI. OTHERS. TOTAL AVERAGE.
1977-78 1088 1961 1350 1466
1978-79 1295 1919 1341 1581
1979-80 1138 2031 1274 1481
1980-81 1317 2270 1243 1610
1981-82 1629 2338 1288 1751
1982-83 1636 2342 1309 1762
1983-84 1639 2317 1294 1750
1984-85 1653 2273 1291 1739
1985-86 1639 2219 1305 1721
1986-87 1734 2345 1206 1761
Source: Statistical Year Book, [1988], Government of Pakistan,
Bureau of Statistics, Islamabad.
TABLE - 9.6
RELATIVE SHARES OF DIFFERENT MARKETING CHANNELS IN TOTAL EXPORTS OF OTHER RICE
VARIETIES.
MARKETING CHANNELS 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 AVERAGE.
Through Tenders. 35.27 42.00 29.70 34.38 37.80
Negotiations with
private parties. 16.67 23.62 19.95 9.59 17.40
Government to Government
through Negotiations. 47.37 34.03 39.50 55.80 44.17
Total. 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: UCG, [1989, p.254], 'Kice Export Operation Study', vol. 1.
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TABLE - 9.11
TREND ANALYSIS OF AVERAGE UNIT PRICES RECEIVED FOR BASMATI AND OTHER* VARIETIES.
YEARS BASMATI. OTHER VARIETIES.
US$/TONNE. TREND. US$/TONNE. TREND.
1975-76 524 100 187 100
1976-77 345 66 180 96
1977-78 451 86 232 124
1978-79 743 142 247 132
1979-80 715 136 255 136
1980-81 713 136 326 174
1981-82 721 138 298 159
1982-83 639 122 212 113
1983-84 604 115 210 112
1984-85 628 120 207 110
1985-86 672 128 160 85
1986-87 720 137 154 82
1987-88 726 139 207 110
Source: UCG [1989, p.73] 'Rice Export Operation Study' Vol-1,
table-3.12.
Irri and negligible share of other rice varieties.
TABLE - 9.12.
Output, Procureaent, Export and Consuaption of Basaati rice in Pakistan (1972-1987).
(000 at)
Percentage to output.
Year Output. Procureaent. Eiport. consuaption. Procureaent. Export. Consuaption.
1971-72 384,0 35,9 177 184.0 9.3 46,0 48.0
1972-73 400,0 133.3 109 267.0 33.3 27.25 66.7
1973-74 486 .0 215.6 131 25,8 44.3 26.9 67,0
1974-75 602,0 287.0 181 384.9 47,6 30.0 63.9
1975-76 642 .3 318.6 306 297.8 49.6 47,6 46,3
1976-77 659,8 201.4 510 110.2 30,5 77.2 16.7
1977-78 560.1 193.3 272 254,5 34,5 48.5 45,4
1978-79 877.7 390.8 179 646.0 44.5 20.4 73.6
1979-80 886.6 382.4 315 518,4 43.1 35,5 58.4
1980-81 980.0 320 .1 410 511.2 32.6 41.8 52.16
1981-82 1054.9 388.2 262 729.6 36.7 24.8 69.16
1982-83 1010.4 337.5 238 711.8 33.4 33.5 70.44
1983-84 965.2 264.6 406 501.3 27,4 42.0 51,93
1984-85 958 .3 284.4 174 726.8 29.6 18.1 75.84
1985-86 883,1 226.5 261 569,1 25.6 29.5 64,44
1986-87 1020,8 201.7 188 771.6 19,75 19.4 75.58
Source: Hamid, et, al., [1990] 'Trade, Exchange Rate, and Agricultural Pricing Policies in
Pakistan', table-4.2.2, The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
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TABLE - 9.13.
AVERAGE EXPORT PRICE OF BASMATI RICE EXPORT FROM PAKISTAN FOR
DIFFERENT REGIONS. (US $ PER TONNE.)
REGION. 1975-76 1978-79 1981-82 1983-84
MIDDLE EAST. 527 793 794 604
ASIA. 419 800 722 597
AUSTRALIA. 480 800 740 539
N. & S. AMERICA 456 825 701 543
EUROPE. 506 782 689 576
AFRICA. 452 800 716 606
Source: Adopted from: U.C.G [1989, vol-II, p.331] Annexture B-l.
TABLE-9.14.
RICE* EXPORT BY VALUE (MLN: RS.) IN PAKISTAN.
YEAR. BASMATI IRRI TOTAL. BASMATI AS % OF
TOTAL RICE EXPORT.
1982-83 1884.0 1798.0 3682.0 51.2
1983-84 3287.0 2401.0 5688.0 57.8
1984-85 1648.3 1691.4 3339.7 49.4
1985-86 2801.7 2725.5 5527.2 50.1
1986-87 2285.8 2766.8 5052.6 45.2
1987-88 2828.3 3576.1 6404.4 44.2
1988-89 3015.9 3950.7 5966.6 50.5
Source: Agricultural Statistics of Pakistan 1988-89.
It inludes all rice varieties i.e., Basmatii, Irri and other.
TABLE-9.15.
RICE* EXPORT AS % OF TOTAL EXPORTS IN PAKISTAN BY VALUE IN RS.













Source: Pakistan Statistical Year Book [1988-89, pp.570-71], Federal Bureau of
Statistics, Statistical Division, Government of Pakistan.
*
It inludes all rice varieties i.e., Basmatii, Irri and other.
TABLE - 10.2.
PADDY PRODUCTION IN PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES.
Regions and
Countries,
Thousand tons (paddy). Annual Growth Rate in X.
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1984-85 1981-85
ASIA: 374663 384693 417499 431614 421336 -2.4 3,0
Bangladesh 20435 21314 21752 21933 21900 -0.2 1,7
Bursa 14146 14373 14288 14590 15387 5.5 2.1
China' 144285 161600 169181 178577 168317 -5.7 3.9
India 79883 70772 89579 87856 87106 -0.9 2.2
Indonesia 32770 33584 35303 37978 38660 1.8 4.2
Japan 12824 12838 12958 14850 14580 -1.8 3.3
Thailand 17774 16879 18730 18700 19000 1.6 1,7
Vietnam 12522 14169 14732 15458 15500 0.3 5.5
Others 40024 3733 1 40976 41672 40886 -1.9 -0.5
AFRICA: 8605 8965 8985 9118 9765 7.1 3.2
Egypt 2236 2441 2440 2442 2450 0.3 2,3
Madagascar 2012 1967 2147 2131 2215 3.9 2.4
Nigeria 1125 1250 1280 1300 1430 10.0 6.2
Others 3232 3307 3118 3245 3670 13.1 3.4
CENTRAL A NORTH- 10800 9240 6900 8600 8732 1.5 -4.8
AKERICA:
Mexico 649 511 416 488 740 51.6 3.3
USA 8289 6968 4523 6296 6169 -2.0 -7.1
Others 1862 1761 1961 1816 1823 0,4 -0.5
SOUTH AMERICA: 13266 15320 14482 14561 14118 -3.0 1.6
Brazil 8228 9735 7742 8990 8750 -2.7 1,5
Columbia 1788 2018 1780 1796 1798 0.1 0.1
Others 3250 3567 2960 3775 3570 -5,4 2.5
EUROPE: 1708 1911 1731 1954 2110 8.0 5.4
EEC 934 1118 1441 1139 1247 9.5 7.5
Others 1534 1706 1544 1735 1862 7.3 5.3
OCEANIA: 747 885 559 704 894 27.0 4.6
Australia 728 854 528 675 865 28.1 4.4
Others 19 31 31 29 29 0.0 11.2
USSR 2400 2500 2600 2600 2550 -1.9 1.5
World 412189 423514 450756 469151 459505 -2.1
All Developed 25952 25074 22343 26378 26277 -0.4 0.3
All Developing 386237 398440 428413 442773 433228 -2,2 2.9
Exports 220416 236008 242953 256539 246899 -3.8 2.9
Imports. 191772 187506 207803 212613 212606 0,0 2.6





AVERAGE WORLD RICE PRODUCTION AND WORLD RICE TRADE, SELECTED
PERIOD.
PERIOD. PRODUCTION. TOTAL EXPORTS. % OF PRODUCTION EXTORTED.
(million metric tonnes)
1936-40 109.3 5.7 5.2
1950-54 122.0 4.7 3.9
1955-59 147.0 6.1 4.1
1960-64 163.5 6.8 4.2
1965-69 184.2 6.7 3.7
1970-74 208.6 7.3 3.5
1975-79 247.8 10.3 4.2
1983-85a 298.9 11.6 3.9
1986-88b 308.2 11.4 3.7
Source: Nick Amin, [1987, p.33]], 'Characteristics of International
Rice Market', table-3.
aThese figures are calculated on the basis of table 9.13, then the
paddy figures have been converted into rice by multiplying with .65
as FAO standard rate (1 unit of paddy =• .65 unit of rice).
^hese figures are taken from the, 'World Rice Situation and
Outlook 1988-89', CCP:RI 89/ CRS 1,FA0, Rome, Italy. February. The
paddy is converted into rice as in note a.
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TABLE - 10.6.
RICE TRADE OF RICE-INPORTING COUNTRIES AND THEIR SHARE OF THE WORLD MARKET.
Region/Country. Aserage Annual Iiports (1000 at) World Iaport in percent.
1961-63 1969-71 1976-78 1978-80 1983-85 1961-63 1969-71 1976-78 1978-80 1983-85
Monsoon Asia: 3304 4501 3720 3301 2307 60.3 64.2 42.2 33,1 21.1
Bangladesh, 479 638 234 279 323 8.7 9.1 2.7 2.8 3.0
Hong long and Singapore, 555 518 522 514 533 10.1 7.4 5.9 5.2 4.9
India, 418 347 25 -347 124 7.6 4.9 0.3 -3,5 1,1
Indonesia, 1044 692 1707 1928 392 19.0 9,9 19,3 19,3 3.6
Korea Republic 15 591 46 366 27 0,3 8.4 0.5 3.7 0.2
Laos Peoples Republic 108 50 105 72 49 2.0 0.7 1.2 0,7 0.4
North Vietnan, -4 490 402 170 98 - 0,1 7,0 4,6 1.7 0.9
South Vietnai, -172 355 n-a n-a n-a - 3.1 5.1 n-a n-a n-a
Sri Lanka,Halaysia A Philip; 861 820 679 319 761 15.7 11.7 7,7 3.2 7.0
Middle East, 311 440 1394 1747 2308 5.7 6.3 15.8 17,5 21.1
Sub-Sahara-n- Africa, 443 610 1459 1823 2643 8.1 8.7 16.5 18.3 24.2
Western European inporters, 676 565 373 688 925 8.7 8.1 8.8 6.9 8,5
0SSR and Eastern Europe 383 558 644 836 433 7.0 8.0 7.3 8.4 4.0
Western Hanpshire, 297 394 406 531 512 5.4 5,6 4,6 5.3 4,7
World Gross Itport, 6120 7305 9268 10894 11447 100.0 00.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: Nick Amin, [1987, p.37], 'Characteristics of International
Rice Market', table-7.
Note: -Bangladesh was East Pakistan prior to 1971.
-Figures for North Vietnam include trade with the People's
Republic of China,
-North Vietnamese figures for 1976-85 are for the Socialist
Republic of (North and South) Vietnam,
-The Middle East includes Jordan Kuwait, Lebanon, Syria,
Yemen (North and South), UAE, Israel, Iraq, Iran, S.Arab,
Algeria, Libya, and Morocco.
-Sub-Sahara Africa includes Chad, Mali, Upper Volta, Nigeria,
Somalia, Tanzania, Angola, Zaire, Madagascar, Mozombique,
Mauritius, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast,
Liberia, Senegal,Sierra Leone, and South Africa.
-Western Europe includes Belgium-Luxamburg, France, F.R.of
Germany, The Netherlands, Austria, Greece, Norway, Portugal,
Sweden, Switzerland, U.K, Denmark, Turkey, and Cyprus.
-Eastern Europe includes, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia,
-The Western Hampshire includes Cuba, The Dominican Republic,
Haiti, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Canada, El-Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Chile, and Peru.
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TABLE - 10.7.
STRUCTURAL SHIFTS IN RICE TRADE.
COUNTRY/REGION 1979-81. 1985-87.
Quantity Quantity
'000'Tonnes Average X '000* tonnes Average %
IMPORTS.
WORLD. 11874 100 11715 100
Developing Countries, 9706 82 9623 82
Far East & Asian CPE. 4428 38 2668 23
Near East, 1786 15 2591 22
Africa, 2269 19 2804 24
Latin America, 1082 9 1356 12
Other Developing Countries, 141 1 191 1
Developed Countries, 2168 18 2087 18
EXPORTS.
WORLD. 11907 100 11653 100
Burma 64 7 5 530 5
China 1164 10 1154 10
EEC (10)1 356 3 485 4
Pakistan 1154 10 1138 10
Thailand 2860 24 4247 36
United States. 2749 23 2246 19
Others. 2977 25 1853 16
Source: UCG, [1989, p.63], table-3.7
Note: ^Excludes intra-EEC (10) trade. Official data on EEC (12) is
not available for Years prior to 1986.
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TABLE - 10.8.
RICE AREA , YIELD AND PRODUCTION: WORLD AND SELECTED COUNTRIES &
REGIONS.
COUNTRY/REGION. Area. Yield. PRODUCTION (milled.
(Million Hectare) (rat per Hectare) (rain metric tons)
1986-87 1987-88 1986-87 1987-88 1986-87 1987-88
WORLD. 145.1 142.2 3.22 3.17 318.3 307.5
United States 1.0 0.9 6.33 6.14 4.2 4.1
Burma 4.7 4.5 2.68 2.72 7.8 7.6
Pakistan 2.1 1.9 2.53 2.53 3.5 3.2
Thailand 9.7 9.2 1.95 1.74 12.5 10.6
Indonesia 9.9 9.8 3.94 3.97 26.5 26.3
Nigeria 0.7 0.6 1.43 1.31 0.6 0.6
Rep. of Korea 1.2 1.3 6.37 6.02 5.6 5.5
Australia 0.1 0.1 5.72 7.50 0.4 0.6
Bangladesh 10.6 10.4 2.18 2.21 15.4 15.3
Brazil 6.0 6.0 1.74 1.83 7.1 7.5
China 32.3 32.1 5.34 5.42 120.6 121.8
India 40.8 39.7 2.22 2.00 60.4 53.0
Japan. 2.3 2.1 6.32 6.19 10.6 9.7
Philippines 3.4 3.3 2.64 2.58 5.8 5.5
Vietnam 5.7 5.6 2.84 2.74 10.4 9.9
Source: UCG, [1989, p.60] , table 3. 5.
TABLE-10,9
PER HECTARE YIELD OF RICE IN MAIN RICE PRODUCING COUNTRIES.
(in kgs).
Countries. 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-8?
India. 2195 2126 2212 1827 1999
Bangladesh 2047 2048 2238 2130 2377
Thailand 1972 1979 2010 1983 1961
Burma 3085 3098 3214 3259 2957
Philippines 2470 2486 2694 2632 2644
Japan 5701 6414 6322 6222 6186
Pakistan. 2507 2488 2351 2532 2477
U.S.A 5153 5520 6097 6218 6143
Egypt. 5768 5310 5950 5952 5714
Source: Pakistan Agriculture Statistics,, [1988-89,, P.75].
TABLE - 10.10.
Levy on import from third countries in EEC.
ECU/1000 KG.
Description 76-77 77-78 78-78 79-80 80-81 81-82 82-83
ROUND GRAIN, 52.65 108.70 74.24 24.52 24.52 106.71 170.27
PADDY.
LONG GRAIN, 110.60 83.98 139.67 102.57 102.57 24.71 110.91
HUSKED RICE ROUND GRAIN, 116.78 65.81 135.88 92.81 92.81 30.65 133.38
LONG GRAIN, 138.25 104.98 174.58 128.21 128.21 30.894 138.64
SEMI-MILLED ROUND GRAIN, 159.17 131.40 185.06 186.33 186.33 56.272 181.83
RICE.
LONG GRAIN, 237.63 206.77 313.47 266.28 266.28 158.18 292.95
MILLED ROUND GRAIN, 169.56 139.94 197.09 198.44 198.44 59.929 193.65
RICE.
LONG GRAIN, 255.29 221.66 336.04 285.46 285.46 169.57 313.29
Source; Commission of EC, 'Agricultural Markets' 1984, Luxembourg.
Table - 10.11.
EC IMPORT LEVIES ON RICE AS PERCENT OF IMPORT PRICE (CIF) & EXPORT
REFUNDS AS PERCENT OF CONSUMER PRICE.
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
IMPORT LEVIES 29.2 23.1 43.1 58.3 73.1
EXPORT REFUNDS 9.6 6,8 11.1 13.0 n.a
Source: USDA 1988,Estimates of Producer & Consumer Subsidy Equivalents, Government
Intervention in Agriculture, 1982-86.
n.a, indicates not available.
Table - 10.12
POSITION OF RICE IN EC.
('000' tons milled rice equivalent.)
1983-84 1984-85 1986-87
PRODUCTION 945 1056 1230
CHANGE IN STOCK -45 -11 -35
IMPORTS 681 878 780
EXPORTS 359 505 562
INTERNAL CONSUMPTION 1214 1247 1266
SELF SUFFICIENCY RATIO 66.5 73.5 83.0
Source; USDA, 1988, Estimates of Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents,
Government intervention in agriculture, 1982-87.
*
This is the ratio of rice in % of total consumption, which shows that other than
given ratio, the remaining % is imported. For example, the total consumption is 100,
out of which 66.5% is locally produced and the remaining is imported. It means that
the self-sufficiency ratio is 66.5%.
353
TABLE - 10.13
TRENDS IN FOOD AID IN RICE BY DONOR AND RECIPIENT.
(000 tons milled rice)
DESCRIPTION. 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
FOOD AID SHIPMENT.
JAPAN, 200 517 284 10 - 17 75 564 654 795 318
^TRIANGULAR. 82 7 23 33 72 40 70 38 33 37 76
United States, 1242 716 723 694 892 508 534 517 442 351 377
+TRIANGULAR 52 36 - 1 - - - - 30 14 -
OTHERS, 19 9 18 7 36 62 Ill 397 257 132 168
+TRIANGULAR, 260 18 17 22 - 23 31 72 137 20 131
TOTAL. 855 1303 1065 677 1000 650 821 1588 1553 1339 1088
WORLD POOD RECEIVED.
AFRICA. 08 08 13 43 80 105 160 140 340 306 580
ASIA, 1845 1294 1052 624 777 639 605 1232 1031 1141 424
LATIN AMERICA. - - - 10 - 13 6 86 79 90 81
OTHERS. - 1 - - 55 56 - 1 2 9 23
TOTAL. 1854 1303 1065 677 912 813 771 1459 1454 1546 1108
SHARE OF FOOD AID IN IMPORT.
AFRICA. 1 1 1 6 8 6 8 6 14 11 18
ASIA. 31 21 19 13 14 11 12 19 16 17 09
LATIN AMERICA. - - - 2 - 3 2 7 7 11 12
WORLD. 23 16 14 09 11 9 9 13 12 12 10
Source: FAO, [1985] Rice: Selected Aspects of Production, Trade,
and Price Policies, Economic and Social Development; paper-54.
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TABLE - 11.1
PROFIT FROM BASMATI RICE AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL NATIONAL
BUDGET AND REVENUES OF PAKISTAN.
YEARS PAKISTAN'S PAKISTAN'S BASKATI RICE EXPORT PROFIT, IRRI RICE EXPORT PROFIT/LOSS,
ANNUAL BUDGET. TOTAE
(Rs, Killion) REVENUES. PROFIT PERCENTAGE PERCENTAGE PROFIT/LOSS PERCENTAGE PERCENTAGE
Rs, Million OF BUDGET. OF REVENGES. RS, MILLION. OF
1977-78 40,898 26,482 258 0.63 0.97 144 0,35 0.54
1978-79 48,994 30,704 681 0.13 2.21 392 0,80 1.27
1979-80 54,629 38,502 1000 1,83 2.59 289 0.52 0.75
1980-81 63,639 47,002 1171 1.84 2.49 707 1,11 1.50
1981-82 71,013 51,930 744 1.04 1.43 510 0.71 0.98
1982-83 87,121 59,181 735 0,84 1,24 - 68 - 0.07 - 0,11
1983-84 100,002 72,290 1078 1.07 1.49 - 502 - 0.50 - 0.69
1984-85 116,819 77,403 558 0,47 0.72 - 152 - 0,13 - 0.19
1985-86 134,479 89,523 1250 0,92 1,39 - 907 - 0.67 - 1.01
1986-87 153,654 103,374 1080 0.70 1.04 - 991 - 0.64 - 0.95
ANNUAL AVERAGE (for 10 5fears) 855.5 0.94 1.55 -57,8
Sources: Government of Pakistan, 'Economic Survey' [1986-87]
Richard Schermerhorn [1990], 'Rice Export Marketing Study'.
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